

The book cover features a light cream-colored background with a prominent diagonal red stripe running from the bottom left towards the top right. The title is printed in a bold, black, sans-serif font, with the words 'CZARISM' and 'REVOLUTION' in all caps and 'and' in lowercase. The text is positioned such that it spans across the red stripe.

CZARISM and REVOLUTION

From the Past to the Future of Russia

BY ARSENE de GOULÉVITCH

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By A. Goulevitch

Translated from the French

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OMNI PUBLICATIONS

Hawthorne, California

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 61-11562

Printed in the United States of America

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

At the present time, when Bolshevism has ceased to be the immediate concern of Russia alone and the fatal misreading of the real nature and implications of Soviet communism has brought the whole world to the brink of disaster, dividing it into two distinct and ideologically opposed hemispheres, a study of the past history of Russia, based on precise facts and figures, should commend itself to the interest of the public.

On the whole Russian history is not well known abroad. A vague form of semi-Asiatic despotism, which from time to time intruded itself upon the West, especially in moments of crisis, or constituted a source of permanent annoyance in less turbulent times, is the picture of Russia that most people abroad have in their minds.

The primary object of Mr. Goulévitch's book is to destroy and allay the gross misconceptions and prejudices regarding the Russian monarchy, which are as deep-seated as they are profoundly incorrect.

The author vindicates Czarism, analyzes it and presents it to us in its proper perspective. The opinion has been expressed that this book somewhat resembles a speech by defending counsel. This, in a measure, is true, but it is difficult to see how otherwise it could attain its goal.

Here are some of the universally accepted and mistaken ideas about Russia under the Czars which the author sets out to rectify.

Russia was immensely wealthy in arable land; there was no excuse for any land shortage among the peasants, except the greed of large estate owners. The peasantry was browbeaten, destitute and underfed. The monarchy was an instrument of despotism and ruled the country by means of a corrupt and incompetent administration. The upper classes were effete, de-

generate and retrograde. Education and any form of progress was opposed, as a matter of principle, by the government. Industry and trade were permitted to lag a score of decades behind the West and were given no encouragement. A venal police rode roughshod over the lives of the population and the individual. Liberty was a thing unknown to the average Russian. Siberia was a vast concentration camp of convicts and wretched political deportees. The external policy of Russia was expressed by imperialism in its crudest form. This policy was pursued by the maintenance of an unnecessarily large army and by the domination of unfortunate minorities, always oppressed and generally exploited.

Mr. Goulévitch's book gives us an objective study, in proper historical perspective, of various aspects of Russian life in the past. These he examines one by one: geographical and racial; the real meaning of Czarism to Russia and the principles on which the body politic was founded: education; agriculture; self-government; mining and metals; finance; trade; commerce and transport. Each chapter consists of two parts, one topical and of general interest, the other factual, supported by statistical data.

We are shown the way in which the monarchy, democratic in origin and Russian in essence, shared in every manifestation of the nation's life; how it was identified with the political, economic and spiritual development of the nation and how it pointed the way to progress and enlightenment.

The concluding chapters contain a brief summary of the part played by Russia in international politics, her contribution to the First World War and a condensed history of the revolutionary movement in Russia. Special stress is laid on the socially disruptive and international character of all left wing forms of Russian political thought and activity. A few brief notes on the sequence of events, which actually brought about the downfall of the monarchy, are also given.

A great amount of propaganda is now directed at the Russian people in the hope of bringing to their knowledge true

facts about the Western way of life and demonstrating the iniquities of the monstrous tyranny under which they are compelled to live. Efforts of this kind are doomed to failure unless they are of a nature which appeals to the population and can touch the innermost chords of the national character. Success must obviously be based on an unprejudiced and fair appreciation of Russia's historical background. Mr. Goulévitch offers his book as a contribution to this end.

PREFACE

Since 1789 there has been a popular tendency to interpret any revolution as a direct consequence of the "ancien régime." This term, moreover, is often no longer used to refer to a preceding political order, but rather to describe an order which, of itself, is obsolete and undesirable. The object in putting forward this interpretation is to establish a connection of cause and effect between the former order and a revolution.

The explanation thus provided for the crimes and destructions brought about by any political or social upheaval remains inevitably the same: the wider the extent of the upheaval, the further advanced the decadence of the "ancien régime."

A conception of this nature easily answers the demands of a theory of simple causation in the march of events: "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc," the preceding predetermining the subsequent, and maintains the principles of "logic" to the satisfaction of everyone concerned. To understand this theory no critical effort of mind, for which the masses have a deep aversion, is required. Further, this conception, so easily assimilated by the masses, provides those by whom it is advanced with an undoubted advantage in allowing them to justify and sanctify any revolution as a begetter of future wellbeing. The conditions under which it takes place, or the country of its occurrence, are of little importance. In this way the ground is prepared for the capture of new "Bastilles" and new emancipations.

These theories on revolutions and their origin, these oversimplified generalizations, nowadays confront civilization itself with a danger graver than ever before. This is amply proved by the events which took place in Russia in 1917 and which are now forcefully brought to the attention of the whole world.

This danger is further emphasized by the subsequent course of these events which, from the outset of the Russian catas-

trophe, spread outside the framework of a national and Russian setting.

The interpretation given abroad would appear to sustain the theory mentioned above. Far from contradicting it, it seems, on the contrary, to confirm it. The reason for this apparent paradox lies in the all but unanimously unfavourable opinion of Czarism held by Western Europe. Indeed, has not Czarism been for ages synonymous with tyranny, unenlightenment, cruelty and stupidity?

The reason for this view is not difficult to find. At present, suffice it to keep in mind that the Soviets and their friends are fostering and spreading it by using the most modern methods of "scientific propaganda." It has, in the past, rendered them invaluable service, the consequences of which are not generally appreciated.

The contention that most of the trials that have faced humanity are due to simple errors of judgement has never been better vindicated than by the generally accepted opinion on the character, role and nature of Czarism.

Further, it seems likely that a way out of the impasse in which the world lies today, could more readily be found, if this mistaken view of the Russian "ancien régime" were amended.

The difficulty, of course, lies in altering it not among the few, who do not share it, but among the broad masses of the West.

The importance and the magnitude of our subject are thus obvious and it is plain, why it transcends individual effort.

If the following pages could but give rise to a new current of public opinion, if they would lead to further research, the purpose of this book would largely be achieved.

Is there any real justification for this rooted hostility to Czarism? Objective facts, statistical data and documents of unimpeachable authenticity point to an emphatic denial. The source is either calumny, or ignorance. The main object of this

book consists in setting things in their proper focus; in telling the truth about Russia under the Czars, thus enabling the reader to judge whether, or not, Czarism stands condemned. An effort is made to contradict some of the preconceived ideas on the State and the people, so often mistakenly characterised as passive, indolent and docile.

I took no part in the public life of former Russia. I do not belong, nor have I belonged, to any party, neither is it my intention to support this, or that political group, or *côterie*. I do not wish to proselytize in favour of any particular party. My only aim is to draw a soberly impartial picture of Russia's past.

Foreigners of all times have described faraway Russia, where there was so much to astound them, as a land of mystery, a kind of "Sphynx." It is only fair to add that a fair dose of "metaphysics" has been contributed by our own authors to what has been published abroad about Russia. Those of my readers, who will accompany me along the path which I intend to follow, unrewarding as it may appear, will find less difficult than generally supposed, to decipher the past, read the present or even to forecast the future of the "Sphynx," provided one is acquainted with the essential facts of Russian history and psychology.

When I commenced writing this book there were many who tried to dissuade me and numerous objections were raised. I was told that to attack Bolshevism and to reveal some of its hideous aspects was an excellent thing. On the other hand, it was pointed out, that if no criticism of Czarism were offered in a comprehensive work on Russia, it would merely challenge public opinion, certain convictions being too firmly rooted in people's minds.

I took a different point of view. In my opinion the practical struggle against Bolshevism is intimately linked with Czarism.

Up to the present day only two voices have been heard abroad, which proclaim the truth about former Russia against the slander of some and the silence of others.

Paradoxical, as it may seem, it was in England that these

voices were raised; a country, where, scarcely eighty years ago, an anonymous publication, entitled "The Hideous Empire," i.e. Russia, was extensively circulated. The title leaves small doubt as to its trend. Needless to say it was followed by other efforts of a similar nature.

Sir Winston Churchill and the late Professor Charles Sarolea, the statesman in his memoirs and the scholar in his studies, both make a definite stand in the defense of historic Russia. Others, I hope, will follow and, in spite of a conspiracy of falsehood, truth at last will prevail.

What was the meaning of Czarism to Russia, the spirit by which it was moved? What did it do for Moscovy, small, feeble and inhabited by nomads, under the Tartar yoke? What were the lines along which the Empire of the Czars eventually developed and what were the branches, taken individually, of Russian national activity? What was the international role of the Empire and what were the results of its downfall? What caused it to fall and why were the consequences of this collapse so immense and without precedent in history? What was the true nature of the Russian revolution and what are the lessons it can teach us?

Such then, are the questions which I have set out to answer in a spirit of impartiality.

The name of "Russia" has now been deleted from the map of the world and her enslaved people are being sacrificed in millions. (1) Historic Russia, with a population verging on 200,000,000, her culture, her genius, her brilliant past are in mortal danger of being obliterated to the greater glory of world revolution.

Economic problems are of great importance today and I have treated them with the consideration they deserve. Statistics are often worth more than abstract expositions and, in dealing with these problems, I have drawn up tables which may be of use to the reader. At the end of each chapter conclusions, based on these tables, are suggested for those who are not in-

terested in figures; while, on the other hand, the tables will furnish the more literally minded with the information they may desire.

For further study references and documents are quoted at the end of the chapters.

I have not touched on Russian culture, as an aspect of national life. It is well known and appreciated abroad. Russia's contribution to science, literature and art is uncontested. Lomonosov, Lobachevsky, Mendeleev, Sechnev, Pavlov, Temeriasev, Mechnikov, Soloviev, Chicherin, Kliuchevsky, Kondakov, Vinogradov, Berdiaev, etc., these names are universally known and respected.

There is no need to mention Russian sculptors and composers, or to extol the superb qualities of the Russian theatre, opera and ballet. Even the enemies of Russia have withheld criticism to suit their ends. (2)

An effort has sometimes been made to differentiate between the cultural level of the nation and the state, in the pretense that the latter did not truly interpret the national genius. It is, however, improbable that a people, allegedly misgoverned for generations, could have created and developed a brilliant culture. In examining the past of Russia there is another factor we must bear in mind: without the creative genius of the Czars she could never have freely developed either her culture, or her civilization.

In Europe, in the 18th century, the prestige of Russia was very high. Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, these names prove what the West thought of these masters of Russia. Their apologists were numerous and eloquent: Voltaire, d'Alembert, Grimm and many others. Why then, did the prestige of Russia progressively decline in the following century? I think this is not a difficult question to answer: the history of most nations is written by their friends, that of Russia, abroad, mainly by her enemies and detractors.

In the 19th century hostile nations surrounded Russia. Out-

side her frontiers she had earned the hatred of the Scandinavians, whom she had steadily pushed back in the course of long wars; the Prussians were spreading tales of a non-existent Slav peril, so as to conceal a very real Prussian-German one; Britain, haunted by the alleged threat of Russia to India, was one of her most implacable and active enemies.

At home she was faced by the Polish and Jewish problems, which I shall examine later. Both these problems were largely European, not solely confined to Russia, and Czarism, at the time, could not solve them to the satisfaction of all concerned. Some of the greatest falsehoods about Russia were spread by influential Polish emigrés and I need not remind my readers of the amazing ability of the Jews for propaganda.

The malevolent and skilful activity of Russian political exiles abroad should also be taken into account. In the second half of the 19th century small, but extremely active groups of Russian revolutionaries, collectively known as Nihilists, attached themselves to sundry political centres of the West; they concentrated on vilifying the Czarist régime by all the means at their disposal. Their aim was first to discredit, then to undermine and finally to overthrow the monarchy. Most of these Nihilists were intellectuals and belonged to the famous "Intelligentsia". As such, they were afforded a ready hearing and the desired conclusion that Czarism was reactionary, unenlightened and cruel was easily drawn.

Curiously enough, the Nihilists, by design or fortuitously, were given asylum and encouragement by conservative countries. Their tales about Russia were accepted at their face value, though the overthrow of the Russian government was but a stepping stone in their program of ultimate world revolution. Their primary task was to earn the goodwill of their protectors against whom they intended to turn at a later date, when the downfall of Russia had been achieved. Today, their successors are no longer proscribed political refugees, but the willing, or paid, agents of Moscow, still assiduously pursuing the ultimate goal of world revolution. The political road of the

past eighty years has been long and tortuous; indeed, it is only now that the eyes of the West are at last being opened.

Our own authors contributed not a little to the false picture of Russia so many people believe to be the true one. One cannot blame the foreigner for taking the stories written by Russians about Russia at their face value, or for failing to see that they were meant as a bitter satire and often depicted the ugly side of life as it had been in the distant past. For more than any other people, we take a malign delight in hearing ourselves and our forbears ridiculed, or criticized—a trait underlined by Dostoyevsky and so many of our writers.

History has sometimes been defined as a permanent conspiracy against the truth: the findings of a commission of enquiry into distortions in the accepted history of France do little to contradict this definition. (a)

It is my fervent hope that the following chapters will shed new light on Russian life and institutions, as they were before the great catastrophe of 1917 and help my readers to approach the evaluation of Russia's past with an open and unbiased mind.

(a) G. Champenois. "Le Sabotage Officiel de l'Histoire de la France." Paris. Bossard, 1930

Special Note: The letters in brackets refer to the works mentioned at the bottom of the pages, and the numbers to the notes which follow each chapter.

NOTES

(1) *The toll of human life under Soviet dictatorship.*

Civil War, 1917	4,500,000
Famine, 1921-1923	6,000,000
Red Terror, 1917-1923	
Professional classes: scientists, authors, scholars, artists, university students, et al.	160,000
Civil and Public Servants, Civilians, Officers, other ranks	740,000
Policemen	50,000
Priests and members of religious bodies	40,000
Peasants and Workmen	1,300,000
Massacred by the Che-Ka and G.P.U., 1923-1930	2,050,000
Famine, 1930-1933	7,000,000
Executed during the collectivization	750,000
Executed by the G.P.U. and N.K.V.D., 1933-1937	1,600,000
Massacred during the period of "Intensification of the Red Terror," 1937-1938.	
Intellectuals, peasants and workmen	635,000
Members of the Communist party	340,000
Political Cadres and Higher Command of the Red Army	30,000
Executed by the N.K.V.D., 1938-1947	
Sundry classes of the population	2,720,000
Priests and members of religious bodies	5,000
Officers and soldiers	23,000
Perished in Concentration camps and prisons, 1917-1947	21,000,000
Total	48,943,000

The original heading proposed for Note 1 was "Total killed, massacred and destroyed." The above figures, however, do not include losses sustained in wars: against Finland, 1918; the Baltic States, 1918-1919; Poland, 1920; Georgia, 1921-1922; China, 1925-1931; Spain, 1936-1939; Finland, 1939; Poland, 1939; Second World War, 1941-1945. To these losses, totalling many millions, we should add reprisals against individuals, villages, and whole peoples, like the Kalmuks, the Tartars and thousands of inhabitants of the Baltic States, removed and deported wholesale to other parts of the Soviet Union. (*"Exil et Liberté."* No. 22. 1955. Paris.)

(2) A typical example of an exception to the general rule: The Paris organ of the Georgian Separatists "Tetri Guiorgui" (No. 25, 1930) in an article by Georgiadze describes the Russian language, as "a tongue of dogs," Russian literature, as "the ravings of a madman" and Russian music, as "poison."

CHAPTER I

A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

Let us begin by examining certain basic facts about the geography, history and ethnology of Russia. It is difficult to discuss the past, the present, or even the future of the country without a sound appreciation of these facts.

No country in Europe was ever confronted with greater obstacles to the development of civilization and, consequently, none was more difficult to govern.

Nations, like individuals, are born either in poverty or wealth and fate is kind to some and harsh to others. Some have seen the light of day in happy, sunny lands, where the climate is mild and open seas promote trade, or are sheltered by protecting mountains from invasion. In such countries civilization wells up and flowers spontaneously and with no effort.

In other lands geography and history combine in retarding the development of culture and hindering the pursuit of peace and security. Among such dispossessed nations we find the ancient Russia of Kiev and Moscow. It lay in the centre of a vast plain, composed to a great extent of sand, marshes, meagre forests and steppes. The climate was harsh, the winters long, the summers arid, the distances enormous, the roads impassable. The towns, built entirely of timber, were constantly destroyed by fire.

These unfavourable conditions were further aggravated by successive waves of Asiatic hordes, which from time immemorial, had invaded the country that stood in their path. S. Soloviev, the famous historian, tells us that between 1240 and 1460 there were two hundred invasions, an average of one a

year. (a) It was during this period that the Tartars, after laying waste the entire country, subjugated Russia.

The early history of Russia may thus be summarized as a gigantic struggle to master rebellious nature and simultaneously to repulse the invader. She could either linger for a while and then cease to exist as a nation, or expand and eventually become the largest continental empire in the world.

Only great monarchs at the head of a great people could create a powerful and disciplined state in this limitless plain, permanently threatened by formidable enemies.

"The Arabian desert," says Renan, "is monotheistic." Russia's answer to the challenge of her plain was monarchy. The continent of Russia was fated to become the seat of a powerful empire. Her Czars (1) laid down the foundations and gathered into one its scattered territories, unified one hundred and forty races (2) and gave them civilization, justice and peace.

The Czars were the embodiment of the highest expression of the Russian genius; the Orthodox Church, the old nobility and the mass of the people had first to be disciplined, but later became the staunch upholders of the monarchy. During the long years of struggle against the Tartars, the Church identified itself with the nation, thus becoming the symbol of patriotism. The nobility, endowed with a sense of statesmanship and devotion to the public welfare was a permanent mainstay of the Empire. Lastly, the amazing tenacity and initiative of the Russian people strengthened and upheld the Imperial crown.

Foreign opinion has been misled into thinking that the vastness of the Russian Empire is due to a spirit of annexation (3). Russia has often been pointed to as the archetype of an aggressive and imperialistic power.

(a) S. Soloviev. "History of Russia From Earliest Times." Moscow. In Russian.

For a thousand years Russia was on the defensive and fought continuously to preserve her "place in the sun." It was only at the end of the 18th century that she finally conquered the southern steppes and the Russian people, no longer exposed to the inroads of pillaging nomads, could at last plan their future in safety and peace.

According to S. Soloviev, "the enormous size of Russia's territory might lead one to compare it to ancient Assyria and Persia. A study of Russian development proves the error of this conclusion."

The expansion of Russia was organic, i.e., logical and natural, not fortuitous; her history is that of a country, which was fated, first to fight for its very existence and then develop into a colonizing power. Two eminent historians, Soloviev and Kliuchevsky, both hold that colonization was the primary factor in the history of Russia. (a)

The acquisition of the territories of Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, Oregon and California does not turn the United States into a robber state. Why should Russia's expansion be held against her? It was but the peaceful penetration of an entire continent. The colonization of the southern steppes, of Siberia, Trans-Caucasia and the Turkistan is a victory of civilization, just as the American penetration of the West and Far West. I would add that during our eastward march the peoples we conquered were neither molested, nor, like the Red Indians, exterminated. Our Russian settlers, so often scornfully branded as "Semi-Asiatics," were, in fact, a rampart of Europe against Asia.

Russian colonization, though it took place in conditions far more harsh and less rewarding than those in the United States, developed quite as rapidly. Within two or three generations law and order were brought to the wild tribesmen of the Turkistan and nomads of Siberia.

The Russian people who, with the help of their Czars over-

(a) Kliuchevsky. "A Course of Russian History." Vol. I. In Russian.

came untold hardship and spread from the Volga to the Pacific and the mountains of the Pamir, are inferior to no people in the world. It is unfair to call the Russians passive and devoid of initiative. It is equally unfair to say that the Czars were prompted solely by a lust for domination.

Imperial Russia never owned any colonies, in the accepted sense of the word, though the cultural level of some of her territories would justify this definition, a fact often forgotten when comparing the former régime with that of other states.

The term "British Rule," as interpreting the democratic form of government in the United Kingdom, was not applicable to the former British Empire as a whole. The administrative systems in many parts of the Empire, the "Different Rights," the "Juridical Restrictions," "Riot Acts" and "Governors General," endowed with semi-dictatorial powers, differed considerably from the mother country. In Russia identical laws applied to the whole of the Empire from end to end. The problem of integrating colonial peoples was brilliantly solved by Czarist Russia. Alone among the great powers Russia had granted her Muslim subjects total equality of status: in the First World War we saw Russian Corps commanded by Muslim generals. The fact that many Oriental peoples, formerly under Russian domination, have shared the same hardships as their Russian brothers through war and revolution, amply proves that their destinies are inseparably linked with that of Russia, one and indivisible, while the separatist movements, which have now come to the fore, have been manifest only since the Revolution and are a direct result of Soviet misrule. (a)

Parallel with this civilizing mission in Asia, Russia was forced to defend her frontiers in Europe against repeated

(a) See my book "L'Islam et l'U.R.S.S." Preface by Jérôme et Jean Tharaud of l'Académie Française. (In French, sold out.) Paris, 1947.

"The Russian Riddle", pamphlet by representatives of non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. New York, 1957.

invasion. To assure these frontiers the Order of Teutonic Knights had to be driven out of the Baltic Provinces; the Swedes, who as far back as 1611 had devastated the entire North West of Russia and even claimed Novgorod, one of the oldest Russian cities, had to be forced to evacuate Finland.

The vital necessity for Russia of defending these frontiers and, besides, her only outlet to an open sea (the Baltic) is obvious.

Finland enjoyed a privileged position under Russian rule, verging on the paradoxical, for over 100 years: thus, Finnish citizens, in Russia, were entitled to all the rights of Russian subjects, whereas the latter were qualified as aliens in Finland.

The Baltic Provinces were originally allowed a considerable measure of autonomy, but the Teutonic policy of the Germans gradually compelled the government to restrict some of the liberties they had been granted. The native population, composed of Latvians and Esthonians, far from being hostile to Russia, looked to her for support against the local nobility of German origin. During the 1914 war they fought valiantly in the ranks of the Russian Armies and the Latvians, whose country was threatened with invasion by the troops of the Kaiser, provided quite a considerable contingent of volunteers.

In defence of the Baltic aristocracy of German origin it must be said that, though pro-German in feeling, they were perfectly loyal to the Crown and served their Russian sovereigns with honour and great distinction at court, in the army and administration.

The problem of Poland stood before Russia in all its complexity, more tragic and more difficult to solve than the problem of Ireland, which England could treat as a matter of internal policy. Any alteration in the status of Poland affected Russia, Austria and Prussia collectively.

It is certainly a matter of regret that, in the past, the Kingdom of Poland should have disappeared from the historical scene. However, history cannot be entirely overlooked.

At the beginning of the 17th century, during those terrible years which we call the "Troubled Time" and long before the final blow was dealt to Poland, Russia was all but destroyed by the Poles. By "Troubled Time" we refer to a period of our history when, with a vacant throne, our country was in a state of turmoil and the Poles seized and pillaged Moscow. They then tried to foist upon Russia their royal Prince and later their King. In 1613 a patriotic rising mercifully saved the country and placed the first Romanov on the throne.

Nevertheless great stretches of Russian territory still remained under Polish domination for many years.

It was only in the 18th century that Russia undertook a vigorous counteroffensive and succeeded in liberating her peoples. In the 17th century a general rising of "Little Russia" allowed the Czar of Moscow to free the southern part of Russia, together with Kiev, the capital and "Mother of all Russian Cities," and later to reintegrate the large province of Smolensk.

The Lithuanian and White Russian provinces were liberated under Catherine the Great.

During the three partitions of Poland no Polish territory proper was annexed and only those lands were claimed which had earlier been seized by the Poles.

Responsibility for the annexation of essentially Polish territories rests solely with Austria and Prussia.

"In 1796, after the third partition of Poland, lands formerly Russian, reverted to her, with the exception of Kholm and Eastern Galicia, which were taken by Austria," says M. E. Haumant. (a) This eminent authority on East European problems, brings strong evidence in support of what has just been said and it would be useful if this book were more widely known and read.

In the Lithuanian and White Russian provinces the living conditions of the peasantry, reduced to a state of slavery by the

(a) E. Haumant. "Le Problème de l'Unité Russe." Bossard. Paris. 1922. p. 69.

Polish landowners, were improved. As a result the peasant population remained loyal to Russia and took no part in the rebellions of the 19th century.

The Congress of Vienna attached "The Grand Duchy of Warsaw," later to become the "Kingdom of Poland," to Russia. Alexander I endowed the Kingdom with a liberal constitution, perhaps the most liberal of any of the then existing constitutions, and very extensive rights.

The attitude of the Russian sovereign was in striking contrast to the treatment meted out to the Poles by Prussia and Austria. (a)

Poland was allowed a Parliament, permitted to conserve her own legislation and maintain her army, etc. This liberal status was unfortunately upset by the rebellion of 1831.

In spite of this Poland still retained many privileges and was administered by a Polish Civil Service. It is worth noting that the Code Napoléon remained in force right up to the First World War and that the Russian Civil Code was never introduced into Poland; another contrast between the rule of Russia and that of her neighbours.

The Russian Army and Civil Service were open to Poles and many of our distinguished soldiers and statesmen were of Polish origin.

During the reign of Alexander II (1856-1881) we might, perhaps have witnessed a final reconciliation between Russia and Poland, so longed for by outstanding men of both nations, like the great Russian poet Pushkin and the great Polish poet Mickiewicz. (4)

Toward 1860 Marquess Wielepolsky, a remarkable statesman endeavoured to bring about a rapprochement between Poland and Russia, but was actively opposed by Bismarck, then Prussian Minister in St. Petersburg.

In 1863 a rebellion broke out in Poland. From the very start it was doomed to failure. The support, strictly verbal, given to

(a) P. Rain. *"Un Tsar Idéologue, 1777-1825,"* Paris. 1913. pp. 289-327.

it by Napoleon III, alienated Russian public opinion and influenced the attitude of Russia in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871.

The consequences of this rebellion were tragic for France, as well as for the rest of Europe and profited only Prussia and Austria. It brought about a change in the status of Poland, for she lost the privileges she had previously been allowed to retain.

Nevertheless, prior to the First World War Russian Poland enjoyed an era of prosperity thanks to the immense Russian market open to Polish industries, while the Russian policy of assimilation was never as harsh as that of Germany in Posen.

At the outbreak of hostilities, in 1914, Russia announced, as one of her war aims, the reestablishment of Polish unity by creating a new Kingdom of Poland out of all Polish territories to be reassembled. On August 14, 1914, Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander in Chief of the Russian Armies, issued a proclamation to this effect, addressed to the Poles of Russia, Austria and Prussia. This proclamation was warmly received at home, in Poland and by the Allies.

It here seems appropriate to quote as a matter of recorded history three authoritative opinions on the Polish question expressed soon after the First World War.

"The situation of Poland is as tragic today, as it was yesterday," writes E. Haumant, "for precisely identical reasons: not the absence of natural boundaries, or the temperamental character of the people, in spite of what our schoolbooks tell us. The main reason lies in the fact that the correct balance between Germany and Poland was upset when the latter gave up Slav lands along the Elbe in the early days of history. The other is this: time has transformed the Holy Roman Empire into a compact Germany and—Moscow into a world. Of these two neighbors, the one in the West has grown at the expense of the Poles and will never forgive them their modest gains of today;

whereas Poland aspires to greatness at the expense of the other neighbor and it, too, will not forgive . . .

"As, in the past, any kind of accomodation with Prussia is out of the question; it would only lead to dismemberment, vassalage and final destruction. An understanding with a future Russia is, a priori, more attainable, as Russia lays no claims to any national Polish territory. The bitter memories of the past might, on the whole, prove no unsurmountable obstacle." (a)

Mr. Haumant further underlines that, in fact, there is no hatred of Poland in Russia and any animosity against the Poles that exists is confined to the "Ukranians." (b)

The late President Massaryk, on his return from Russia in March, 1918, submitted a confidential memorandum to President Wilson, at the latter's request. Here are the concluding words of this document:

"All the small peoples of Western Europe—Finns, Poles, Esthonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Czecks, Rumanians, etc., stand in need of a powerful Russia; they will otherwise all fall into the hands of the Germans. The Allies should support Russia at all cost and by all the means at their disposal." (c)

Lastly, Professor Ch. Sarolea in an article published by *"The English Review"* in June, 1925, expressed the view that:

(a) E. Haumant. Ibid.

(b) For further details on the Ukranian question see my articles in "La Nouvelle Revue," May 1931, "La Revue Belge," June 1931, "Revue des Ambassades," January 1938, "Revue Politique et Parlementaire," October 1952 and article by Henry Lémery, former Vice-President of the French Council of Ministers, "Exil et Liberté, February, 1955.

(c) "Sovremennia Zapiski." Russian Review, Vol. XLII, p. 411.

"If Russia is not promptly restored and made capable of keeping Germany in her place, the newly created states, and Poland in particular, are bound to perish. A super German State will in the near future threaten the peace of the World."

In the 19th century half the Jewish population of the entire world lived within the boundaries of Russia. At the time, the State lacked the means of assimilating these millions of people and, as a measure of self-protection, had recourse to restrictive legislation concerning the Jews. The following are the principal measures to which they were subjected(5):

A special ban prohibited the Jews from settling anywhere in Russia, except in the west and south-west, where they had long been concentrated. These regions included some of the wealthiest provinces and were twice the size of France. However, the Jewish colonies of St. Petersburg, numbering well over 60,000, of Moscow and Rostov, only slightly less numerous, show how liberally this ban was interpreted.

Another restriction debarred the Jews from government service. In this respect Russia was not alone, as a similar law existed in Germany up to 1914; besides, until quite recently, in a country as democratic as Switzerland, a Jewish officer, or civil servant was an exception.

Lastly, the number of Jewish pupils admitted to state schools was limited to 10% of the total, an exception being made for more able scholars. On the other hand the Jews had many schools of their own, where instruction was in Yiddish and Russian was taught as a compulsory language.

Strange as this may appear, the most important Jewish theological college in the world was situated in Russia.

Politically the Jews were considered disloyal. Many young Jews joined the revolutionary movement and were active members of proscribed political groups and societies. Whether they outnumbered the Russian members is beside the point. The authorities regarded them as representative of the Jewish race

and reacted accordingly, while the loyal subjects used this fact as a pretext for openly demonstrating their dislike for the Jews, as a whole.

The Jews were subject to Russian Common Law, possessed complete franchise and were eligible to both legislative chambers, the Duma and the Council of Empire.

One is entitled to ask, whether the Jews were unhappy in Russia? An honest and convincing answer is given by an outstanding Russian Jew, the late Dr. Pasmanik; (a) He writes that, before the revolution the economic status of Russian Jews was not only satisfactory, but really good. The continued improvement in the economic life of Russia could but contribute to the wellbeing of the Jews. Discussing the intellectual and moral level of Russian Jewry, Dr. Pasmanik says: "The artistic, intellectual and spiritual expansion of the Jews in Russia during the last decades of the Empire can be compared with the renaissance of the Jews in Spain in the 12th and 13th centuries." He continues: "In the normal course of events the Jews had every reason to hope that the restrictive measures to which they were subjected would be soon abolished. As it was, most of them had been greatly relaxed during the war years."

Another eminent Jew, Mr. J. Bickerman, agrees with Dr. Pasmanik and says that the Russian Jews were prospering, increasing in numbers and consolidating their material and moral status in step with the cultural and economic development of the country. (b)

And what of the pogroms?

The old and often quoted legend that these hideous episodes were provoked and organized by the government has time and again been disproved. When they occurred the authorities immediately took the most drastic steps to curb the rioting and safeguard the life and property of the Jews. Po-

(a) "Ten years of Bolshevik Domination." Collection of articles published in English by "The Patriotic Union of Russian Jews abroad."

(b) "Russia and the Jews," pp. 84-85. In Russian and German.

groms have taken place after the fall of Czarism and have assumed the character of terrible disasters. Dr. Pasmanik, in his book, throws much light on this subject.

What was once a blot on Russia has now, unfortunately, occurred in other countries in forms incomparably more vile.

The staunch patriotism of many exiled Jews and their loyalty to the Monarchy would, probably, shock their fervent defenders against the alleged "atrocities and horrors of Czarism."

Lastly I quote a sentence from a recent book by M. Léon Leneman: "If, in the days of the Czars the Jews accounted for 4.1 per cent of the entire population of Russia, they now represent 1.48 per cent." (a) This quotation requires no comment.

Russia, like every great state, committed many errors both in her politics and her system of administration. Nevertheless, the overall influence of the Empire was one of liberation, not oppression. Religious, cultural and intellectual freedom was enjoyed by the peoples under the sceptre of the Czars. There even was a time when Russia was a haven for the religiously persecuted in Central Europe, a haven, where many a Dane and German found safe refuge. In more recent times it was the turn of the Serbians, Bulgarians, Rumanians and Greeks. It is also gratifying to realize that the Jesuits were admitted to Russia when their order was the object of persecution in many countries.

As a general rule the amount of freedom enjoyed by minorities corresponded to their loyalty. The principle of a single, official language (a principle applied in all civilized nations) was not an obstacle to the free development of individual native languages and traditions. They were encouraged by the government, as a matter of self interest. Budding national life was protected against the influence of stronger neighbours. Thus, the modest beginnings of Finnish literature were shielded against Swedish ascendancy; the Esthonians and Latvians were

(a) "La Tragédie des Juifs en U.R.S.S.," Paris, 1959. p. 19.

likewise protected against the germanization of the Barons, supported by Prussia. In the Caucasus Georgian and Armenian literature were upheld as a check to Turkish infiltration.

Under the Czars "Pax Rossica," more lustrous and greater than "Pax Romana" reigned over vast expanses, stretching from the Vistula to the mountains of Manchuria, over lands and nations long troubled in the past by bloodshed, dissensions, invasions and wars.

NOTES

(1) The reigning heads of Russian principalities bore the title of "Veliki Kniaz," Grand Duke. In 1547, after the fall of Byzantium, the Grand Duke of Moscow assumed the title of Czar, (Caesar).

Dating as far back as the 10th century, Grand Dukes, Czars and, later, Emperors all followed the same principles of statecraft, to a degree which was quite remarkable. They were like talented pupils of great masters, who begin by copying their teachers and later become artists in their own right. Among these rulers Peter the Great stands out like a modern colossus, linking in his giant personality the past and the future of Russia.

(2) This large diversity of races is due to the fact that Russia lay across the path of the Great Migration, which, fifteen centuries ago, determined the destinies of Europe and of the lands bordering the Mediterranean. Every race that trod this path from East to West shed some of its numbers in Russia.

Below is a summary of the principal races and nationalities which made up the population of Russia. The figures are based on the census of 1897, the last under the Empire.

<i>Principal Races</i>	<i>Millions</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Arian	100	78.13
Uralo-Altai	20	15.62
Semitic	5.8	4.20
Iberian	2.4	2.05

Subdivision of Races

Arian:	Slavs	92
	Germans	1.8
	Latvians	1.4
	Lithuanians	1.2
	Armenians	1.2
	Moldavians & Rumanians	1.1

	Iranians (Kurds, Persians)	0.78
	Jmoud	0.44
	Greeks	0.18
	Gypsies	0.04
Uralo-	} Finns, proper	2.3
Altai:		4.8
		12.9
	Turco-Tartar	
Semitic:	Jews	5.06
	Chaldeans & Arabs	0.74
Iberian:	Caucasian Races	2.4
Subdivision of Slav population:	Russians: Great	55.7
	Little (Ukrainians)	22.4
	White	5.9
	Poles and other Slavs	7.9

(3) Russia was the largest continental empire and covered an area of over 14 million square miles, exclusive of inner seas. This area represents one sixth of all the land surface of the world, and is three times as large as that of the United States.

(4) Polish politicians and biographers describe Mickiewicz as an inveterate enemy of Russia and Czarism. This description is both tendentious and untruthful. Boia-Jelensky, a fearless Polish critic, has revealed the true feelings of the poet in a series of articles, published in 1929, by the "Wiadomosce Literackie" (Literary News) of Warsaw. We are told that every effort was made to destroy documentary evidence, which might in any way compromise Mickiewicz, the "Russophobe." For example, he quotes an autographed letter, accidentally preserved, in which the poet sympathetically describes the enthusiastic welcome given to Nicholas I by the population of Warsaw.

"The spiritual life of Mickiewicz was much influenced by the years he spent in Russia," writes Boia-Jelensky.

"For this native of Kovno and Wilno, Russia was Europe. He was dazzled by the cultural life of Russia far more than by her might. The poet lived in surroundings in which his genius could freely develop. If Mickiewicz, after leaving Kovno, had gone to Warsaw, his welcome would not have been as warm as in Russia, where this humble provincial school-teacher was received with open arms."

He was frankly ironical about Warsaw. In one of his letters he wrote: "I am grieved by the terrible stagnation of your Polish literature." Boia-Jelensky draws attention to the generous financial assistance given to the poet by his Russian friends in later years, when he was destitute in Paris. The proud Mickiewicz accepted it gratefully, thus proving the warmth and intimacy of his relations with Russian society.

In his preface to the third edition of "Grandfathers," published in Russia,

Mickiewicz renders homage to the name of "the Monarch who, of all the Czars of the earth, harbours within his realm the greatest number of races and peoples." "Under the Czar, who is their father, all are entitled to an equal share, not only of the good things of the earth, but also of things moral and spiritual. May the name of this father to so many peoples be glorified by every generation and in every tongue."

(5) The position of the Jews was different earlier in our history. In the 16th and 17th centuries foreigners were rare in Russia. The majority lived in settlements outside Moscow and did not mix with the native population. There were very few Jews and only vaguely defined regulations limited their freedom of movement throughout the country.

In the 18th century under Peter the Great all existing restrictions were removed and foreign Jews were, in fact, encouraged to settle in Russia. Some were brought over by Peter after his travels abroad, for instance, a certain Shapiro, who later became Baron Shafirov; the Czar married off Shapiro's daughters to members of the Russian nobility. Administrative freedom for the Jews lasted well into the 19th century.

CHAPTER II

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CZARISM

A popular commonplace would have us believe that the Government of former Russia was anti-democratic, reactionary and opposed to progress.

This is what the late Professor Ch. Sarolea, of Edinburgh University, an authority on Russian history and one possessing first hand knowledge of the country, has to say on the subject.

"It would be wrong to say that the Russian government was anti-democratic. On the contrary, the Russian monarchy, like that of St. Louis, was essentially democratic. It was brought into being by the will of the people, while the dynasty of the Romanovs was placed on the throne by a constituent representative assembly of the entire nation." (a)

In 1612, the words addressed by Pojarsky to the representatives of Russian cities, assembled to elect a new monarch (1) correctly interpreted the feelings of the country:—

"We know that unless we possess a monarch we can neither fight our common enemies—Poles, Lithuanians, Germans or our own brigands, who threaten the State with further bloodshed. Without a monarch how can we maintain relations with foreign states, or ourselves preserve the stability and strength of our country?"

In the eyes of the nation the restoration of the monarchy was a guarantee of internal peace and external independence.

(a) Ch. Sarolea. "The English Review," June, 1925.

Pojarsky's words were repeated in the solemn act of election of the first Romanov (1613). In the oath of allegiance to the new dynasty the states of "all the Russias" promised to sacrifice body and soul in the service of their monarch against enemies from without, "Poles, Germans and the Crimeans," and to fight to the death the leaders of any rebellion (b).

The same democratic principle, i.e., the freely expressed will of the people, which placed a Romanov on the throne in 1613, today brings a new President of the United States to the White House.

The principles of monarchy and democracy were not opposed to each other in Russia and antagonism between them was not a normal feature of our political life. (2)

To quote Professor Sarolea, once again:—

"On closer examination we find that the Russian State was a vast federation of fifty thousand small peasant republics. Each busy with its own affairs, obedient to its own laws and even possessing its own tribunals of "Starostas" (Elders). The Russian State was not undemocratic—on the contrary if anything, there was too much democracy.

... The reason, why the popular masses so easily fell prey to the Bolshevik tyranny lies mainly in the exaggerated spirit of egalitarianism supported and encouraged by the monarchy."

This view, though exaggerated at first sight, is fundamentally correct, as we shall see in our next chapter.

At the beginning of this century there was no clear cut division between the classes in Russia: no definite ruling class, an undefinable middle class and no properly consolidated "social élite."

(b) Taranovsky. "Sobornoe Izbranie" (Election by the Constituent Assembly of all the Russias) St. Petersburg, 1913. (in Russian)

This lack of distinction between the classes was one of our major weaknesses, especially in the second half of the 19th century, at a time when it adversely affected the social structure of the country. We are told that we were anti-democratic. But is it realized that for a son of the people the access to the highest posts of government was easier in Czarist Russia than anywhere else in the world? Far from being an exclusive cast, Russian nobility (3) was constantly changing in composition, owing to a steady influx of government servants of varied origin. The number of ministers of state, generals, scholars and scientists, of peasant stock or humble origin, was very large, especially after the reforms of Alexander II. (4) Our upper classes were less isolated than elsewhere, while the absence of dividing lines between the classes made the "social ladder" easier to ascend. At the outbreak of war, in 1914, our social structure was still in a state of flux and was not as yet firmly based after the great reforms of 1864. The absence of a solidly established social edifice, steeped in tradition, was the price paid for the privilege the state offered its humblest subjects of attaining the highest posts in the government. (5) The First World War and the terrible events by which it was followed struck at a social structure not yet moulded into a conscious whole and, consequently, unprepared to offer a cohesive and resolute resistance.

What was the attitude of the monarchy toward progress? In the article, already quoted, Professor Sarolea says:—

"Real progress was given greater encouragement under the Russian monarchy than in most other European countries. The monarchy corresponded to what Montesquieu and Voltaire called "Enlightened Absolutism" and led, rather than followed public opinion. Political unrest in Russia was usually the result of too rapid advances. Everything had to be improvised and the sovereigns were first in their desire to make up for lost time. It often happened that Czarism in the space of a few years tried to achieve

results which it would have taken other countries generations to attain. Centuries went to the building of Paris and Rome; as compared to them St. Petersburg is "a mushroom town." It took several generations to create the Louvre. The huge Winter Palace on the Neva was built in a few months. Between 1860 and 1870 Russia witnessed greater reforms than any other country at any given period in the history of Europe. These reforms were far more radical than those which followed the French Revolution: serfdom was abolished by a stroke of the pen; the legal apparatus of the country was recast; a network of railways was laid before the building of roads was undertaken; development of industry was encouraged and its expansion was prodigious."

I should like to emphasize that Czarism was the truest expression of social monarchy, or better still, of a social power. Being completely independent it rose above the interests of the individual, party or class and it should be noted that after the revolution of 1848 a similar conception became increasingly popular in Europe. The Czars were thus able to enforce equity among their subjects to the greatest good of the nation as a whole. For example, in order to satisfy an ideal of social justice the State did not hesitate, in 1861, at the time of the liberation of the serfs, to endow them with adequate holdings made up of land requisitioned from private landowners: an act of admirable social radicalism that no non-revolutionary government had up to then dared to enforce. Let me add that, within certain limits, the liberty of the press, the right of political association and assembly, were more liberally interpreted in Russia, than in many Western countries of today. This, like so many other statements about Russia of yesterday will, I am regretfully sure, surprise many of my readers. (6)

The few facts I have enumerated should, I hope, be useful in laying a foundation for a correct appreciation of the character of the Russian ancien régime.

Russia is supposed to have been governed by a parasite and corrupt administration.

The Russian administrative machine was a centralized bureaucracy and suffered from many of the defects inherent in this form of administration. No one was blind to these shortcomings, least of all the authorities, and certain defects were even branded in masterpieces of literary satire, like Gogol's "Inspector General." Any form of government by bureaucracy is prey to abuses of one kind or another and it is typical that, whereas the opening performance of Gogol's play was acted in the presence of the "reactionary" Czar, Nicholas I, who personally congratulated the author, it was banned in Berlin. Apparently the barbs of Gogol's satire struck nearer the mark in Prussia than they did at home. (7)

If we consider the size of Russia, our administrative apparatus was certainly no worse and even better than that of other nations, faced with similar problems of government.

The fact that there were fewer civil servants than in the majority of other countries, is an important point to keep in mind. According to the last general census, analyzed in 1906 by Professor Mendelev, ("Toward a Knowledge of Russia") the total number of government employees amounted to 336,000. This figure comprises the entire administrative apparatus, elected officers of local government, the judiciary and the police. France at the same date budgeted for 500,000 state employees.

Comparing these two figures, we cannot but wonder at the amount of work the average Russian civil servant was expected to shoulder. Count A. Saltykov, in a remarkably lucid preface to Professor Mendelev's book (a) states that, in his opinion:

"The Czarist administration was honest, well organized, competent and not arbitrary in its dealings with the public. It was expeditious, punctual and conscientious, command-

(a) Munich, 1924, in Russian.

ing undisputed authority; the structure of the governmental machine was flexible and allowed for adaptation to modern requirements. All in all the Czarist régime was less formal, less bureaucratic than that of many other European states."

Some branches of the administration were, admittedly, antiquated and not properly equipped to deal with changing conditions: among them we may point to the police. The numerical insufficiency of the force was patent and, ultimately, this weakness partly explains the success of the uprising which preceded the Revolution. The police appropriation in the budget was ridiculously low and the number of policemen, per head of population, very small in comparison with other countries, seven times less than in England and five times less than in France. (8)

In a country the size of Russia this dearth of police officers was certainly striking. It is partly explained by the great prestige enjoyed by the Czarist authority throughout the nation, as well as by the high individual qualities and devotion to duty of individual members of the force, so valiantly proved in the streets of the Capital during the stormy days of March, 1917. Contrary to foreign ideas on Russia, founded on propaganda spread by our revolutionaries, the Czarist government relied less on sanctions to uphold and enforce its authority than many of the states in the West.

Our administrative machine was founded by Speransky, a minister of Alexander I and Nicholas I. It was modeled on the centralized system of the French Consulate and the First Empire.

Realizing the drawbacks of over-centralization, the government introduced in 1864 a system of Local Self Government, which at the time was unequalled anywhere in the world.

The administrative divisions of Russia were called "Gubernii" (Governments or Provinces, corresponding to states) and "Uezdy" (districts, corresponding to counties in the U.S.A.).

(For the sake of clarity I shall refer to these divisions as Provinces and Districts.)

In 1864, "Regulations dealing with Provincial and District Institutions" were promulgated and a new system of "Zemstvos," or local self-governing bodies, was created (Zemlia in Russian means earth, land, soil).

Though a form of restricted local autonomy had previously been in force, it was felt after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, that the entire community should in the future participate in the administration of local affairs. The central government availed itself of the opportunity offered by this great reform and, by creating the Zemstvos, endowed the "Provinces" and "Districts" with local self-government.

The principles of the reform were explained in the preamble to the "Regulations."

"Each Province and District possesses its own individual interests and is faced with local problems. The management of these interests should be entrusted to the Province and District concerned, on lines similar to those which obtain in any private enterprise, directed by a private individual. The owner is the person best suited to direct a business, as it is he who suffers the consequences of mismanagement and bears the full burden of responsibility."

The Zemstvos were called upon to deal with all matters relating to local interests, such as, education, public relief, food supplies, the upkeep and construction of roads, social insurance, public health, preventative measures against the spread of epidemics, prison inspection, etc.

The Zemstvo District Councils were elected for a term of three years by the peasants, landowners, manufacturers and tradesmen owning real estate in the District and met several times a year. The permanent executive body of a Council was the "Zemskaia Uprava," a committee consisting of a chairman

and several members, all elected from the members of the Council.

At least twice a year delegates from all the District Councils met in the chief town of the Province. Assembled in council, they discussed the business of the Province and, like the District Councils, elected a permanent committee to act as an executive body.

The whole administrative machine of local self-government, collectively called the "Zemstvo," was, in theory, subject to the control, first of the Governor of a particular Province and ultimately of the Minister of the Interior. In cases of dissension between the Governor and the Zemstvo, the latter had the right of appeal to the Senate, the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Empire.

The cost of local government was defrayed by the Zemstvos. In order to meet the heavy charges involved they were authorized to levy local taxes, own capital and real estate.

The table below shows the annual budget of the forty Zemstvos of European Russia between 1865 and 1913.

1865	5.7 million roubles
1903	99.5 million roubles
1906	124.2 million roubles
1912	220.2 million roubles
1913	253.8 million roubles

(The value of the rouble in this table and in all tables of this book is the gold rouble, equivalent to 1/10 of the £ Sterling, i.e., 2/-, two shillings, or 50 cents.)

On the eve of the First World War the assets of the forty Zemstvos, mentioned above, were valued at 2 billion roubles, while their reserves totalled 288 million roubles.

In this book it is impossible to dwell on all the magnificent work of the Zemstvo. However, the Health Service was so outstanding as to merit special attention. It was completely free, open to all classes and unhandicapped by any tests. Within a very short time it had earned an unparalleled record of efficiency and public service.

In an introduction by Prof. Strouve to Mr. Fedorov's book "Russia Under the Communist Régime," written in reply to a report drawn up by visiting British trade unionists, we read:

"It is difficult for the authors of this report to make a fair appreciation of the Russia they have just left, as they have no idea of what the country was like before. I quote a case in point: under the Czarist régime local self-government (the Zemstvo) had introduced a superb service of public health, unique at the time. One of the founders of this service was Dr. Frederick Erissman of Swiss nationality and a professor of Moscow University. In 1897 I had occasion to call on him in connection with the Congress for the Protection of Workmen in Zurich. He was then socialist member of the Zurich Municipal Council. He spoke in the highest terms of the Russian Medical Service, instituted by the Zemstvo and said he considered it to be the outstanding success of the age in the realm of social medical welfare, not only because it entitled everyone to medical assistance free of any charge, but also on account of its great educational value. Anyone acquainted with the Russia of today is aware that this superb organization has been broken up and the social and spiritual principles on which it was founded swept away." (9)

An entirely new legal system came into being simultaneously with the administrative reforms of 1864. It was founded on modern conceptions in the realm of law and many Russian refugees abroad, by bitter experience, have learnt to appreciate the advantages of our judicial procedure. According to A. Leroy-Beaulieu "the authors of the legal reform proved both their erudition and experience." (a)

The law was to be "swift, just and equal for all." Thus ran

(a) A. Leroy-Beaulieu. "The Empire of the Czars and the Russians," Paris. 1887. Vol. II. p. 289.

the official wording. That this ideal was realized in full measure is a matter of which we Russians may feel justly proud.

The Law was swift. In France, to this day, the sentence of a justice of the peace, even on trivial matters, has sometimes to be awaited for months. No such delays were tolerated in Russia.

The Law was just. Judges, once appointed, could not be dismissed and were completely independent. At the time, the election of magistrates was still considered a radical innovation and had only once been applied in France for a short period during the Revolution of 1789.

In Russia, with the exception of one or two districts, magistrates were elected either by the Zemstvo District Councils, mentioned previously, or by Municipal Councils (Dumas) in the towns.

A defendant had the right of appeal against sentences passed by Justices of the Peace to the Local Council of Justices of the Peace. Criminal and civil cases were tried at Assizes, held in administrative centres. Appeals against sentences passed at the Assizes were lodged either with Courts of Appeal or with the Senate, the Supreme Court of Appeal of the Empire. Criminal cases were tried by jury, drawn from a list of jurymen, composed of local inhabitants. No instance of suppression of an elected panel was ever recorded in Russia. (As we know, trial by jury was abolished both in Fascist Italy and Hitler's Germany.) In the thirties of this century the Paris daily newspaper "Le Temps" enquired into the possibilities of reforms in the existing legal procedure of France and many eminent French jurists suggested measures which had long been in force in Czarist Russia.

All Russian subjects were equal before the Law and legal procedure was brought within reach of the poor. The minutiae of litigation and appeal to the courts were simplified, as far as possible. The functions of solicitor and barrister were combined and the fact that the solicitor pleaded his client's case at the bar rendered less expensive the procedure of defense. No stamp

duty was levied on legal documents and the poor were absolved from paying legal costs.

I have already mentioned the respect commanded by the Czarist administration. The prestige of the Russian bar was just as high.

The new Penal Code was also founded on modern theories, while capital punishment had already been abolished for a century except for political murder, cases of this kind being tried by courts martial, or special courts. Corporal punishment was done away with long before the reform of 1864. So much for the famous Russian "knout" and other barbaric forms of punishment.

Our Civil Code, like the penal and criminal codes, was advanced and modern; one of its striking features was the legal status of women, which was more liberal and broadminded than in many other countries even to this day.

It has been said of the Czarist government that it was either deliberately hostile to learning, or that it designedly prevented the spread of education among the people. No more unfounded criticism was ever made, for in this particular domain no country has ever achieved greater results than Czarist Russia.

A detailed account of the various methods by which education was fostered and systematically spread cannot be given in this book. A general idea will, however, be obtained from a balance sheet of the results achieved during the reign of the last Emperor, Nicholas II, 1894-1917.

The funds required for public education were provided by the Central Government, the Zemstvo and the Municipalities. The increase in the amounts respectively allotted is shown in the following table.

	1894	1914	Increase
	in roubles		
State Credits	40,000,000	270,000,000	570%
Zemstvo & Municipalities	70,000,000	300,000,000	329%

The increase in the number of students was proportional to the new schools and universities opened and the credits allotted. Pupils and University Students in State Schools and Colleges. (a)

	1894	1914	Increase
Primary Schools	3,276,000	7,500,000	159%
Secondary Schools	225,000	819,000	254%
Universities	15,000	80,000	433%

Primary education was free and open to all. A plan for the introduction of general and compulsory education had been before the governments as far back as 1862, but was reluctantly abandoned by Alexander II, owing to the shortage of funds. His grandson, the late Emperor, was more fortunate in this respect. Revenue had soared and the state of the nation's finances was excellent and in 1908 a comprehensive plan was drawn up for the gradual introduction of compulsory education throughout the Empire.

The number of children of school age was 13.5 million as shown by a special census. To deal with this total, 250,000 schools were required. There were only 70,000 primary schools at the time and an additional 180,000 had thus to be provided.

From 1908 an average of 10,000 schools was opened annually and by 1914 there were 130,000 schools.

Even during the war years (1914-1917) several thousand schools were opened and compulsory education would have become an established fact by the middle twenties had the Revolution not intervened. This is further confirmed by a Soviet enquiry, held in 1920, which revealed that 86% of children between the ages of twelve and sixteen could both

(a) The above figures do not include approximately 600,000 pupils in private schools in 1914. All the figures on education are taken from the "Russian Manual, 1915," published by the Russian Central Statistical Committee, "The Statesman Yearbook" and from works by S. P. Kowalevsky, responsible for presenting the estimates for public education from 1907 to 1917, and other sources.

read and write while their age proves that they had been taught before the Revolution.

There were two different types of secondary schools: one standard, the other specializing in technical knowledge, commerce, or agriculture.

In 1914, of the 819,000 pupils in secondary schools, 657,440 attended the former and 161,500 the latter.

During the reign of Alexander III the creation of secondary schools, specializing in one particular branch of technology had been suggested. The idea was to provide a sound technical grounding for pupils who were unable to follow a university course. These schools commenced to function during the last reign and, by 1914, were attended by 161,500 pupils, mostly of working class origin.

A remarkable change in the social composition of the pupils attending the standard type of secondary schools took place between 1900 and 1914. At the beginning of the century the majority consisted of children of well-to-do parents. As the number of schools increased they were attended by an increasing number of children of the poorer classes and just before the War (1914) the latter formed a substantial majority.

Below is a table showing the increase in the number of pupils in the standard type secondary schools.

	1894	1914	<i>Increase</i>
Boys Schools	89,410	228,500	155%
Girls Schools	54,102	328,800	507%
Seminaries (Theological)	63,250	100,090	58%

The attention of the reader is particularly drawn to the increase in the number of girl pupils. The same phenomenon occurred in the universities, thus placing Russia in the forefront of European countries in the provision of education for women.

University education had expanded with equal rapidity. Within the period mentioned the number of students rose from 14,000 to over 80,000, of which 50% studied in polytechnical, technical, engineering, mining and agricultural colleges.

A new university or college was opened practically every year in the ten years preceding the First World War and, as we saw, the number of undergraduates rose by over 400%. (10)

Tuition fees in Russia were extremely low. Primary education was entirely free. The annual fee in secondary schools was under one hundred roubles (ten pounds sterling or 50 dollars) and only slightly higher in universities. Accessories required by the students at technical colleges, such as drawing paper, etc., were supplied free of charge, and the salaries of the entire teaching and lecturing staffs were paid by the State.

The Soviet Government is now merely developing a system that had been founded many years before the Revolution. The craving for learning and "schooling" is an inborn Russian trait. In their powerful drive for industrial expansion the Soviets will never lack eager and inquisitive students, thirsting for knowledge and anxious to apply it. "Caveat Occidentis."

In conclusion, I should like my readers to dwell on the main passages of "Rules of Conduct for a Czar," composed by Nicholas I and the great writer Jukovsky, tutor of Alexander II, "The Liberator." These rules illustrate better than anything else the spirit of the monarchy and, consequently, of the Russian body politic.

In these days of materialism and moral decadence it is difficult not to be moved by the thoughts and feelings expressed in these "Rules." They were a guiding star to the former masters of Russia; may they guide her masters of tomorrow.

"Respect the Law, and by your example teach others to respect it. If the Law is broken by the Czar it will not be obeyed by the people.

"Spread education. The benefits of Order and Law are appreciated only by an educated people. Give heed to public opinion: it often enlightens the Czar. It is his faithful ally and a stern judge of those who carry out his will.

"Love Freedom. It stands for Equity. It interprets the

generosity of the Czar and the liberty of the people. The Czar's love of freedom strengthens the obedience of his subjects.

"Govern not by Force, but by Order. The true might of the Czar lies not in the size of his armies, but in the prosperity of his people.

"Choose worthy and capable counsellors. Pride blinds the Czar and places him in the power of servile courtiers, unmindful of his honour and of the public good.

"Respect your people and they will be worthy of respect.

"Love your people. The people will not love the Czar, if he does not love them.

"Be not disheartened by the World, but keep forever in your heart a vision of the beautiful and a belief in good, which is faith in God. You will thus be saved from despising humanity, for to despise humanity is deadly for one who is called upon to reign."

NOTES

(1) Only two dynasties ruled over Russia from 862 to 1917: the Rurikovichs (Descendants of Rörekr, the Norseman) and the Romanovs, 1613-1917.

The Slav tribes summoned the famous Norse chieftains Rörekr (Russian Rurik) and his two brothers to come and reign over them, as their land was "Vast and rich, but order there is not."

Again, when in 1613, after a period of internal strife and invasion following the death of the last male descendent of Rurik, the first Romanov ascended the throne, it was by a freely expressed vote of the entire nation. (The Romanovs were linked to the extinct dynasty by the female line).

Thus, the monarchy was not founded on conquest, or might, but rested on a principle of legality, the vote of the entire people.

The democratic origin of the dynasty was never forgotten by our Czars, as witnessed by a quotation from a letter by Nicholas I, considered the most reactionary of Russian monarchs, to Napoleon III on the eve of the latter's coup d'Etat. "I am all the more in favour of universal suffrage, as I do not fail to recollect that my own dynasty owes its origin to the people, who twice freely expressed their will."

This letter is equally instructive from another point of view, namely that the Czar admitted of two forms of government only: either the rule of one, in whom the aspirations and interests of the nation were embodied, or the rule of all. Further he adds that were he not Russian, he would be a republican. Words and thoughts, such as these, expressed by a sovereign like Nicholas I, may appear surprising. They are, however, in perfect keeping with the Russian tradition, for anyone acquainted with our past.

(2) In connection with these two principles some thoughts, expressed by Belinsky in a review of an article, written by Jukovsky, are of interest. (Jukovsky was one of our great poets, a writer with a gift for interpreting some of the best traits of the Russian genius). The occasion was the unveiling in 1839 of a monument commemorating the battle of Borodino. Belinsky was the most famous literary critic we have ever had and a man well known for his radical views. He was also a convinced adherent of "Zapadnichestvo" (Westernism), a trend of Russian philosophical thought of the 19th century, which sought a closer link between the traditions and principles of the West and Russia. We owe him one of the finest definitions of the principles of the Russian monarchy and one of the most comprehensive answers to the fundamental question: what did Czarism mean to the country?

"For us Russians there is nothing affecting the nation which does not stem from the living source of Supreme Power. The year 1613 was great in events, but our ancestors found no cause for rejoicing until the house of the Romanovs had given them a Czar. Then only did they see the full grandeur of their achievement, because a Czar had once again become a living reality.

"By the fact of his presence on the throne the events of the past years were sanctified, the sacrifices of unknown thousands became hallowed, the goal had been reached and the whole national movement, based on the spontaneous urge of the people, had crystallised and acquired a coherent meaning.

"May our joy today be as great. May the entire population of our immense country, like the united floods of an ocean, share in this joy.

"But consider what would occur if the vast concourse, assembled here today, were suddenly deprived of its Czar, the ruler who stands above it, serene and regal, in whom in the past, it had placed its faith and into whose hands it confidently surrenders its future. This glorious occasion would be devoid of all solemnity; it would be transformed into a gathering of an idle people, who no longer hold anything sacred. We know why our ancient Kremlin echoes to the cheers of the multitude when the imperial standard floats over its walls, telling us of the presence of him, who is the life and soul of the nation.

"The word 'Czar' strangely reflects the whole conscience of the Russian people for whom it has a deep poetical and mystical meaning. This is not a matter of chance. It is a necessity, direct, reasonable and logical, the result of the entire history of Russia.

"Our historical development differs from that of the West. The government has invariably led the people and been their guiding star. The Czar is our liberty, because he is the fount of our civilization, our culture, our life. A great monarch freed us from the Tartars and gathered into one our scattered lands. An even greater Czar introduced Russia to a newer, broader life. Their labours were completed by their successors. Every step along the road of progress, every stage in the development of the nation is an outward expression of the power that resides in the Czar. This power is neither abstract, nor fortuitous. It expresses the will of Providence and, for us Russians, is a living and understandable reality. It interprets this will, often concealed from us, and senses the real needs of the nation. This harmony, between the will of Providence and the actions of the Czar, has evolved into a principle, dual in conception, yet single in outward expression: absolute obedience to the will of the Czar and absolute obedience to the will of Providence.

"This absolute submission to the will of one, as an expression of the terrestrial and transcendental, is for us Russians so obvious, that it needs no proof and need not be argued. But if we delve further into this subject there emerges something of greater importance: this submission to the will of the monarch is not only indispensable, but it is the dominating factor of our lives, the salient characteristic of our race. The whole of our emotional conscience is expressed by the one word 'Czar,' and beside it the word 'Country' is only of subordinate value, like cause and effect. It is time for us proudly and freely to acknowledge a national feeling, centuries old; let us, once and for all, realise that we are as entitled to take pride in our love for the Czar, of our boundless devotion to his person, as the British of their institutions, or the United States of their freedom.

"The expanse of Russia is immense, great is her youthful strength, limitless her might. One is carried away by the vision of the grandeur that awaits her. As a nation, we have every right to be proud.

"But we must always remember that only one road leads to this glittering goal. We must cling to the dominant principle of our national life; we must renounce all alien ideals, no matter how attractive they appear, and cherish what is ours. Because the whole essence of our existence as a nation, its very roots and every heartbeat, are contained in those magic words, 'The Czar.'"

(3) A civil servant or a soldier, on reaching certain rank, or being awarded the Order of St. Vladimir (corresponding to the French Légion d'Honneur) was granted patents of hereditary nobility. The class of Russian society called Nobles (Dvoriane) in the 20th century, had more in common with the Third Estate of France than with the ancient nobility of that country.

Herzen, the revolutionary, writing to Michelet, made the following statement: "The cultured section of the Third Estate in Russia consists of nobles, who have earned their patents and spring from the people. This constant in-

flux of fresh members distinguishes Russian from foreign privileged classes. Since Peter the Great the history of Russia is, in fact, the history of the nobility (Dvorianstvo), now surpassing in numbers half the electorate of France, after the Laws of 31 May, 1850, i.e., approximately three million people."

If, at the time (1852) it was still possible to talk of "privileged classes," after the reforms of 1861-1864 any tangible privileges they had enjoyed were removed. On the whole, the Russian nobility had little in common with the nobility of the West, a product of the feudal system. What might be termed feudalism in Russia differed greatly from the West and its remaining traces were removed by Peter the Great. The attributes of feudalism, dukes, counts, barons, fiefs, castles and feudal law, were unknown. Our feudal lords, if one may so call them, were the hereditary descendants of the heads of principalities and formed the aristocratic caste of "Boyars," while the nobility (Dvorianstvo), mentioned above, was a class apart and frequently in conflict with them.

If we compare the histories of France and Russia we shall see that the first Czars of Moscow, Ivan III and IV, and later their successors, handled the haughty "Boyars" much in the same way as Louis XI and Richelieu, the feudal French aristocracy, while the reforms of Peter the Great and Alexander II, entailed the same consequences for the nobility as the French revolution of 1789.

Some details, probably unknown abroad, concerning Russian titles are of interest. None conferred any rights or privileges on the holders, while the manner in which they were distributed was, to say the least, curious. It frequently happened that families of princely descent had shed, or lost, their titles, whereas, others, not noble by origin, owned foreign titles, acquired or granted abroad. We must always remember that a title in Russia was no criterion for distinguishing between ancient lineage and "plebeian" origin; many untitled Russians descended from families much more ancient, than the bearers of high-sounding and magnificent titles.

An authority on heraldry once remarked: "A history of these new names would embrace the world and would include every country: China (the Princes Orbeliani), Ethiopia (the Princes Abashidze), Jewish-Portuguese (the Counts Diviers), Jewish-German (the Counts Kankrin), etc.

(4) When Peter the Great built up his new administrative machine he divided the civil service into fourteen grades and ruled that promotion was to be based on merit alone. Further, by requiring a School Leaving Certificate for entry into Government service he established an egalitarian tradition, based on an assessable standard of education. Privilege, conferred by birth, was thus done away with, once and for all. Henceforth, right of entry was based solely on this certificate, which became the key to a career in govern-

ment service from junior clerk to ambassador, senator or member of the Council of Empire. Of equal importance is the fact that, starting from Peter the Great, educational establishments, primary, secondary and university, were made accessible to all, irrespective of social standing.

An idea of the democratic composition of the Civil Service, as early as the 18th century, is gained from an old historical work, entitled "Acts of Bravery and Merit by Distinguished Captains and Ministers." The author describes some outstanding men of his time, like Menshikov, the son of a peasant; Shafirov, a foreign Jew (Vide note 5, Chapter 1); Yagujinsky, the son of a church watchman, Lefort, a foreigner of unknown descent. It would be easy to quote the names of generals, admirals and ministers of the humblest origin and, not least, the great Russian scientist and scholar of the 18th century, that versatile genius, Lomonosov.

I should, however, add that up to the sixties of the last century, owing to the condition and standing of certain classes, the number of state servants of humble, or lowly origin, was necessarily restricted. After the radical reforms of Alexander II our administrative machine was undoubtedly the most democratic in Europe, while even that aristocrat of government in every country, the diplomatic service, was not exempt from the general wave of democratization. Let me quote the names of a few of our diplomats during the last two reigns: Nicholas Giers, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Alexander III, son of a customs officer on the Russo-Austrian frontier; Nelidov and Zinoviev, two brilliant ambassadors in Paris and Constantinople, both sons of village schoolmasters; Izvolsky, Foreign Minister and later Ambassador in Paris, was a man of quite humble origin. It was the same in other branches of the administration and the forces. To mention but a few: Witte, a great Minister of Finance, under Nicholas II, late Prime Minister, created Count on his return from Portsmouth, U.S.A., where he engineered the peace treaty with Japan in 1906; Plehve, Minister of the Interior, assassinated during the abortive revolution of 1904; Trepov, Prime Minister, and Rukhlov, Minister of Transport murdered by the Bolsheviks in 1919. In the Forces: Generals Alexeiev, Dragomirov, Ivanov, Lechitzky, Denikin; Admirals Rojdestvensky, Makarov, Kolchak and so many others. The father of General Lechitzky was a priest in a remote village of the Province of Moguilev; General Ivanov's, a quartermaster sergeant in the gunners; Admiral Makarov's, a chief petty officer in the navy. These were outstanding men in the government and the forces, who owed nothing to birth or the social standing of their parents. Some were exceptionally unassuming and modest. When Rukhlov's parents, simple peasants from Vologda, visited him in the capital and were present at receptions in his house they wore peasant dress, which appeared to shock neither their son, nor his guests.

On the other hand, it should not be assumed that the aristocracy took no

share in government. Some of our most talented administrators belonged to the aristocracy and many were former pupils of the famous school and university, the Imperial Lyceum, founded by Alexander I, the alma mater of Pushkin and many famous men. The sons of the aristocracy served in the Guards. Some regiments, like the Preobrajenski, were particularly favoured by the Sovereigns; but here, too, the principle of democracy prevailed and officers of regiments of the line were transferred to the Guards, as a reward for gallantry in the field.

(5) This social picture of Russia obviously refers to fairly recent times, but the egalitarian and democratic trend I have emphasized appears to be inherent in the national character. This is what J. Krijanitch, a Serbian by birth and a graduate of the Catholic College of Vienna, tells us in his memoirs, written in 1646, after spending five years in Russia.

“The Russian lead a simpler life than other Europeans. The gulf between rich and poor is not as great as in the West, where some wallow in riches and others are sunk in the depths of misery. Everyone in Russia, rich and poor, eats to his heart’s content and lives in well heated houses, whereas in the West the poor suffer from cold and hunger. “Thus,” he concludes, “life for the workman and peasant in Russia is better than in other countries.”

(6) To dwell at length on the doctrine of Czarism would serve no purpose, but a few brief historical remarks may further clarify the subject. First let us establish the nature of the power, wielded by the Czar.

The Czar was not an autocrat in the generally accepted meaning of the word, synonymous with “despot.” The Russian word is “Samoderjetz,” and is a literal translation of the Greek “autokratos,” i.e., holding power independently and freely. The title of “Samoderjetz” was assumed by the Grand Dukes of Moscow only after the complete emancipation from the Tartar yoke, when Russia, personified by the Czar, as mandatory of the nation, was at last independent and free to rule herself, without restraint or interference from abroad.

The Honour of the nation, the Good of the people and Supreme Justice, were forever personified by the Czar. He was the “Suum cuique tribuere, neminem leadere” of Roman Law, at its best. There can be no comparison between Czarism, Oriental Despotism and Western Absolutism. Both the latter express power, unlimited either by law, or by moral restrictions. Russia, on the other hand, was a country ruled by law and corresponded to the German definition of “Rechtstaat” after the reforms of 1809-1811 and, especially, after the codification of Russian Law, in 1833.

At the outbreak of War in 1914 the legislative power was exercised jointly by the Czar, the Council of Empire and the Duma. The Council of Empire

(the Upper Chamber) was created in 1810 and consisted of 98 members, nominated by Provincial Assemblies for a term of nine years, a third of which was renewed every three years. Other members, numerically not exceeding the nominated members, were appointed by the Czar.

The Duma, created in 1905, consisted of 442 members, elected for a term of five years by universal suffrage.

The Duma and the elected members of the Council of Empire could be dissolved by Imperial Decree which was accompanied by an order for general elections on a given date. A deep sense of responsibility toward the nation had always restricted the power of the Czar. The feeling that he was the first servant of the nation, expressed by the early Romanovs, was shared alike by the dynasty and the people. The famous sentence of Louis XIV "L'Etat c'est Moi," expressing in a single phrase the essence of absolutism, is quite unthinkable on the lips of Nicholas I, for all his reputed autocracy. It would have been in direct contradiction with the principles of Czarism, as understood by him and his predecessors. The power of the monarch was only a consequence of his duties and the heavier their burden, the greater his power.

An incident in the private life of Nicholas I illustrates his attitude to both. One day his two small sons were playing chess. The youngest of the two boys after losing repeatedly suggested staking his brother's right to the future crown on the issue of the next game. He won and in high glee ran to his father to tell him he was now the Czarevitch. He was met by a stern rebuke. "Is this your idea of Russia?" said the Czar. "Do you think that it is ours to do with as we will? Always remember that all of us, both great and small, owe our lives and our work to the country, and that we, the mighty, have been so placed only the better to serve it."

The following words come to us as a distant echo of Peter the Great, addressing his troops on the eve of Poltava: "The time has come. The fate of our country will be sealed tomorrow. You are not fighting for me, but for the Empire, which I merely hold in trust, for your Faith, for the Church of God. As for Peter, know that he is ever ready to lay down his life so that Russia may live in glory and prosperity."

Most of our sovereigns were men of simple tastes, modest in dress and personal habits, who tried to avoid, as much as possible, the onerous etiquette of the court, or the profitless tedium of official ceremonies. Peter the Great, would escape from his retinue in Paris and visit, unescorted, places of interest; Nicholas I, drove about the streets of the capital in a one-horse carriage, or sledge, stopping to talk to the simple people and allowed them to address him by the warmhearted Russian "Thou." The tiny room, with a simple camp bed, which he often used in preference to his sumptuous bedchamber in the Winter Palace, can still be seen. Alexander II and his grandson, the late Emperor, who both retained the rank of Colonel, which they held at the

death of their fathers, invariably, except on ceremonial occasions, gave precedence to officers of higher rank.

This modesty and unassuming sense of duty were enhanced by great personal courage: we read of Peter the Great rescuing the victims of the floods that all but swamped his new capital, and subsequently dying from the effects of exposure; of Nicholas I, daily visiting the wards, where lay the cholera-stricken inhabitants of the city; of the giant Alexander III, propping up with his massive back a derailed railway carriage, which threatened to crush its inmates and last, perhaps the greatest, our late sovereign who willingly accepted imprisonment and death, rather than sign a shameful treaty, offered from Berlin as the price of his freedom.

Will foreigners ever understand that mysterious bond, which united the sovereign and the nation, or comprehend that the Czar was indeed "the Father" of his people, their true defender, powerful and faithful, the devoted servant of his subjects, the ultimate source of justice, the great and charitable protector? In all its manifestations Czarism was truly national, progressive, egalitarian. An attack on Czarism is an attack on the nation, on the people, on all that in the past has stood for "Russia."

I have previously mentioned Sir Winston Churchill and Professor Charles Sarolea. I shall now add another name to the short list of foreign statesmen and writers who fully appreciated the significance of the fall of Czarism and realised what this would entail. On February 24, 1917, M. Paléologue, French Ambassador to Russia, had an interview with his Italian colleague, Carloti. The latter was full of optimism and thought that transition to a "new order" could be effected smoothly. Mentioning this interview, M. Paléologue writes: "I tried to convince him that, on the contrary, the fall of the monarchy would be followed by a period of disorder of indefinite duration similar to the one that followed the death of Ivan IV. I added that Czarism was not only the official and outward form of Russian government, but the foundation, the framework, in fact the whole edifice, of the Russian community. The historical individuality of Russia had been created and maintained by Czarism and the entire collective life of the country was integrated in the monarchy." (*"La Russie des Tsars Pendant la Grande Guerre,"* Paris, 1921, Vol. III. p. 203)

Much has been said in support of this or that form of government. Whatever the arguments adduced they are not applicable to Czarism. The latter is something essentially Russian, produced by and dependent on Russian realities. It is not possible to identify it with any other régime and its ultimate destinies cannot be assessed by comparison with other monarchies. This fact will be made clear to my readers when together we examine these realities.

(7) Centralization reached its peak during the reign of Nicholas I, i.e., prior to the reforms of 1861-1864, and his administration has often been violently criticised. I take the liberty of quoting the English historian Mackenzie Wal-

lace, an authority on Russia, who lived there during the latter half of the 19th century. The first edition of his book "Russia" was published in 1877, but the lines which follow refer to the last edition of 1912.

"The rigidly centralised government of Nicholas I is often harshly criticised by many Russians and their criticism is accepted by the majority in England. Before condemning we should, however, remember that the system of government in force was historically justifiable and we must not allow attachment to our own British institutions to stand in the way of distinguishing between theoretical and real historical possibilities. What might appear to be the best form of government in the abstract to political philosophers could, in certain concrete cases, prove entirely unsuitable. It is not for us to decide whether Russia should have ever existed as a nation, but we can assert that without a strongly centralized administrative system she could never have become a great European power. That part of the world which today is represented by the Russian Empire was, up to a fairly recent past, a mere collection of independent or semi-independent political units, subjected to the simultaneous stresses of centrifugal and centripetal forces. The centralized administration of autocracy brought Russia into being and later saved the country from dismemberment and political extinction. Finally, after civilising the country it placed it among the great nations of the world." (Translated from the French).

I strongly recommend the chapter in this book devoted to Russian administration. We are given a truthful description of Czarist bureaucracy in historical perspective and the continued evolution of the Russian civil service towards better methods of administration is well described; we are told of the difficulties which the "chinovniki" (government employees) had to face and are given a glimpse of national good humour and patience, as typified by them and by the police.

(8) The famous, or as it was generally termed, the "infamous" "Okhrana" has become a by-word and the name is now used to typify one of the many forms of Czarist tyranny. Its reputation has been vilified and reports of its activities distorted. It has been compared with those monstrous organs of Soviet espionage and murder, the Che-Ka, the G.P.U. and the N.K.V.D. and the N.M.V.D., the active instruments of ruthless political terror. The reputation abroad of the Russian Secret Police was derived from political exiles and nihilists, who had good reason for their hatred. It was pitted against the best organised revolutionary movement in the world and because of this, perhaps, never attained the high efficiency of Scotland Yard in dealing with ordinary crime. Had it been half as efficient, or ruthless, as reputed, the repeated acts of terrorism of our revolutionaries could never have been committed with such relative impunity, nor have met with such deadly success.

The descendants of those nihilists are now at the summit of power in Moscow. They have at present directed their propaganda against capitalist

states, all of which are in turn branded as "slave-drivers," "butchers," "war-mongers," or by any other epithet, that suits the occasion. We are led to believe that some aspects of life in the U.S.A. are similar to "the vilest forms of Czarism." This comparison stems from the same sources as the old and hackneyed anti-Czarist propaganda. There is no reason why the old form should be any more truthful than the new.

"Bolshevism is even worse than Czarism." This is an assertion often made by Western correspondents, which we cannot allow to pass unchallenged. It is used to condemn the present régime in Russia and is founded on the misconceptions to which I have so many times referred. Czarism is presented, not as it was, but as a form of government the West has been taught to abhor. Comparisons of this kind do not help to throw light on the state of affairs in Russia and are merely journalistic platitudes. A recent refugee from the Soviet Zone, reading one such assertion, remarked: "You might as well say that it is darker by night, than by day."

I have already mentioned Dr. Erismann's admiration for some aspects of our national life. Many of us exiles have had proof time and again of the universal love and regard for our country among foreigners, who at one time lived there, and of their desire to return as soon as conditions will permit. It was a good country, easy to live in, and many are honest enough to admit it. It is among people like these, who are not gulled into believing the perverted nonsense that the West is asked to accept, that we find a true appreciation of Russia.

(9) The medical service of the Zemstvo enjoyed the support of all classes. Large sums were donated by merchants and business men, while the land-owners contributed grants of land, often building and equipping village hospitals at their own expense. A case in point may be quoted, where a large village of well over two thousand inhabitants, was provided by the local landowner with a fully equipped modern hospital. The Zemstvo doctors were first class men of their profession and many of them looked upon their work as a dedication, a service to the people. The particular hospital, just mentioned, was run by a Jewish doctor, a former assistant of the famous doctor Roux of Lausanne and a man of the highest medical qualifications. So high was his reputation and so modern the service the hospital could provide that many patients came to it from distant towns.

(10) As we have seen, the number of university students rose by four hundred per cent during the last twenty years before the revolution. Though this increase was, obviously gratifying and to the general good, it was not devoid of alarming consequences.

In other countries, where progress is less spontaneous and sudden, university education follows the natural development of the cultural level. It was the other way around in Russia. Let us pause for a moment and examine the type

of young people who began to stream into the higher seats of learning. Secondary education had been made accessible to the poorest classes, hence the vast majority of the students, were the children of peasants, labourers and wage-earners on the lower-scale. Some rose to great heights and in later life contributed much to the fame of their country, but many were disorientated and lost all sense of proportion and reality. They were completely uprooted—the knowledge they had just acquired went to their heads—they despised the milieu in which they had grown up and to which, by tradition, they belonged. In the welter of new ideas and new vistas, which their minds were not yet ready to absorb, they lost their bearings. They were incapable of creative work and lacked definite purpose; for them, manual work was the lot of the imbecile and the development of their country's resources of no interest. Political abstractions, endless and profitless arguments, prefabricated theories and undigested ideas were the only subjects that aroused their interest. Many, I am sure, genuinely believed that they could talk into existence a new pattern of society, or bring about that "New Jerusalem," which was the main theme of their debates, their endless spate of words and their dreams. In a burning desire to be appreciated, they coined a name for themselves: "Intelligentsia." This high-falutin term deceived very few and soon the word acquired a derogatory meaning and was used to describe an unsuccessful and worthless "highbrow."

It was soon apparent, even to these intellectually conceited young people, that they were shunned and, on the whole, despised. They became embittered and sought refuge in violent propaganda, based on rabid political theories.

In the closing years of the last century Dostoyevsky rose against, what he called, "This demi-science." "It is," he wrote, "the most frightening scourge of our time more terrible than plague, famine, or war. A despot unparalleled in the history of humanity, it is served by acolytes and slaves, all of whom bow before it in love and superstition. Science fears this superstition and demeans itself by giving it support."

Mendeleev, the great scientist and avowed materialist, joined in this protest. In 1906 he drew public attention to the fact that the "under-developed" intelligentsia was being infiltrated by anti-social elements; he also deplored the loss of progressive minds, in danger of being swamped by a flood of militant anarchy.

The government, though fully aware of the anti-social leanings of the "students," deliberately continued to pursue a policy of increased university education. To its credit, it realised that this anarchy of youthful thought was merely the growing pains of a precocious child, in pursuit of a vaguely formulated Tolstoyan dream, or a tepid brand of Marxism. It sensed that no real danger lay behind all this talk, this criticism of any and every step taken by the authorities, this denigration of Russian traditions, not even in the

mildly subversive propaganda conducted among the workmen and peasants. It rightly felt that time would gradually wipe out these anomalies in a better educated generation.

Not all the members of the "Intelligentsia" were, however, inoffensive zealots, and this was unfortunate for the State. From their ranks there gradually emerged a group of a different stamp, young men and women, imbued with a flaming hatred of society and the State. The "Nihilists," as the name indicates, believed in nothing, obeyed nobody and repudiated all laws, both man-made and divine. Their God was World Revolution, and no considerations, human, social, or ethical, could restrain them from putting into effect the monstrous theories they were taught by their organized leaders.

Read "The Possessed," that prophetic masterpiece by Dostoyevsky and you will appreciate how the perverse plans, laid many years ago, have now been fulfilled and found concrete expression in modern Bolshevism.

The "Nihilists" were not numerous, but, unlike their lukewarm brothers of the "Intelligentsia," they knew what they wanted and went straight for their goal. Their first act of open warfare was the assassination of Emperor Alexander II on March 13th, 1881.

Favoured by the course of events they have all but destroyed the very "Intelligentsia" which gave them birth. We shall return to these questions in Chapters X and XI.

CHAPTER III

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is no longer the dominating factor of Russian economy. The expansion of industrialization and the importance it has acquired in the economic policy of the Soviet Union have pushed it into the background; the insane policy of collectivization, with all the misery, famine, bloodshed and complete disruption of any stable continuity of output that it entails has contributed still further to decrease the former preponderance of agriculture. Though, as we shall see in the following chapters, industry was rapidly expanding before 1914 and the Revolution, the economic policy of the State in those days was based on and geared to agriculture.

The importance, both economic and social, of Russian agriculture was universally recognized. Yet, it was a subject on which precise information was sadly lacking. Abroad, and in Russia, there was a tendency to assume that the amount of arable land was little short of limitless and that the rural population was but thinly scattered over its surface. There followed the conclusion that the relative poverty of the "muzik" was mainly attributable to the inadequate size of his holding and to the fact that the greater part of the land was in the hands of large estate owners. The wretched peasant, miserable and dispossessed, was a favorite theme of revolutionary propaganda.

If the Russians themselves were hypnotized by the immensity of the plains in which they lived, it is not surprising that abroad these false assumptions should have been accepted, as self evident. But, like so many other preconceived ideas about Russia, they do not stand up to examination.

Let us begin by ascertaining how much land was actually available to agriculture in the fifty provinces of European Russia. (Our analysis is confined to this part of Russia, as in Siberia the entire arable acreage was held by the peasants). Then, review the agricultural policy of the Government and the various measures adopted to ensure the well-being of the peasant and lastly examine the results obtained by these measures.

Here then are the relevant figures. (1) (As the former Russian agricultural unit of one "dessiatine" equals approximately two and one half English statute acres, I shall, for the sake of simplicity give the figures in English measures).

Statistical figures for 1905 give the total area of European Russia, as 969,382,000 acres, (the three Baltic Provinces, with an independent agrarian policy are excluded), less 294,705,000 acres, the area of three northern provinces, where, owing to climatic conditions agriculture was not possible. We are left with a total of 674,677,000 acres in 44 provinces. Of these, 158.75 million acres were forests and 100 million acres, sand and marshland. We thus obtain a net figure of 415,927 million acres. In 1915, 316.5 million were under cultivation, the balance consisting of pastures and land lying fallow. The area actually cultivated was further reduced by a considerable quantity of lea acreage, extensive in Russia, and amounting approximately to 30% on estates and 60% on peasant holdings in pre-war years, (1914).

The next point to examine is the density of the population per acre. It is obvious that if the whole territory is taken into consideration, the figure will of course, be lower than in Western Europe; but, if we compare the density of the rural population in relation to the amount of arable land available, the reverse is the case. This is explained by the small urban population of Russia, amounting to 17 or 18% of the total, as against 45 to 75% in the West. In 1905 there were 139 rural inhabitants per 250 acres of land in Russia, compared with 107 in Germany, 84 in France and 79 in Britain. On the other hand, in 1905 five

acres of arable land per head were available in Russia, while in France approximately the same figure obtained as far back as 1892. This last comparison is not really fair, as even in some of our Western and Central Provinces where the summers are longer and the climate is milder than in the East, the Russian average was lower than in France.

Only in the provinces of the lower Volga and those bordering on the Black Sea do we meet with the higher figure of approximately 10 acres. The yield per acre, however, in France and Russia differed considerably, due primarily to inferior methods of husbandry, but also to climatic, geological and other conditions. (a)

The figures quoted should, in my opinion dispel the idea that land in Russia was a commodity in unlimited supply.

"The landlords owned nearly all the land in Russia." This is a commonly held opinion, but one that is quite unfounded. If reference is made to enormous tracts in the northern and north-eastern provinces, thinly populated and where the peasants' holdings were small it should be understood that the soil in these regions was quite unsuited to agriculture and that by far the greater part was owned by the State. (b) These provinces, located on the confines of European Russia, were covered by dense forests and their main wealth lay in the minerals they contained. The timber was mostly used as fuel for blast furnaces in the great iron and steel works of the Urals and it was only in the last decades before the Revolution that active steps were taken by the Government to avert the threat of deforestation.

(a) Professor D. Mendeleev in his original study "Toward Knowledge of Russia," published in 1907, drew attention to certain geographical conditions, unfavorable to agriculture. Further studies were made by Count A. Saltikov and V. Paletika. This point must not, however, be overstressed, as proved by the tables at the end of the chapter.

(b) In 1916 arable land held by the State, the Crown, monasteries, churches, cities and the Peasants' Bank was estimated at 6.9% of all public lands. This figure represents less than 5.5% of lands suitable for cultivation.

As regards agricultural land it should be noted that this was mainly split up into small parcels and was owned by the peasants. According to figures published as a result of an agricultural census taken in 1916 out of total of 179,274,232 acres under cultivation only 19,218,402 acres, or 10.7 per cent, belonged to estate owners, the balance being the property of the peasants.

The figures quoted tally with those produced by one of the ablest Soviet agricultural experts. According to his estimates, on the eve of the Revolution, 90.45% of arable land was cultivated by the peasants and 9.55% by estate owners.(2)

Other Soviet statistics express the value of land jointly held in the 36 provinces by estate owners and peasants as follows(a):

	Total Area	Estate Owners, (In million Acres)		Peasants	
In private ownership	347.5	58.5	16.8%	289.0	88.1%
Arable land	177.5	23.75	13.3%	155.75	86.7%
Under crops	112.5	10.	8.9%	102.5	91.1%
Cattle (in million heads)	111.2	3.9	3.5%	107.3	96.5%

In 1907, in Germany, holdings not exceeding 125 acres amounted to 40% of land privately owned; in France holdings of 100 acres, or less to 58%, in 1892; and in Belgium to 38.95%.(b) In Russia, in 1905, holdings of 27.5 acres accounted for 75% of the total, thus showing that the number of small holdings in relation to the total amount of land in private ownership was greater in Russia than in Western Europe.

The principles of land tenure in Russia were more democratic than in the West and this democratization had evolved very rapidly. In 1861, immediately after the emancipation of the serfs and ensuing redistribution of land the total still held

(a) Soviet Review: "On the Agrarian Front," 1927. Nos. 11, 12. pp. 93-113.

(b) S. Seebohm Rowntree, "Land and Labour; Lessons from Belgium." London. 1910. pp. 44-45.

by the landlords amounted to 300 million acres. By 1915 this figure had fallen to 157.5 million. (b)

It is obvious that, if during 55 years, the acreage of large and medium landed property decreased by 47.5%, the amount of land owned by the "moujik" had grown considerably. This assumption is borne out by figures: at the time of the emancipation the peasants were endowed with 284.25 million acres. In 1916 they owned 470 million, while the Peasants' Bank held a further 5,567 million acres, purchased by the Bank for resale to the peasants. (These figures do not include the three Baltic and three northern provinces.) Thus, the total of the peasants' acreage had gone up by 68% in the 55 years mentioned, 1861 to 1916.

This rapid evolution, which resulted in the complete democratization of land tenure in Russia was brought about by measures expressly taken by the Czarist government to increase and maintain the wellbeing of the peasants.

When serfdom in Russia is discussed two points are generally emphasized: its long duration and the late date at which it was abolished.

An important, perhaps the most important, fact to remember is this: serfdom in Russia had nothing in common with serfdom, as it emerged from the feudal system, in the West. (3) But, as serfdom it nevertheless was, let me say that in Russia it had lasted for two hundred and fifty years only and affected but half the peasant population, whereas in Western Europe it had endured for eight or ten centuries. As for the date, 1861, it was not so far behind other countries as one might suppose. While it is true that in Denmark, for instance, serfdom was abolished in 1788, statute peasant labor was enforced up to 1850. In the German States it was abolished at varying dates during the first half of the 19th century. In rural districts, however, up to 1848, the police and the maintenance of law were in the hands of the local squires who retained the right of corporal punish-

(b) D. Pestrzjzky, "Close to the Soil." Berlin. 1922. p. 19. In Russian.

ment. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire serfdom was abolished in 1848.

The mitigated serfdom of our peasant even at its height bears little resemblance to actual slavery in the United States, and none at all in the forms it had acquired by the 19th century. (4) As comparison between Russian serfdom and slavery in the United States is often stressed, I would point out that in 1861 our peasants were freed while the negroes in the States were still slaves.

In the majority of countries serfdom was broken by revolution. In Russia liberation took place on the initiative of the government. If we were behind other countries by a few years, let us reflect on the fact that when they were freed our serfs were granted generous holdings of land, an unprecedented act in the annals of history.

As a matter of interest, I should say that quite a few foreign economists—Haxthausen, Zando, Ferroti, Southerland-Edwards—who visited Russia between 1840 and 1850, evinced less enthusiasm for the immediate suppression of serfdom in its existing form than the Russian sovereigns. For a number of political and economic reasons, which he analyses with true German thoroughness, Haxthausen in particular was definitely against this measure so dear to Nicholas I and brought into being by his son Alexander II, the Liberator. (a)

Instead of immediate and complete emancipation, these foreign economists favored a staggered plan spread over a number of years.

The "Law of Emancipation" of 1861 granted personal liberty to the former serfs and disposed the landowners of 87.5 million acres in favor of the peasants, i.e., a third of all the land they owned, amounting to more than half of the area cultivated by them. In law, this amounted to expropriation. (b) The State in

(a) "Studien über die inneren Zustände des Volksleben und insbesondere die Einrichtungen Russlands," Hannover & Berlin. 1847.

(b) See article by Baron Nolde in "Le Monde Slave," March 1927.

its turn surrendered 200 million acres and liberated its peasants who, though not serfs, were bound to the land owned by the State, or the crown. The size of the holdings granted to the village communes (the "Mir") for distribution among their members averaged 37.5 acres per "hearth."

For reasons which will immediately be made clear, the grandiose reform of 1861 engendered an agrarian problem which it took 45 years to solve successfully.

The maintenance of the existing standard of living depended on the possibility of so increasing production as to meet the demands of the population, growing at the rate of 1 to 1½% per annum. In 1861 the total population was estimated at 70 million. In 1913 it had risen to 174.5 million; an increase of over 100 million; while, in the 20th century the annual rate of increase had jumped to 2½% per annum.

The problem before the government may be summarized thus: how to utilize the productive forces of the nation to the best advantage in order to maintain a constant improvement in the general standard of living in the face of a steadily growing birth rate.

The Czarist government solved this complex problem by following an elaborate program directed along four main lines. 1. The development of industry; 2. a further increase in peasant land tenure; 3. improvement in methods of agriculture; and 4. Agricultural credit.

1. Increased industrial production is obviously able to provide, in theory at least, virtually unlimited employment and is not subject to those limiting factors which impede agricultural expansion. The development of industry depends, however, on three factors: raw material, labor and an assured market. The first two factors presented no particular problem in Russia. The third was dependent on the rural population. The rapid expansion of industry in the decades preceding the Revolution are a striking proof of the increased purchasing power of the peasants.

2. As previously explained, between 1861 and 1916, nine-

tenths of the agricultural land changed ownership and passed into the hands of peasants. This transfer was accelerated by the activities of the Peasants' Bank, founded by the State in 1882 with the object of providing the peasants with greater facilities for the purchase of land. Toward the close of the last century Russian agriculture was going through a difficult time partly due to the general agricultural crisis in Europe, but also because of the impoverishment of the landowners who had been severely hit by the liberation of the serfs and consequent forfeiture of part of their estates.

The policy of the Bank, as laid down by charter, consisted in acquiring real estate in the shape of arable land, and reselling it to the peasants on extremely favorable terms; the loans, advanced by the bank over an average of 55 years, often amounted to 90% of the purchase price of the land. The rate of interest charged was low and any annual deficit in the operations of the Bank was guaranteed by the Treasury. Five-sixths of the Bank's clients were peasants owning less than 22.5 acres, i.e., the poorest section of the rural population.

Loans Granted by the Peasants Bank 1901-1912

(In Gold Roubles)

1901	221,001,000
1903	388,277,000
1905	450,595,000
1907	500,493,000
1909	723,126,000
1911	1,027,464,000
1912	1,167,994,000

In viewing these figures we must agree that the description of the Bank as "the largest institution of agricultural credit in the world" was well deserved. (a)

I have described the steps taken by the government to increase peasant land tenure in European Russia. Now let us turn

(a) Wieth Knudsen. "Bauernfrage und Agrarreform in Russland." Munich, 1913. p. 134.

to Siberia, where all the arable land was turned over to the peasants, those from European Russia being encouraged to emigrate and generously subsidized.

The penetration of Siberia began at the end of the 16th century. There gradually developed a movement, which through the centuries took the form of a steady trek eastward that brought Russian pioneers to the shores of the Pacific and across the Behring Straits into Alaska. This eastward flow proceeded evenly through the years, with no "rushes" like the Klondyke Gold Rush, and, up to 1831, was free from government interference. Thereafter a certain measure of encouragement was given to the settlers, but there resulted no marked acceleration in the general trend and at the time of the liberation of the serfs the entire populaion of Siberia numbered less than 3,000,000. A new phase was opened in the nineties of the last century. Two factors brought about this change: the rapid growth of the population and the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, begun in 1891 and completed in 1906.

A committee was founded by the management of the railway known as the "Committee of the Trans-Siberian." It took particular interest in the transportation of would-be settlers, and by organizing canteens, rest centers, and in general looking after the welfare of the emigrants, gave an enormous impetus to the settling of Siberia. The Committee was generously supported by the "Board of Emigration," which corresponded to a Ministry of Colonies, founded in 1897. The number of settlers increased from a steady average of 100,000 p.a. at the end of the century, to 400,000, and by 1907 had reached 600,000.

Every encouragement was given by the government to induce the peasants from European Russia to settle in Siberia. Credits were opened; starting with 5 million roubles in 1906, 11 the following year and soon reaching an annual figure of 30 million.

Emigrants were carried free of charge by the Trans-Siberian Railway, the government paying for their transportation. A grant of 100 to 400 roubles per family was allowed and each

family, upon arrival, was given gratis a holding averaging 100 acres.

A system of large depots of agricultural machinery was established in Siberia for supplying the settlers on terms which only the government could afford.

During the reign of Nicholas II (1894-1917) 5½ million emigrants were carried to Siberia and were allotted 100,000,000 acres of land (four fifths of the territory of France).

3. Emigration to Siberia, measures to facilitate the purchase of land in European Russia, etc., were, no doubt, steps taken in the right direction; however, they were based on a quantitative assessment of the agrarian problem and were, by themselves, insufficient. It was imperative to introduce better methods of husbandry in view of the constantly decreasing acreage of available tillage. Yet improvement was slow among the peasants.

The greatest obstacle to progress was the "mir," (5) or agricultural village commune. Compared with more archaic forms of land ownership it was, at one time, a step forward, but under modern conditions of civilization and economics, the abolition of this system was a crying necessity. Individual ownership was the answer as the only method which could lead to improved methods and increased yields.

To abolish the "mir" was a stupendous task. Russian public opinion of all shades and at all times had shown a singular attachment to communal ownership. Great exponents of Russian thought, though often holding diametrically opposite views, were unanimous in defending the "mir" and unequivocal against its suppression. Opposition, theoretical, social and political, was eventually overcome by the government and an immense agrarian reform, aimed at creating a new class of small landed proprietors at last got under way.

The *coup de grâce* to the rural commune was dealt by Prime Minister P. Stolypin on 22nd November, 1906, in the face of a storm of criticism and abuse by every organ of the "liberal" press.

The proposed reform was as radical as that of 1861. It was preceded by a decree cancelling the balance still due by the peasants for the land that had been requisitioned in their favor in 1861, a concession which cost the Treasury 80 million roubles. The "mir" was thus freed from financial obligations to the State and the individual peasant could leave the commune unburdened by debt. By the new law, heads of families were allowed to withdraw from the commune and claim as personal property the land which they had been using as members of the "mir." As this often consisted of scattered parcels, a special clause provided for the exchange of these parcels against a single plot.

The whole change-over was to be achieved by a) gradually abolishing the "mir"; b) granting title deeds to heads of families only and debarring other members of the "mir" from the right of claiming communally owned land. This restriction included members who habitually earned their livelihood outside the commune, e.g., workers in towns, factories, etc., as they constituted a permanent threat of further parcellation; c) the creation of small properties of a single tenant, as a means of putting an end to the depressing system of splintered holdings and an incentive to improvement.

Stolypin's reform, by creating a new type of holding, brought about a radical change in the question of housing. Farmhouses, standing on their own land, the private property of individual owners, now began to replace the customary large villages, saving time and labor, and reducing the danger of village fires. This new type of dwelling became increasingly popular, especially in the southwest and the middle reaches of the Volga, and the changed appearance of the countryside over a period of a few years was astounding.

The immediate result of these changes was the dawn of a new era in agriculture. By January 1, 1915, only nine years after the promulgation of the law, 3,027,129 peasants, heads of families, had left the "mir" and held 67,132,500 acres individually owned. (An area larger than half of France.) By

January 1, 1916, their number had risen to 5,793,540. The popularity of the reform may be gauged by increasingly frequent instances of whole communes voluntarily disbanding in order to avail themselves of the benefits derived from the new system.

It is obvious that an agrarian reform of such magnitude demanded an immense amount of complicated work and organization which was entrusted to Special District Committees; 12,000 agents and surveyors were employed at a cost to the Treasury of over 100 million roubles. The staunchest supporters of the reform would have recoiled in dismay, appalled at the expenditure, if the government had not assumed responsibility for all the charges involved.

A general improvement in the level of agriculture followed the development of the system. Having created a new type of owner, the government came to his financial assistance. In 1913 grants amounted to 37 million roubles, of which 25 million were paid by the central administration and 12 million by the Zemstvo (local administration). The handful of agricultural instructors of 1900 grew into an army 4,581 strong, engaged in teaching and demonstrating improved methods of cultivation.

The number of students in agricultural colleges rose from 9,300 in 1907 to 18,000 in 1913. An average of 2,000 graduated annually and over 300,000 farmers attended special courses in practical agriculture.

Sponsored by the government, model farms were organized in every province; large depots of modern agricultural machinery and tools were opened; cattle breeding was improved. On the eve of the First World War a fundamental change in the general aspect of Russian Agriculture was in full process of development: a new class of small landowners, attached to the soil and proud of their independence, had come into being; the soil of Russia had at last passed into the hands of the peasants who had coveted it for centuries.

This new sense of responsibility among the peasants brought home the fact that their future wellbeing, still threatened by

rural overpopulation, henceforth depended solely on their own efforts and that improved methods of husbandry and increased yields could allay this threat.

Stolypin's reform pursued a double aim: on the one hand, increased agricultural production and a consequent improvement in the country's economy; on the other, the creation of a small peasant bourgeoisie as a solid foundation for the social framework of Russia. It is not surprising that our revolutionaries and their fellow-travellers, the left-wing politicians, should have tried by every means, from propaganda to bombs, to disrupt and handicap this magnificent act of statesmanship, until they finally succeeded in shooting its author to death. The inscription on Stolypin's statue in Kiev, where he was assassinated, and which was taken from one of his speeches, is a tribute to his work and to his whole life: "You desire great upheavals; we, a great Russia." If the aims toward which his policy was directed had been achieved, we should have been spared much bloodshed and even, perhaps, the Revolution. Another decade of untrammelled peace and security would have consolidated the reform of 1906 and finally solved the agrarian problem. But fate willed otherwise. When war broke out in 1914 only 15-20% of the whole program of reorganization had been completed.

4. Not the least among the measures taken by the government to develop agriculture was the extension of rural credit.

After the emancipation of the serfs, rural credit, mainly secured by agricultural produce, was obtainable from the State Bank and later from the Peasants' Bank and a few other banking enterprises. In 1895 "The People's (Petty or Mutual) Credit" was first instituted and at once became popular with the peasants, while the reform of 1906 further stressed the necessity for extending the existing credit machinery in order to meet an ever growing demand.

On January 1, 1903, the State Bank's agricultural loans amounted to 46,476,000 roubles; three years later they had risen to 128,244,000 roubles. Other operations of the Bank,

connected with agriculture, between 1903 and 1913 rose from 15,118,000 roubles to 58,280,000, of which 45,077,000 roubles represented loans to institutions dealing with rural credit and 13,203,000 roubles, loans in the proper sense.

The State Bank was quick to recognize the great advantage offered by grain elevators. (a) In 1912 it was decided within the next four years to build in the East and Southeast of European Russia 85 elevators with a total capacity of 65,600,000 poods. (b) After their completion another 77, of 62,750,000 poods capacity, were to follow in other regions of Russia and subsequently a similar network was to be extended to Siberia. In the opinion of the government the existing storage capacity of 45,000,000 poods was inadequate, and, in its desire to come to the assistance of the peasants, the program was given energetic support. The old elevators were condemned as inefficient, too small and not readily accessible to the small farmer. The new type built by the State Bank was ultra modern and ranked with the finest installations on the continent. Grain was not only stored in these elevators, it was cleaned and classified and the owner was given facilities for obtaining a loan on his produce, or selling it on commission. A further concession was made to the small producer: the minimum amount of grain accepted for storage was set at approximately 25 poods, i.e., two-fifths of a ton.

Fifteen State Bank elevators were completed and in operation by January 1, 1914, and 46 were in process of construction. Owing to technical difficulties arising from the war it was not possible to carry out the original program, though by 1916 the number of fully completed elevators had risen to 40, with a total capacity of 27,700,000 poods, and 27 others were being built.

(a) In Russia, as in America, the term "elevator" is applied to a general storehouse and elevator specially equipped for the preservation of grain in perfect condition.

(b) 1 pood equals 40 lbs. 61 poods equal 1 ton.

Operations of Elevators Belonging to the State Bank

Years	Number of elevators	Turnover in thou- sands of poods	Turnover relative to capacity %
1913-1914	13	5,507	90%
1914-1915	26	17,942	150%
1915-1916	37	25,660	220%

These figures, though relating to the war years, testify to the energy with which the original program was being carried out by the State Bank and permit one to appreciate the results that might have been obtained under normal conditions.

A new law of June 7, 1904, was passed to complete and amend the 1895 regulations governing "Petty Credit." "People's Banks of Mutual Credit" were founded by the State with the participation of the Zemstvos for handling and extending rural credit operations, expressed by the following figures:

	<i>Jan. 1, 1905</i>	<i>Jan. 1, 1911</i>	<i>July 1, 1914</i>
Number of Banks	6,813	12,546	19,165
Membership	2,340,400	5,577,900	11,631,100
Turnover	112,539,000	328,761,000	954,224,800

It will be seen that between January 1, 1905, and July 1, 1914, i.e., in nine and a half years the number of banks was trebled; membership increased over five times and the volume of turnover, nearly ten times.

The figures above relate to the operations of the "Mutual Credit Banks" only, controlled by specially appointed agents called "Mutual Credit Inspectors," whose duty it was to popularize the system of mutual credit by conferences and lectures to the peasants and to explain to them all the advantages of the system. Large scale operations, connected with the disposal of crops, etc., of the State Bank, the Peasants' Bank and other banking institutions are not included.

This ends the summary of the measures adopted by the Czarist government to develop and increase agricultural production and improve the standard of living and general well-being and prosperity of the "Mujik."

An era of continued and increased expansion dawned for Russian agriculture in all its aspects, as a result of the measures enumerated. Between 1869 and 1914 the yield of the peasant, always inferior to that of the large estate owner, rose steadily from just over 29 poods per diessiatine to 38 poods in 1899, and to 41 poods at the outbreak of the war. The manufacture in Russia of agricultural machinery increased fourfold from 1904 to 1914, importation from abroad continued to mount and, in 1913, the turnover of agricultural machinery, implements, etc., was valued at 140 million roubles. The manufacture of artificial fertilizers rose from 13 to 32 million poods between 1907 and 1913 and imports of fertilizer from 10 to 30 million poods.

Agricultural societies, numbering 447 in 1902, increased to 2,967 in 1909 and 4,685 at the end of 1913. A year later there were also 2,023 other agricultural associations mainly concerned with marketing, the purchase of machinery and the creation of rural industries. In 1909 there were only 106 such associations.

The same trend was manifest in other branches connected with agriculture. The number of credit associations rose from 1,680 in 1905 to 8,000 in 1913. The most striking fact was, however, the extraordinary increase in the number of agricultural cooperative societies, from 2,000 in 1902 to 22,000 in 1912, of which 4,200 were founded in 1911.

The following table illustrates the expansion of agricultural production in relation to cereals. The first two columns in the following table give the yearly average for 1898-1902 and 1908-1912. The figures for 1913, the last year of normal production, are given in column three.

Production of Grain in Russia (in millions of Poods)

	1898-1902	1908-1912	1913	1913 increase in relation to 1898-1902 average	
				Quantity	%
Rye	1,281.4	1,350.1	1,593.3	311.9	24.9
Wheat	787.6	1,118.1	1,554.8	837.2	116.8
Barley	350.5	581.1	750.4	399.9	114.2
Oats	679.1	896.9	1,087.0	407.9	60.0
Other cereals	202.5	402.9	429.4	226.9	102.4
Totals	3,301.1	4,349.1	5,414.9	2,183.8	64.8

Nothing comparable has ever been achieved by any country in Europe and I would further stress that the remarkable expansion of our agriculture was based on a national effort without help of imported foreign labor, as in America, Canada and the Argentine. It enabled the government to meet the needs of an increasing population, provide more and better food for the prospering peasant, increase our foreign trade and settle our foreign commitments by the export of grain.

Exports of Russian Grain (in millions of Poods)

	1898-1902	1913	Balance	%
Rye	80.0	39.5	-40.5	50.6
Wheat	133.0	203.1	+70.1	52.7
Barley	83.2	239.5	+156.3	188.3
Oats	55.4	36.4	-19.0	34.5
Other cereals	46.4	129.3	+82.9	178.6
Totals	398.0	647.8	+249.8	62.7

Value of above (in millions of Roubles)

	1898-1902	1913	Difference	%
Rye	46.0	32.9	- 13.1	28.4
Wheat	136.4	225.1	+ 88.7	55.2
Barley	49.7	186.1	+136.4	274.4
Oats	39.2	31.8	- 7.4	10.8
Other cereals	32.2	114.0	+ 81.8	255.6
Totals	303.5	589.9	+286.4	94.4

Thus, thanks to an increase in exports and a slight rise in world prices, the sale of Russian grain on foreign markets in 1913 brought in practically double the amount as compared with the previous decade.(a)

In 1913, 12% of the Russian harvest was exported. At the beginning of the century home consumption amounted to 2,833.1 million poods as against 4,767.1 million poods just before the war, an increase of 1,934.0 million poods, or 67%. During the same period the population had grown from 135.2 million to 174.5 million, an increase of 27.9%. A comparison between these two figures, 67% (home consumption) and 27.9% (increase in population) is in itself a striking proof of the improved standard of living of the broad masses.

Let us now compare Russian and world production. (The figures are taken from the Bulletin of the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome for November 1914.)

World Production of Grain in 1913
(in millions of poods)

	World Production	Russian Production	%
Rye	2,378.0	1,593.3	67.0
Wheat	4,971.4	1,554.8	31.2
Oats	3,324.6	1,087.0	30.3
Barley	1,771.4	750.4	42.3

Between 1909 and 1913 Russian production of these four main cereals was 28% greater than the combined production of the Argentine, Canada and the United States and her exports of cereals exceeded the corresponding exports of the Argentine by 177%, of Canada by 211% and of the U.S.A. by 366%.

These comparative figures would appear to dispense with the need for any further commentary but for a striking fact

(a) Attention is drawn to the change in the amounts of various types of grain caused by an increase or drop in demand. Rye, for instance, could no longer compete with wheat, which sold at a better price, greatly to the advantage of our national economy. For further details on this subject see my article in "Revue Politique et Parlementaire," Paris, January 10, 1931.

which, though well known, is not fully appreciated: since the fall of Czarism enormous regions of the USSR, known but recently as "Russia," have been struck by recurrent famines, a damning fact in a country where the expansion of agricultural production was proceeding at the astounding rate we have just shown.

Russia led the world in the production of potatoes and animal fodder. Vast quantities of vegetables and fruit were also grown, while the Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia specialized in grapes and produced excellent wines and liqueurs.

We occupied third place among the tobacco growing countries, coming after the United States and British India. Because of the varied climatic conditions in our tobacco-growing regions we were able to grow different kinds of tobacco and thus meet the demands of markets catering to different tastes. Tobacco from the Caucasus went to make the type of cigarette known as "Russian," while Crimean tobacco was exported to Egypt, amounting to 18.3% of the total Egyptian imports and was used in the manufacture of the famous Egyptian cigarettes.

Plants used as raw material in many branches of industry were also extensively grown in Russia. In the chapter on Industry we shall examine the production of beet, flax and hemp. Cotton, introduced by the Ministry of Agriculture, merits special attention, however, because of the striking success obtained in its cultivation.

The climate of European Russia is unsuitable to cotton-growing, but in Central Asia, and particularly in the Turkistan conditions are exceptionally favorable. This region covers an area equal to former Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Holland and Denmark put together and its importance is immense.

In 1881, after the final defeat of the fierce Turkoman "Teke" tribe and the capture of its stronghold, "Geok-Tepe," Central Asia was at last pacified. Before the conquest of this enormous

region and the introduction of the Czarist administration it had been for centuries a hotbed of anarchy and tribal wars. No ordered economic life was possible under these conditions and cotton was not cultivated, though, according to local tradition, the art was known to the natives long before the Christian era having probably been imported from Persia and China. Lack of security and organizing ability, primitive methods of irrigation, the absence of transport facilities and shortage of capital, in fact the total absence of the benefits of civilization, rendered the cultivation of cotton quite impracticable from an industrial point of view.

The civilizing achievements of Czarist Russia in this part of the world in the space of 25 years were magnificent. Free labor replaced a regime of slavery. Order, justice and equity now reigned instead of the tyranny and despotism of proverbially cruel warring chieftains. The railway engine ousted the camel as a means of transportation. Schools, hospitals, roads, business houses and industrial undertakings sprang up over the whole region. Tashkent, until it was ruined by Red vandalism, was, in the words of Professor Ch. Sarolea, "a little Paris" in the heart of Asia.

The steps taken by the Imperial Government to promote cotton-growing in the Turkistan are worthy of the greatest praise. New brands of better quality were introduced and replaced those locally grown, unsuited to modern industry. Vast stretches of desert were reclaimed by irrigation and brought under cotton cultivation.

As we shall see in the next chapter, Russia became one of the biggest cotton-weaving countries in the world and, on the eve of war in 1914 the internal demand of her huge population was met by the output of her mills.

The figures below, showing the source of supply of raw cotton during the thirty years preceding the Revolution, illustrate the rapid expansion of the industry.

Cotton Used by Russian Industry (In millions of poods)

Year	Russian	Foreign	Total used	% of Russian in relation to foreign cotton
1888	1.2	7.9	9.1	13.2
1895	3.3	8.2	11.5	28.7
1900	5.8	10.3	16.1	36.0
1905	6.2	10.4	16.6	37.3
1910/11	13.9	11.9	25.8	54.0
1915/16	22.2	7.0	29.2	78.9

The steady rise in output was not even retarded by the war, as we see that in 1915-16 78.9% was grown at home.

On the eve of the Revolution, thanks to the energy of the Government in developing the Turkistan, our textile industry no longer depended on imports from abroad. The Ministry of Agriculture had other irrigation projects in hand and a further 50% increase in production might confidently have been expected. There is little doubt that had the Revolution not upset the whole industrial organization of the country, Russia would shortly have become one of the great cotton exporting countries of the world.

The cultivation of cotton, so laboriously developed, was virtually destroyed by the Bolsheviks. After years of neglect it has again come to life at the price of untold suffering; grandiose schemes are on foot which will, some day, restore it to its former prosperity. Accompanied by waving of flags and beating of drums we are told of the brilliant results now being achieved; after forty years of power Moscow is only now restoring what had been so brilliantly built up by the "retrograde" Czarist regime.

Russia was in the forefront of cattle breeding countries and, like agriculture, the cattle trade was rapidly expanding.

Total of livestock 1895-1914
(In thousands of heads)

	1895	1910	1914	Increase in % compared to 1895
Horses	25,600	32,100	37,500	47.3
Cattle	31,600	48,500	52,000	64.5
Sheep	60,000	83,900	90,300	50.5
Pigs	10,100	12,500	14,500	43.5

Much of the transport in Russia was horsedrawn and all the work in the fields was done by horses until the tractor made its appearance shortly before the first World War. Horsebreeding was a national industry and in this respect Russia occupied a unique position. According to figures taken shortly before 1914 we owned more than half the total number of horses in the world 33 million out of 60 million. By 1914 the number had risen to 37.5 million, i.e., 21 horses per 100 head of population. (In France the corresponding figure was 8 to 100.) Some of the State and private studs were successful in introducing excellent new breeds, such as the "Orlov Trotters," the fastest in the world, while the export of Russian horses rose from 60,000 in 1895 to 107,000 in 1913.

The expansion of cattle breeding was particularly noticeable after the turn of the century when higher world prices for meat and improved methods of dairy farming made for an increase in the margin of profit. Sheep farming, though on the increase in Asia, was gradually being replaced by more profitable forms of agriculture in European Russia. Nevertheless, in 1913 Russia was still ahead of Australia with 90.3 million head as against 85 million. The Australians, however, specialized in Merino sheep while the Russians gave up the breeding of sheep for wool and concentrated on the common kinds suitable for slaughter. The total of common-breed sheep rose from 75.9 to 86.1 million between 1908 and 1914, whereas the total of Merino sheep dropped from 7 to 4.2 million. Because of an increase in demand for woollen yarn by our national mills, Russia

also imported large quantities of wool from abroad.

The number of pigs rose by 16% between 1910 and 1914, while the proportionate rise between 1895 and 1910 was only 23.7%. The spread of dairy farming and more intensive methods of cultivation contributed to this increase, as pig fodder, in the form of fats and vegetable refuse, became increasingly available. Generally speaking the number of pigs in a country is in direct proportion to the wealth of the rural population, even more so than in the case of cattle, and this was particularly striking in Russia. Just before the 1914 War Russia had become the largest bristle exporting country and, in 1914, sold 127,000 poods of bristles abroad. Russian curing was steadily gaining in popularity and Russian bacon, which as late as 1907 was virtually unknown, was now cured and exported in large quantities. (95,746 poods worth 820,000 roubles in 1908 and 543,000 poods worth 4,200,000 roubles in 1912).

Below is a table, covering the period from the beginning of the century up to the war, showing the increases in exports of live animals; fresh, cured and smoked meat; butter and poultry produce.

	Average		Increase	
	1898-1902	1913 (In thousands of Roubles)	Total	%
Live animals	9,900	34,000	24,100	243.4
Fresh, salted & smoked meat	1,700	9,400	7,700	454.0
Butter	16,400	71,200	54,800	334.1
Eggs	33,600	99,600	66,000	193.1
Fowl, dead & alive	3,000	7,000	4,000	133.3
Totals	64,600	221,200	156,600	244.1

These figures, resulting from the great changes that had taken place in the agrarian life of the country, leave no doubt as to the expansion of Russian agriculture and especially of our rural economy. All the benefits of the radical reforms, previously mentioned, were made manifest by an increase in all the many branches of her agriculture. Particularly was this the

case in those connected with farm industries. The latter, because of a greater yield in profits than the trade in grain, are of immense importance in any well-ordered agricultural economy.

All that has just been said relates only to foreign trade; the value of home consumption obviously by far exceeded the export figures quoted. The fact, however, that exports of farm produce were rising faster than those of grain was of great importance to our economy. Between 1898 and 1902 the ratio between the two was 21.2%, grain fetching 303.5 million roubles and farm produce, 64.6 million, while in 1913 it had altered to 37.5%, valued at 589.9 and 221.2 million roubles respectively.

In the years preceding the war large chilling plants were installed to facilitate exports and an increasing number of especially designed railway trucks allowed for a speedier movement of perishable produce without risk of damage. Space does not allow me to dwell any longer on this subject, but I should like to mention two examples directly connected with these facilities. In 1913, Russia contributed 50% to the total world trade in eggs, while Siberia supplied half the total of all the butter consumed inside the country and exported considerable quantities as well.

Exports of Siberian Butter

1894	400	poods
1895	5,000	—
1898	16,000	—
1900	1,050,000	—
1903	1,746,000	—
1906	2,974,000	—
1909	4,100,000	—
1913	5,550,000	—

These figures point to the great advances made by agriculture in Siberia and should be related to my previous remarks on the colonization of this immense region.

In these pages I have given a brief outline of the remarkable development of Russian agriculture during the last ten or

fifteen years before the First World War. The completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the revolutionary agrarian reform of Stolypin, the stability and excellent state of our finances together contributed in bringing about an era of mounting national prosperity. The picture, as we see it today, is tragic. The landed democracy of which the great Stolypin had dreamt, has been destroyed. Collectivization is doomed to failure, even at the price of further restricting the liberty of the peasant and of turning a free man of the soil into a paid farm hand. Soviet agricultural policy, in the 40 years of its application, has moved from one disaster to another. Between 1927 and 1928 there were 20 million unemployed on the land and the enforced collectivization of 1929-30, accompanied by atrocities, unparalleled even in the USSR, spelt the doom of Russian agriculture.(a) The "mujik" has been turned into a slave, while famine and reprisals cost the nation millions of lives. An objective assessment is almost impossible, but figures taken from the Soviet Press speak of the ruinous state of Russian livestock, of the meagre yields, the poor quality of agricultural work and, at best, of the abysmal apathy of the peasant. We are told of new coercive measures; of new directives; immense virgin regions are brought, theoretically, under cultivation; and yet the peasant remains an enslaved pauper and agricultural figures lag behind those of 40 years ago. A sorry picture indeed, if all that Mr. Khrushchev can do is to boast of having reached the 1913 level of production. It has taken the Soviet tractor forty years to dead heat with the Czarist horse and plow.

(a) See my articles in "Politique," April 1927, and "Revue Politique et Parlementaire," May and August, 1928.

NOTES

(1) The statistical information contained in the chapters dealing with agriculture, industry, trade, commerce and finance are taken from the following official Russian publications: "Explanatory Notes on the Budget of the Empire," a series of documents commencing from the end of the 19th century, part of which was annually devoted to economic questions giving a complete survey of the activities of the various branches of national production; a collection of "The Russian Financial Market," published by the Chancellery of Credit of the Ministry of Finance; "Collection of Statistics on Russian Agriculture"; and "Collection of Statistical Data on the Russian Mining and Metallurgical Industries." Any other sources are specifically mentioned.

(2) Though only 9.55% of all the arable land was owned by the landlords their contribution to the total harvest amounted to 11.24%, as the yield on their estates was 20% higher than on that of the peasants. Moreover, the landlords produced mainly for export and, though often called "absentees in Western Europe," they were, nevertheless, always in the vanguard of any development or improvement in the field of agriculture.

According to the figures of the Soviet Agricultural expert previously quoted, in 1913, i.e., the last year of normal production, estate owners disposed of 54.5% of their grain harvest and held 33% in reserve, their personal consumption being negligible. The peasants marketed 20.4% and consumed about one third of their crop. If we consider that before 1914 Russia exported 12% of her total grain harvest, the balance being absorbed by the internal market, we shall appreciate why the disappearance of large and medium estates alone suffices to explain the absence of any real exportable surplus after the Revolution, quite apart from the ruinous agricultural policy of the Soviets.

(3) The nomadic and turbulent peasants were bound to the land by the Czars at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries. This measure, attributed to Boris Godunov, was taken both in the interests of the State and the peasants themselves. At the time the Russian peasant depended to a greater degree on the chase, fishing and petty rural industries than his Western brother in the 10th century, and primitive agriculture retained a nomadic character. The usual procedure was to clear a patch of forest by fire, work it for as long as it produced, and then move on to some other place. Furthermore, the peasant could consider himself lucky if he succeeded in staying in one particular place for a year or two without being driven away. Chicherin, the historian, tells us that in the 15th century even the Boyars seldom resided in their domains as feudal lords, but "acquired their lands as nomads." ("Essays on Russian Law," Moscow, 1888.) This primitive and stagnant form of agriculture was partly due to unfavorable climatic conditions, but the main

cause lay in the annual raids on Moscovy of pillaging tribes. An idea of what Russia was like in those days is gained from the fact that in 1571, nearly a hundred years after the removal of the Mongol yoke, the Crimean Tartars captured and destroyed Moscow. (General Suhotin, "Russian Wars." St. Petersburg, 1898 p. 48) The State was compelled to wage a constant, stubborn and ruinous struggle in an endeavor to maintain conditions which would ensure the safety of its subjects, guarantee them the means of production and protect them from enslavement. The Tartars in the South and East, the Poles and Lithuanians in the West, the Teuton Knights and the Swedes in the Northwest, threatened the very existence of Moscovy. In order to save the country from annihilation and to obtain the means to continue the fight the Czars were driven into levying ever mounting taxes and found themselves forced into fostering agriculture in spite of the difficulties this entailed. The need for creating some sort of stable and permanent social structure was essential. There resulted a number of "Ukaz" (ordinances) which bound the peasant mass in Central Russia to the soil belonging to the State or owned by the nobles. The latter, likewise, saw their freedom curtailed for henceforth they were allowed to leave their estates only by permission of the government. The noble thus became the servant of the State, while the revenue from his lands constituted his pay. The Czar, in granting him a "pomestie" (estate), demanded in return the fulfilment of certain military and administrative duties. Henceforth, no nomadic peasants, no more wandering Boyars.

The social edifice which gradually took shape as a result of these measures, was made even more rigid by Peter the Great in the course of his titanic struggle against the Swedes, when the very fate of Russia was at stake.

Let me remind you that the war with Charles XII lasted for twenty-one years and engaged 1,700,000 Russian soldiers. One hundred and twenty thousand were killed and 500,000 invalided out of the army. The import of these figures is apparent if we consider that the population of Russia in those days (14 millions) was no larger than that of Sweden. All through the 18th century this figure remained unchanged, a fact that is not surprising considering the general state of the nation at that time.

In order to put the resources of the country to better use, Peter the Great ordered a general census of the rural population later known as the "First Revision." Serfdom was at its height; three quarters of the peasants were in bondage, the remaining quarter, called "State" or "Free" peasants, were settled on State or Crown lands and were independent of any individual landlords. Things gradually changed and by the middle of the 19th century only 50% of the peasants were serfs. A gradual change like this would hardly have been possible under feudalism as it had existed in the West. But, as I pointed out in Chapter II, feudalism was never established in Russia and our form of serfdom differed largely from that of Western Europe. In the West it was

generally brought about by conquest, while in Russia, as we have seen, its origin was quite different.

The measures introduced by Boris Godunov and his successors effectively turned Russia into an agricultural country, as witnessed by our exports at the time: cattle, meat, salt, skins, honey, game, horsehair, bristles, flax, hemp and a variety of goods in transit from the East. Grain, as an item of export, appeared only at a later date; for as long as our agriculture retained a nomadic character, no exportable surplus was ever available. In fact, in the country which later became the granary of Europe, corn was frequently in extremely short supply. Commenting on this state of affairs, a few historians have come to the conclusion that the attachment of the peasant to the soil was the one factor which saved Russia from economic disaster.

The economic status of the peasants and especially the serfs was a matter of the gravest concern to our sovereigns and the idea of emancipating them was conceived by the Czars in the second half of the 18th century, before the French Revolution. As we have seen, both nobles and peasants were attached to the land, but in 1762 freedom of movement was handed back to the nobility. In taking this step, Peter III relieved the nobles of their obligatory service; henceforth they were permitted to relinquish their duties at any time of the year and allowed to reside wherever they wished, either in Russia or abroad.

Should the liberation of the nobility not have been followed by an immediate emancipation of the serfs? The answer is "yes" but at that time it would have been premature. The government considered it right to free "the Men of Service" for, as the relative "Ukaz" points out, "their devotion to the Head of the State and zeal in execution of their duty were general and universal." This was undoubtedly fair. During the following reign of Catherine the Great, the nobility gave ample proof of its devotion to public duty and, as a result of historical circumstances this loyalty was particularly manifest at the end of the 18th century though it never failed all through the course of our history right up to the Revolution. The estates of our landed nobility were the birthplace of Russian culture, as we know it in the 19th century. The wandering Boyars of the 16th century effectively receded into history after the law of 1762.

The case of the peasants was altogether different. The monstrous rising, lead by Pugachev in 1763, brought into vivid light the anarchical instincts still prevalent in large masses of the peasantry and cut short any ideas of emancipation which the liberally minded Catherine, the friend of philosophers, might have cherished. (Pugachev was a brigand on a grand scale who burnt, pillaged and put to the sword the whole basin of the Volga. The plundering and murdering bands under his command were joined by groups of peasants of the regions through which he passed, who swelled his ranks and contributed to

the astounding exploits and success of his "army." This uprising, called "Pugachevshchina" is brilliantly depicted by Pushkin in "The Captain's Daughter.")

Paul I, Catherine's successor, took a lively interest in the serfs and in 1797 promulgated measures which considerably improved their lot. Officially, however, the subject of emancipation was taken up for the first time in 1801. Alexander I, that young idealist, filled with republican ideas, discussed it with his friends as soon as he was crowned. These young men, though captivated by the ideals of the French Revolution, were in closer touch with reality than the monarch and convinced him that the country was not ready for such a step. Even the Swiss LaHarpe, his former tutor, who, to a large degree was responsible for Alexander's republican leanings, strongly opposed the idea.

Alexander, perforce, had to give in, but nevertheless published a law encouraging emancipation of entire villages, and soon the number of serfs freed by their landlords ran into hundreds of thousands. (Referred to in "War and Peace" by Count L. Tolstoi.) In spite of this the Emperor never quite relinquished the idea of total emancipation and toward the end of his reign entrusted one of his close collaborators with the task of drawing up a draft law for putting it into effect. However, the privilege of planning this grand reform fell to Nicholas I, his brother, and the glory of final realization, to Alexander II.

All possible data relevant to complete emancipation was studiously examined and brought up to date by special committees in 1826, 1835, 1839, 1840, 1846, 1848 and 1849. The reasons which had brought about the attachment of the peasant to the soil and made it necessary to continue his bondage were no longer operative and now, as the century progressed, the ground was steadily being cleared for total and final emancipation. It is very probable that the serfs would have been freed by Nicholas I had the Polish rebellion and especially the events in Europe of 1848 not deterred him. In a speech on March 30, 1842, the Emperor declared that bondage in any form was an evil and added "anyone acquainted with the situation will realize that it cannot last."

(4) The condition of the serfs in the middle of the 19th century is well described in a conversation between a visiting Englishman and Pushkin, whose liberalism and breadth of mind are well known. "Speaking in a general way, the charges which the peasants have to bear are really not very heavy. The head tax, paid by the Commune, and the poll tax are not ruinous. As to the latter, once it has been fixed by the landlord, the peasant is at liberty to augment his income how and where he pleases. Do not forget that in Russia today some serfs travel as far away as two thousand versts. You call that serfdom. As far as I am concerned I do not know of any single people in

Europe who enjoys a similar liberty of movement ("prostor"). Look at the complaints of your English workers" (reference is probably made to the Chartists). "One might think we were dealing with the building of the pyramids by Pharaoh. Not a bit of it. We are concerned with the cloth of Mr. Smith and the needles of Mr. Thompson. . . . Have you ever seen anything freer, anything less servile than the attitude of our peasant toward you? Can you find a trace of servility in his appearance, in his speech, or in his whole demeanor?"

Cases of harsh treatment of the serfs by some landlords are, of course, undeniable. But, taking everything into consideration, the customary comparison with slavery in the United States does not stand up to examination and, as Pushkin pointed out, the situation of the proletarian masses in Western Europe and England at the time was much inferior to that of our Russian serfs.

(5) The appearance of the "mir" and of the system of an annual change over of individually allotted land dates back to the time when the peasants were bound to the soil. For valuable information on the origin, patriarchal and administrative, of the "Mir" the reader is referred to A. Miller's excellent study, *"Essai sur les Institutions Agraires de la Russie Centrale du 16-me au 18-me siècle."* Marcel Giard. Paris, 1926.

The "Mir" was a rural community administered by the peasants themselves in all matters which concerned them economically. The duties of the police were the responsibility of elected authorities, and justice, in civil matters, was administered by elected tribunals. It is this typically Russian social organization that Professor Sarolea had in mind when he compared Russia to a vast federation of fifty thousand small peasant republics.

At one time the rural commune was encouraged by the State which derived considerable advantages from the collective responsibility of all the members of the commune for payment of taxes, while this mutual guarantee also acted as an efficient check on lawlessness. The functions of the "Mir" and the lines on which it operated were definitely laid down by Catherine the Great.

CHAPTER IV

INDUSTRY

"Russia will, in the near future, become one of the leading industrial nations of the world. A number of factors point that way: the inexhaustible abundance of raw materials of every kind, mineral wealth, and extensive range of production and the astounding growth of the population." Thus wrote Mr. Edmond Théry, the eminent French economist, on his return from Russia in 1914, (a) while only a few years earlier the great scientists Mendeleev had made a similar prophecy. (b)

At the time Russian industry was relatively young and just entering upon a period of energetic expansion. Nevertheless, Russia no longer presented a country exclusively engaged in agriculture and mainly dependent on imports for the supply of the manufactured goods it required. To overstress Russian dependency on industrial imports would be wrong, as wrong as the view sometimes expressed by the West that Russian industry was largely created by foreigners and foreign capital, that industrial progress was obstructed by the Czarist government as a matter of considered policy, or even that Russians, as a whole, were temperamentally non-technical minded, in fact that in matters of industry and trade we were rather like a colony of the West.

The continued industrial growth of the USSR is in itself a striking proof of the nation's ability. It might lend color to the view that under the Czars, industrial development was neglected, were it not for irrefutable facts and figures which prove the contrary. Not much was generally known abroad

(a) Ed. Théry. "La Transformation Economique de la Russie." Paris, 1914. p. 87.

(b) Source previously mentioned, p. 79.

about the very rapid expansion of our industry before the Revolution and the little that was known has since been largely forgotten.

I shall give an account of Russian industry before 1917 in a necessarily short description of its various branches, its development and sources of supply in raw materials, supported by statistics showing how it expanded within the last decades of Czarism and depicting the bright future toward which it was advancing.

Industry in Russia owed more to government enterprise than in any other country of the world.

It was only toward the middle of the last century that the Russian people were able to turn to the systematic development of the great resources of their country for reasons which I mention in other chapters. As it was, the Caucasus and Central Asia, later so vital to industry, were brought into the fold about a century ago and, from a technical point of view, we were a young country. It may be said that some of our great industries were started by Peter the Great, that others had existed before him, but they were isolated enterprises that did not come within the scope of a general system of industrialization.

One of the main preoccupations of Peter, like the Czars before him, was to raise our national economy to a higher level but the measures taken by his predecessors were quite ineffective, as is shown by the parlous state of the nation's finances at the time of his accession. Other methods were required and the young Czar applied himself to a thorough overhaul of agriculture, industry and trade. Though following the general principles of French protective commercialism, Peter had the wisdom to base his reforms on sound Russian economic tradition. Tugan-Baranovsky, one of our best known authorities on Russian industry, says:

“Though industrial capitalism did not exist before Peter the Great, commercial capitalism was fully developed. The

existence of this commercial capital was not the result of governmental interference but was due to a normal evolution of trade and the recognition of the benefits of large scale as against petty commerce. The assets of industry in Peter's day consisted of this trading capital, a fact proved by a glance through the list of leading manufacturers. Contrary to an opinion widely held the majority were Russian and members of the merchants' guild.

"The number of factories owned by foreigners was very limited during the reign of Peter I. . . . The greater number was owned by Moscow capitalists, merchants of the old stock. The character and moral qualities of these men laid their stamp upon our industry, to which they brought the traditions of Muscovite large-scale trade and which they helped to develop under favorable conditions. The high standards and way of life of these solid merchants were not the work of Peter's hands, but without him the growth of industry in Russia would have been impossible." (a)

Peter initiated his economic reforms by a series of ordinances in which he insisted upon the advantages of a technical education and industrial expansion. According to one of our historians "Peter frequently turned the throne into a professorial chair," so as to explain to his people the conditions governing social progress. In his desire to promote an inclination for commerce and industry among the varied classes, he propounded that a nobleman should be able to engage in these pursuits without loss of dignity though, as we shall see in the chapter devoted to Trade, admonitions of this kind were quite unnecessary. Peter did not confine his efforts to lecturing and advice; he granted concrete benefits to the pioneers of industry and guaranteed their investments by governmental orders. He had an inventory of the country's mineral resources drawn up, while energetic prospecting led to the discovery of new deposits and

(a) Tugan-Baranovsky. "The Russian Factory in the past and the present," St. Petersburg, 1898. Vol. I, p. 8.

new ores, which in turn was followed by the founding of new industrial undertakings. Often, a fresh enterprise launched by the Czar, was handed over by him to private ownership after it had been squarely set on its feet. The founding of a ship-building industry and the inception of our navy and merchant fleet bear witness to his relentless and insatiable energy.

This intense activity was well rewarded: before Peter's time there were hardly a dozen factories in Russia, at the time of his death they numbered 233 not counting the mines, while some of the factories founded by him were still operating in 1917. During his reign, the urban population rose from 292,000 to 802,000. The process initiated by Peter continued unchecked so that by the end of the 19th century there were 3161 industrial undertakings in operation and Russia was beginning to lose the salient characteristics of a country solely dependent on agriculture.

Industrial expansion on a large scale in a country the size of Russia was of necessity deferred until the day when thousands of miles of railway brought within practicable reach the immensely rich deposits of the South, the Urals, the Caucasus and the far distant regions of Siberia. In this respect the United States and Russia are very much alike: In both countries industrial development was made possible by the railway. Other factors, of course, also contributed in bringing about this new orientation of Russian economy, not least among them the final pacification of the country, the measures taken by the government directly to promote industry, the trade tariff of 1891, called "an intelligent tariff" by Mendelev, and the substantial influx of foreign capital, especially during the last years of the 19th century. An increase in the urban population, from 8,175,000 to 25,819,000 between 1867 and 1913, is in itself an indication of the social and economic changes that were taking place. On the eve of the First World War industrial revenue virtually equalled the revenue from agriculture though of course the latter still engaged the labor of a majority of the population.

Sources of National Revenue 1913

Agriculture	6,300 Million Roubles
Industry	6,200 Million Roubles
Other branches of activity	3,000 Million Roubles
Total	<u>15,500</u> Million Roubles

Four fifths of the requirements of the internal market were by then supplied by our national industries, while most of the goods imported from abroad were unfinished articles, or material intended for re-manufacture.

Young industrial countries enjoy an undisputed advantage over older nations; technical progress, gained by long experience, is available to them ready made. Russia was no exception and the new plants which rose in the steppes of the South, in the mountains of the Caucasus and the virgin forests of Siberia were modeled on the best the West could offer, equipped with the newest type of machinery and tools and employed the most modern methods of production and manufacture.

A remarkable change was taking place in Russian industry: It is best illustrated by the findings of two enquiries held at an interval of 20 years. In 1887 there was an average of 43 persons employed and a turnover of 43,200 roubles per factory. In 1908 there were 157 operatives, a turnover of 485,000 roubles, and 8,606 new undertakings launched.

Even more striking are the statistics for the period between 1900 and 1908: for factories powered by steam, there was an increase of 4.9% in the number of factories, 16% in the number of workers, 41.2% in motive power and 49.8% in turnover.

These figures show the general tendency of Russian Industrial expansion: the concentration of production in large industrial units, comparable to the German "Riesenunternehmen," or the huge plants in America.

One is struck by the speed and intensity of the drive by which this expansion was being attained. In 1890 industrial production was valued at 1,500 million roubles and the number of workers totalled 1,450,000. In 1914 production was worth

about 6,000 million roubles and there were 3 million workers, a respective increase of 300% and 100% in a quarter of a century. The annual yield in taxes of Russian industry amounted to 500 million roubles, (1) the mining industry alone contributing to Russia's national economy a net annual revenue of between 600 and 800 million, after allowing for deductions in respect of sinking funds, capital reserves, social, fire and other forms of insurance. It would be correct to say that Russia in those pre-war years (1914) was an investor's paradise, where both native and foreign capital earned handsome dividends, while large sums were at the same time reserved for further capital investment.

A noticeable feature was the considerable accumulation of substantial capital reserves available to industry from native sources inside the country, in marked contrast to the closing years of the 19th century, when investments from abroad were predominant. The Russian financial market which came into being between the years 1908 and 1912, was now in a position to absorb over two thirds of the total stocks and shares issued at home, i.e., 3,657,100,000 roubles, allowing only 1,509,300,000 roubles to go abroad. (a) At the time the total of foreign capital, invested in Russian industrial, commercial, municipal and credit concerns totalled 2,242,874,000 roubles. (b)

I do not for a moment suggest that Russia was on the point of closing her markets to foreign capital. On the contrary, it would appear that in the rapidly expanding development of her natural resources there was ample room for both Russian and foreign capital. In friendly competition they were bound to

(a) A. Raffalovitch. "Russia. Its Trade and Commerce." London 1918. pp. 394-95.

(b) "Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction." Publication of the "Institute of Economics," New York, 1924. p. 182-184. For particulars of French capital investments, over one third of the sum mentioned, see my articles in the "Economist," London, 27 December, 1924, and "La Vie Financière." Paris, January 3, 1925.

exercise a beneficial influence on the whole economic life of the country.

Before examining the most important branches of Russian industrial activity, when I shall mention some of the outstanding social works, founded and financed by our large employers, I particularly want to stress the interest taken by them and especially the Imperial Government in the welfare of the workers. Our first labor legislation was drafted under Alexander III. Among its main provisions was the establishment of a special body of factory inspectors whose duty lay in the control of individual factories, the safeguarding of the interests of the employed and the prevention of any exploitation of the worker by the employer. A new set of labor laws, advanced and liberal, was promulgated by Nicholas II. Concerning them United States President Taft expressed himself, when speaking before many notable Russians two years before the 1914-18 war, in the following terms: "Your Emperor has introduced legislation for the working classes more perfect than that which any of the democratic countries boast."

THE MINING INDUSTRY

The riches concealed underground in Russia are far more varied than the different kinds of soil on her surface.

The exploitation of this wealth was barely under way and, even today, it is still far from fully developed. Yet, even in those days we were the largest producers of platinum and manganese; second, of tin and asbestos; fourth, of gold and fifth, of copper and asphalt.

COAL. Coal, until recently the mainstay of modern industry, is located in many regions of Russia. We were fourth among the coal-producing countries of the world, coming after the United States, Canada and China, and our coal reserves were estimated at 544 million tons.

The biggest coal fields, considered among the richest and

most easily workable in the world, lie in the Don Basin and spread over an area of 32,000 square miles.

Elisée Réclus, the French geographer, tells us that "In 1865 over 650 shallow seams were discovered, varying between one foot and twenty feet in depth and containing coal of every possible quality, from anthracite to the cheapest grades. The trench-like gullies and ravines traversing this area, allowed for an easy assessment of the seams and facilitated the work of the miners."

Soon after this date, the mining industry which had existed in rudimentary form since 1799, began to expand. Production, however, remained relatively unchanged until an extensive network of railways had been laid by the State and an expanding internal market supplied by industry provided an outlet. In 1864 the annual output of the Don Basin amounted to 114,754 tons; in 1885 it reached 1,885,246 tons and continued to increase up to the Revolution. Other coal fields, though less extensive, lay in the Dombrova district of Poland (then Russia), near Moscow, in the Urals, the Caucasus and, in this century, in Central Asia.

*Output of coal in Russia
(in millions of tons)*

Year	Don	Other districts of			Total
		Dombrova (Poland)	Eur. Russia	Asiatic Russia	
1885	1.88	1.80	0.53	0.05	4.26
1895	4.90	3.70	0.46	0.05	9.11
1905	12.80	4.70	0.74	1.03	19.27
1908	18.27	5.64	1.17	1.48	26.56
1911	19.96	6.00	0.94	1.70	28.60
1912	21.42	6.46	1.23	2.13	31.24
1913	24.70	7.00	1.56	2.16	35.42

This table also shows the importance of the Don coal fields in relation to the other mines.

The newly discovered coal seams in Siberia which produced over 3 million tons in 1916 appeared very promising at that

time and the region of Kouznetsk has since been developed into the biggest coal centre of Russia, surpassing the Don Basin both in size and yield.

In spite of the difficulties created by the war and the loss to the Germans of the whole Dombrova fields, the annual output of the mines continued to rise and reached a record figure in 1916.

CRUDE OIL. The abundance of oil in Russia is well known. Geologists have estimated reserves at approximately 3,000 million tons, or 35% of the world total of which 15% is located in the United States.

The pioneers of the Russian oil industry were Kokarev and a peasant named Dubinin, who first extracted oil in Baku on the Western shore of the Caspian in the first half of the 19th century. But the immense resources of this region were tapped and placed on an industrial footing after the pacification of the Caucasus in 1864.

This pacification, or rather the subduing of the fierce hillmen of the huge mountain range which stretches from the Black Sea to the Caspian, had taken over fifty years. (2)

Under peaceful and orderly conditions, the government was able to build harbors, construct good highways, joining the principal towns and strategic points, blast long tunnels, introduce ordered legislation and administration. Special attention was paid to developing the agricultural and industrial resources of the region: vineyards, afforestation, cotton and silk, mining of copper and manganese, boring for oil.

Vast sums were spent by the government on this elaborate program of expansion. The treasury lost on balance, but Caucasian production as a whole helped to strengthen our national economy and to increase the balance of trade.

Wise administration, Russian technical and financial resources, as well as the influx of foreign capital, combined to assure a prosperous future to a region which, until recently, had been the home of wild, unruly hillmen and nomad tribes constantly at war and divided by a century of old feuds, eking

out a precarious existence by raising a few sheep or by pillaging travellers and Armenian settlers.

Certain conditions which only a large country and government protection could provide were necessary to turn the budding Caucasian oil industry into a world exporter, with security for foreign capital investment, an expanding internal market, protection against competition, an organized system of trade, abundant credit and efficient transport.

The development of the industry falls into three periods.

1) Up to 1905. Production rose at a rate unequalled anywhere. Though late in the field, Russian oil production overtook the United States by 1897 and at the beginning of the 20th century Russia was the largest producer of oil in the world. During this period new and better marketing and distributing methods, like the adoption of the oil-tanker, were introduced by the captains of our oil industry.

2) A period of crisis during the abortive revolution of 1905. The wave of disorders, strikes and sabotage which swept across the country culminated in Baku where the revolutionaries set fire to the oil wells, wrecked plant and installations and eventually drenched the whole region in the blood of a provoked war between the Tartars and the Armenians. A special committee sent by the Government to assess the damages reported that "three fifths of the total installation are in ruins and all work at a standstill. In the remaining plants the suspension of work is likely to be of a temporary nature."

During this period overall production dropped by one third. America was quick to take advantage of reduced Russian production, and a number of foreign markets, both actual and potential, was lost. (a) Russia forfeited her supremacy in the world oil trade, a position she has not yet recaptured.

3) After 1906. A new period of production from fresh fields in Baku and Grozny, which compensated for the diminishing yields of some of the older wells.

(a) See P. Danielbek. "Exports of Russian Petrol and World Markets." St. Petersburg, 1916.

Russian Oil Production
(In thousands of tons)

Year	Bakou		Grozny	Maikop	Emba	Ferghana	Total
	Old	New					
1906	7.345	0.001	0.630	—	—	0.070	8.046
1907	7.800	0.080	0.640	—	—	0.060	8.580
1908	7.656	0.100	0.860	0.001	—	0.050	8.667
1909	8.490	0.220	0.940	0.006	—	0.015	9.671
1910	8.000	0.500	1.210	0.020	—	0.029	9.759
1911	7.066	0.700	1.230	0.130	—	0.030	9.156
1912	7.107	0.900	1.070	0.150	0.017	0.030	9.274
1913	6.700	1.080	1.200	0.080	0.100	0.040	9.200
1914	5.656	1.400	1.610	0.070	0.280	0.030	9.046
1915	5.738	1.700	1.460	0.120	0.270	0.030	9.218
1916	5.600	2.300	1.680	0.030	0.260	0.030	9.900

In the years just before the Revolution a great deal of prospecting for oil was done and some potentially very rich oil fields were tapped. In 1917 boring was started in a particularly promising region near Novo-Grozny and the initial output of 600,000 tons was then considered most encouraging. Thanks to the heavy yields of these new fields, the Soviet government was always relatively well supplied with oil and could even claim, in the early years of its existence, a certain measure of success in the development of their oil industry. Nevertheless, production fell and was only one twelfth of the world output, compared with one sixth in pre-war years. (b)

(a) This table is based on data borrowed from the Report submitted to the Congress of Representatives of Russia Trade and Industry, held in Paris in 1921.

(b) For information on capital investment in the oil industry, the changes which have taken place since 1917, the bitter struggle to safeguard private interests and the policies of international trusts and foreign governments, the reader is referred to my articles in the following publications: "Revue Economique Internationale," Brussels, December 1924 and November, 1927; "Journal of Commerce," New York, January 9, 1926 and November 5, 1927; "The Statist," London, October 1927; "Paris-Télégrammes," Paris, October 1927, November 2 and 9, 1927; "Vie Financière," Paris, January 20, 1925. October 26, November 7, 1927 and June 21, 1929.

IRON ORE. Reserves of iron ore were estimated at 2,400 million tons. Much of this ore is located in widely separated parts of the country, but the biggest and richest deposits, where the ore contains up to 50% and 70% of pure iron, lie in the south of Russia in the region of Krivoi Rog. These mines are reported to have been worked by the Scythians, and Aeschylus, five hundred years B.C., commenting on their lances and weapons, attributes their quality to the fine metal from which they were forged. The industrial exploitation of these mines began in the second half of the 18th century and they were described in some notes on a voyage from St. Petersburg to Kherson by the academician Zuev: "At Krivoi Rog and along the banks of the Saxagan River, I noticed ferruginous strata. The steppes there look less dreary and the presence of rich mineral deposits in the soil appears likely."

An earlier iron industry, which was later relegated to second place, existed in the timber-clad mountains of the Urals from the beginning of the 18th century, where it was founded by Peter the Great. Here smelting was performed in wood-charcoal burning furnaces and, in later years, the steel produced in the Urals was renowned for its special qualities. The development of Krivoi Rog, lying in a woodless region, was delayed until it was linked by rail to the Don coal basin. Once this had been achieved output began rapidly to increase. The first mine was opened in 1881 and still bears the name of Alexander Pohl, its founder and one of our ablest mining engineers of the time. Soon, with the aid of French and Belgian capital, Krivoi Rog became the largest mining center of Russia.

Output of Iron Ore
(In thousands of tons)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Krivoi Rog</i>
1870	0.765	—
1880	0.984	—
1890	1.727	0.406
1900	5.748	2.745
1913	9.226	6.200

New mines in Siberia, at Nikolaevski Zavod and Petrovski Zavod, came into production shortly before the First World War and we were by then exporting appreciable amounts of ore abroad.

MANGANESE. Russia is extremely rich in manganese, so vital to the manufacture of steel. Of the total world production 56% was mined in Russia, 35% in India, 5% in Brazil and 4% in other countries.

The largest single deposits, covering an area of over 60 square miles, lay in the Caucasus at Chiatury. The best manganese, containing up to 55% of pure ore, was mined in this region, while smaller deposits were worked at Nikopol in the South and in the Ural mountains. Between 1891 and 1895, annual production averaged 200,000 tons. By 1913 it had risen to over a million tons.

*Output of Manganese
(In tons)*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Urals</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Caucasus</i>	<i>Total</i>
1910	0,918	178,200	537,700	716,818
1911	2,460	202,280	434,840	639,580
1912	3,213	238,700	577,520	819,433
1913	19,510	265,250	970,000	1,254,760

Increase 1910-1913,				
in tons	18,592	87,050	434,300	537,942

Exports: 1910	557,540 tons
1913	1,147,540 tons

PRECIOUS METALS. In most of the rivers of Siberia, from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean, alluvial deposits of gold are to be found. The gold mining industry, with a labor force of 90,000, ranked third and came after coal and oil. Though still largely undeveloped, it had already helped to open up hitherto uninhabited regions and to transform mining settlements into small townships. Assisted by the Government, the mining companies built schools, hospitals and churches, while the post and telegraph reached out to and linked outlying parts of the

country. Gold mining was practised in Siberia as far back as the 17th century, but the proper development of the industry began in the second half of the 19th century.

Output of gold in the main centers
(In tons)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Urals</i>	<i>W. Siberia</i>	<i>E. Siberia</i>	<i>Total</i>
1864	5.49	1.02	16.40	22.91
1874	5.44	2.56'	25.33	33.33
1884	8.00	2.15	25.64	35.79
1894	10.66	2.80	29.60	43.06
1904	10.00	3.16	30.56	43.72
1914	8.82	6.33	51.20	66.35

Attention is drawn to the 50% increase in the last decade against 100% in the preceding forty years and the growing importance of the East Siberian mines. This expansion was due to improved methods of extraction and the use of modern machinery, while the building of roads and railways in the Urals and Siberia brought within accessible reach far flung and outlying mining centers. As an example, the following railway lines were laid down in 1913: Orsk-Troitzk, across Orenburg, 235 miles; the Altai Railway from Novo-Nikolaevsk to Semipalatinsk, via Barnaul and a branch line to Bisk, 515 miles; Archinsk-Minousinsk, 275 miles; the Kolchinsk line, 125 miles. The Altai Railway was completed by 1917 and yet another line along the Amur River, begun before the War, was also completed that year. A concession had been granted for the construction of the main South-Siberian railway of 1070 miles. The discovery of new veins during construction work was a frequent occurrence. When the Amur railway was being built, in particular, it was difficult to prevent the workmen from quitting their jobs and wandering off into the neighboring forests in search of gold.

The Department of Emigration undertook the construction of lateral railroads and a further 10,000 miles were taken in hand by the Ministry of Communications.

Before the Revolution Russia was the fourth largest gold

producing country in the world, following South Africa, the United States and Australia.

PLATINUM. The mining of platinum was virtually a Russian monopoly. Before 1917, Russia produced 95% of the total amount of platinum mined in the world. About 4% came from Columbia and 1% from the United States and Australia. Only a small amount of platinum was retained at home and all but a fraction of the total output went abroad. Between 1904 and 1908 the yearly average mined amounted to 4.3 tons; between 1909 and 1913, to 7.3 tons, an increase of 70.4% in five years. During this period the market price per Russian pood (1/61 of a ton), containing 83% of refined metal, rose from 19,000 to 36,000 roubles. Legislation introduced by the government just before the fall of the Czarist régime to encourage the platinum industry and the adoption of a modern dredging technique would have reduced the cost of production by about 50% and still further increased the existing substantial margin of profit.

SILVER. A very old Russian mining industry. Modern methods of extraction by electrolysis enabled the industry to expand at the beginning of this century and to increase the output by 150%: 13.12 tons between 1900 and 1905; 32.80 tons, 1910-1915. Unlike Mexico and Norway, where the metal is obtained from silver mines proper, silver in Russia was extracted from copper, tin and lead mines, the ore in the latter being particularly rich in silver content.

Other metals and minerals

COPPER. Copper is one of Russia's most important mining assets. It was obtained on an industrial scale in the Ural Mountains as far back as the reign of Peter the Great and later in the Altai range, yet output supplied only about half the demands of industry. In 1902 8,820 tons were produced, against a demand of well over 16,400 tons; after 1906 the mines in the Caucasus, where production was doubled in the course of four years, helped to reduce this shortage.

Production, consumption and imports of Copper
(in tons)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Production</i>	<i>Consumption</i>	<i>Imports</i>
1907	14,541	18,180	3,672
1908	17,000	19,262	2,328
1909	18,590	21,246	2,655
1910	22,690	28,000	5,426
1911	25,607	31,180	5,541
1912	33,574	37,426	3,852
Increase 1907-1912,			
in tons	19,033	19,246	0,180
Per Cent	132.4%	107.7%	4.9%

By 1912 production was gradually overtaking consumption and it was even possible to export limited amounts abroad after satisfying the requirements of the home market. In 1907 a beginning was made in the Caucasus of refining copper by a method of electrolysis and by 1911 the annual output had reached 5,000 tons. Similar factories were founded in the Urals and yielded another 6,600 tons. In 1912 copper mined by this process all but met the internal demand.

ZINC. Rich deposits of zinc are found in the Altai region, Nerchinsk (in Siberia), the Khirgiz steppes north of the Caspian, as well as near Murmansk on the White Sea. Unfortunately, the working of these deposits was neglected and mining was mainly confined to Poland where conditions of work and transport were easier. Home production was supplemented by an average of 16,400 tons imported annually. In 1915-1916 a large plant was constructed in Siberia with an estimated output of 49,000 tons. In the first months of 1917 this plant produced 16,400 tons and doubled this figure in the first full year of operation. The cost of production of Siberian ore was particularly cheap, due to the fact that it contained a considerable content of gold and silver, thus bringing the cost of production below that of Germany and the United States.

Many regions rich in zinc also abounded in lead. In 1917 a plant was erected in the Altai Mountains with an estimated

output of 20,000 tons, ten times the amount hitherto produced.

The whole range of the Altai is exceptionally rich in mineral deposits, yet the development of this region could not be profitably undertaken until modern methods of concentration, smelting and refining were introduced in view of the complex composition of some of the ores. At the time these methods were just beginning to be applied in countries where metallurgy was more advanced than in Russia and explains why the exploitation of this potentially rich region appears to have been neglected.

SALT. Russian reserves are sufficient to provide the world with salt, literally, for centuries. 1,311,500 tons were produced in 1896; 1,800,000 tons in 1906, and 2,215,000 tons in 1912.

Before closing this part of the Chapter, I must mention a few metals and minerals which were as yet practically untouched industrially, such as quick silver, cobalt, tin, nickel, antimony, mica, graphite, tungsten, chromium, sulphur, asphalt, cement limestone, phosphates (reserves estimated at 5,500,000 tons) and radium. (a)

METALLURGY

In the 17th century Tula and Kaluga, in the center of European Russia, were the only two towns where there existed a metallurgical industry. Peter the Great availed himself of the energy and enterprise of a blacksmith from Tula named Demidov to found a metal industry in the Urals, and, in token of gratitude, handed over to him the first foundry built there

(a) In the years following the Revolution foreign interests were for some time tempted to persevere with mining in Russia on the strength of concessions granted by the Soviet Government. The fate of these attempts is now past history, but I refer those interested to my analysis published in the "Revue Economique Internationale" Brussels. (Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 240-277). The views I then expressed, were subsequently justified, as witnessed by the failure of huge concerns like Harriman and the Lena Goldfields.

by the State. In the seventies of the last century the urgent demand for rails and substantial government orders gave birth to a flourishing industry, mainly centered in the south of Russia. Here, with a minimum of transport difficulties, the iron ore from Krivoi Rog and Mariupol was easily handled and the finished products rapidly found their way to ports of the Dniepre, Volga, Black Sea and the Caucasus. Subsequently, apart from isolated centers, like St. Petersburg and Moscow, the whole of the Russian iron ore industry was concentrated in the South. In 1913 it turned out over one-third of the total national output and this share continued to increase from year to year.

Development of the iron industry from the end of 19th century to 1913
(In millions of tons)

	Pig Iron		Iron and Steel Semi-processed		Iron and Steel Fully processed	
<i>Years</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Total</i>
1898-1902	1.351	2.646	1.054	2.470	0.880	1.972
1908-1912	2.254	3.301	1.930	3.600	1.654	3.916
1912	2.843	4.200	2.490	4.506	2.100	3.730
1913	3.109	4.640	2.718	4.922	2.313	4.043
Increase						
1898-1913	1.758	1.994	1.664	2.452	1.433	2.071
Per cent	130.2	76	156.3	99.3	163.2	104.9

Though the above table shows substantial progress in all branches of industry, the blast furnaces and foundries were as yet not working to full capacity, the latter standing at 5,705,000 tons for pig iron, 5,475,000 tons for semi-processed, and 4,934,000 tons for fully processed iron and steel.

In 1914 Russia had moved up to fifth position among the iron and steel manufacturing countries of the world, having surpassed the production of Austro-Hungary and Belgium, and coming immediately after France.

By 1913 imports of pig iron from abroad fell to 0.67% of the

total internal demand, whereas at the beginning of the period under review they amounted to approximately 50%.

The whole industrial structure of the country was largely dependent upon the prosperity and development of the iron and steel industry and its importance cannot be overstressed. This dependence was especially manifest during the war years of 1914-1918 when, after the desperate shortage of 1915, the industry was able to rally and adequately to meet the requirements in guns, shells, etc., of all our extensive and widely dispersed fronts.

A French appraisal of the industry as a whole, made by M. Cl. Aulagnon, depicts a healthy and prosperous state of affairs. M. Aulagnon was Councillor of Foreign Trade to the French Government and Director of several Russian and foreign metallurgical Companies. His views, published in "Science et Industrie" (Paris, 1924, p. 431), in an issue specially devoted to French and Russian mining interests command respect. This is what he says:

"Some of the individual plants of which the Russian metallurgical industry was composed were capable of producing and processing up to 500,000 tons of metal per annum and technically rivalled the best installations in Europe. Located as they were in the midst of a network of railways, by which they were served, and surrounded by clusters of workers' settlements with their churches, schools, clubs and theatres, they appeared to have risen out of the vastness of the southern steppes by the wave of a magic wand.

"These up-to-date plants, the coal fields, iron ore mines, immense machine factories and other ancillary industries, gravitating round them, were a striking proof of industrial achievement under Czarism, of Russian and foreign technical skill and wise capital investment."

In the same issue (p. 73) another expert, M. E. Grüner, chairman of the "Krivoi Rog Mines" and deputy chairman of the Central Committee of "Houillères de France" (French Coal Mines), gives us a more detailed description of the vigorous industrial life of the South:

"Between 1900 and 1913 new plants, manufacturing an amazing variety of articles, seemed to rise on all sides. Near the salt mines of Bakhmut there were factories producing chemicals, plate and crystal glass; a variety of metallurgical plants turning out steel pipes of every possible diameter, from narrow gauge oil well piping to pipe lines for bringing the gushing oil to the ports of the Black Sea; others, manufacturing telephone and telegraph cables, accessories for the railway and water mains; yet others turning out agricultural machinery, all helping to lighten the burden of foreign imports.

"In the vicinity of the larger cities there were railway yards building fast, modern locomotives, luxurious coaches for the transcontinental lines, thirty and forty ton freight cars, an assortment of machinery for the mining industry and other industrial plants, spinning and weaving mills. Destroyers, fast cruisers and mighty battleships were being built and launched in the shipbuilding yards both of the Boog in the South and the Neva on the Baltic.

"The tempo of the industrial evolution that was taking place in Russia was as intense as in the United States a few decades earlier. The growing prosperity of both these industrially young countries was marching in step and everything augured well for the future."

THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY

The textile industry was one of the oldest in Russia, the best organized and one of the most important. Small family businesses had gradually merged into hugh industrial concerns

employing 880,000 hands, and surpassing in size similar enterprises in Western Europe. The textile industry was well looked after by Government and owners alike, and, socially, was ahead of any of the other industries. Many of the big mills were like small well organized townships with their own schools, hospitals, infirmaries, day nurseries, rows of workers' dwellings, libraries, recreation centers and even theatres. In 1914 the annual output of the industry was valued at 1,000 million roubles. Most of the capital invested was Russian and the majority of the owners belonged to the old merchant families of Moscow.

Cotton

Priority of place as regards the number of factories, workers and turnover, in the whole range of textiles, was held by cotton. In 1912-1913, 410,000 tons of raw cotton were utilized by the spinning mills thus placing Russia third, after Great Britain and the United States. About two-thirds of this figure was grown in Asiatic Russia, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter.

Statistical figures of the International Cotton Federation show that in 1906-1907, 262,300 tons of yarn were produced by the Russian mills and 360,656 tons, six years later, 1912-1913. The number of shuttles increased by 42%, from 6,500,000 to 9,213,000.

The last available report, covering the period from 1906 to 1913, of the Russian Central Cotton Committee gives the following figures for finished cotton goods.

	1900	1913	Increase	%
Number of power looms	151,306	249,920	98,614	65.1
Finished goods (tons)	192	589	321	67.2

Between 1906 and 1913 the value of foreign imports was reduced from 21,300,000 to 11,000,000 roubles, while exports to Persia, China, Turkey, Rumania, etc., rose from 25,000,000 to 43,895,000 roubles. At the same time, consumption per head

within Russia increased by 100%. Coupled with the enormous growth of the population it is an indication of the expansion of the industry.

Between 1911 and 1916, the London "Times" collected a series of reports from its correspondents in Russia on various branches of our industrial activity and subsequently published them in "The Times Book on Russia." Concerning the cotton industry, we are told that in the opinion of experts some of our mills were among the finest in the world as regards equipment, organization and management, especially those at Narva, which were compared favorably with the mills in Lancashire. (a) We read that the installations in Narva contained half a million shuttles, 4,000 looms, a workers' settlement of over 3,000 tenants, a hospital worth a million roubles, etc., all very modern and run with due regard to local conditions. (b)

Other mills, at Orekhovo-Zujevo, Bogorodsk and Kostroma, rivalled those of Narva in size and output; their reputation was world-wide due to the superb quality of the goods they manufactured.

Wool

The foundation of the woolen industry, second in importance to cotton, dates back to the reign of Peter the Great, like so many of our industries. At first, output was confined to supplying the needs of the Armed Forces, but, about 1850, woolen goods commenced to appear in large quantities on the market. Up to the end of the century, Russia exported considerable amounts of raw and semi-processed wool. However, at the turn of the century the increased demand for woolen goods at home and the consequent expansion of the woolen industry brought about a reversal in trade and imports of wool mounted steadily year by year. The breeding of the merino sheep was also being gradually superseded by other more profitable forms of animal

(a) P. 90.

(b) P. 91.

husbandry. This new trend is illustrated by the following figures: 1901-1905, 23,315 tons imported, worth 33 million roubles; 1906-1910, 45,870 tons worth 40 million roubles; and 63,410 tons worth 89 million roubles in 1913.

The figures quoted relate to raw wool and indicate an enormous expansion of the wool weaving industry at home. From 1900 to 1912 nearly three hundred new factories were founded (916 and 1210), while the number of shuttles and power looms increased by 15% and 60% respectively. In 1912 a total of 1,423,627 shuttles and 43,173 power looms were operated by the industry and the output for the year amounted to 80 million yards of woolen textiles, an amount three times as large as that produced twenty years earlier.

Thanks to the improvement in the standard of living, the demand for woolen goods was, however, so high that in 1912, 27 million roubles worth was imported from abroad. In subsequent years these heavy import figures would, in all probability, have dropped with the expansion of the home industry, as shown by a reduction of 10 million in 1913.

Flax

Linen and furs were the best known items of our export trade ever since the early days of Russian history. "Muscovite linen" was greatly valued by the West in the Middle Ages, while the wealth in flax of our northern provinces amazed the first English trading captains at Archangel in the days of Queen Elizabeth I. Napoleon bought up vast quantities of Russian linen to clothe his armies and in the days of sail the navies of the world, including the British Navy, made extensive use of Russian sail cloth. Indeed, the quality of this cloth must have been held in high esteem by the experts for, when British manufacturers sought to introduce cloth of their own make to the American market, they were not averse to a little quiet juggling with the trade mark of the famous Russian Bruzgrine factory.

In more recent times, linen cloth best known abroad was produced by our factories near Yaroslav.

The development of the industry followed the general trend of Russian industrial expansion and was most marked in the years preceding the 1914 war. Russia was then leading England and France as a linen weaving country and herself consumed 81,900 tons of raw flax annually as against 51,321 tons in 1900. The table below gives the difference in production between 1900 and 1913:

	1900	1913
Spun linen yarn	33,450 tons	51,400 tons
Sewing thread	2,900 tons	4,344 tons
Looms	11,101 (9627 power)	15,957 (15,315 power)

Only 20% of the flax crop grown, which in 1914 amounted to 426,233 tons and represented 80% of the total world production, was utilized at home. The balance was exported abroad (four-fifth of the flax used in Europe was of Russian origin) and was worth over 100 million roubles.

Silk

In 1913, 10,730 tons of silk worm cocoons were produced in Russia: 108 tons in the South; 6,200 tons in Transcaucasia; and 4,422 tons in Turkistan. Large quantities of raw and semi-processed silk were also imported from abroad, averaging 1,620 tons, worth 14 million roubles in 1901 and 4,000 tons, worth 34.5 million roubles in 1913. The expansion of the silk weaving industry was in direct proportion to these figures, but manufactured silken goods from abroad were required to meet the demands of a rapidly expanding market. The value of these goods is quoted at 5.2 million roubles in 1901 and 7.9 million roubles in 1913. Though heavy, they do not minimize the importance to the industry of raw silk imports. The latest available authoritative figures relate to the industrial census of 1908 and show 309 factories in operation with an annual output of 46 million yards of pure silk valued at 50 million roubles.

Russia came sixth among the silk manufacturing countries of the world; the largest centers of production lay in the province of Vladimir near Moscow, and here was situated the famous Giraud factory, the largest in Europe and one of the finest in the world.

Hemp and Jute

The Russian Navy, created by Peter the Great, transformed the primitive craft of rope and cable making into an industry. At first, mainly centered in St. Petersburg, it gradually spread after 1880 to the provinces of Yaroslav, Orel, Riazan and Perm. In 1912 production of string, ropes and cables totaled 26,410 tons. The industry was, however, heavily handicapped by climatic conditions, the latter affecting the yield of hemp which could never be gauged by the extent of the area under cultivation. Thus, 460,000 tons were harvested in 1908, only 311,640 tons in 1909 and 410,000 tons in 1912.

Large quantities of hemp were exported abroad: 47,541 tons, valued at 12 million roubles in 1908; 51,900 tons, at 17.4 million, in 1912; and 53,246 tons, at 20 million, in 1913.

Toward 1880 jute began to replace hemp on the market though the raw material was mainly imported from abroad, as efforts to acclimatize jute were on the whole unsuccessful. These imports rose from 100,246 tons in 1881 to 244,016 tons in 1901 and 385,246 tons in 1913. The ten existing factories, with 2,400 looms and 45,000 shuttles, were chiefly engaged in the manufacture of sacks, annually valued at 150 million roubles.

SUNDRY INDUSTRIES

Sugar

The refining of sugar from home grown sugar beet was among our major alimentary industries which also included

distillation (3), brewing, the production of vegetable oils, canning, milling, fishing, etc. (a)

The first sugar refining factory was founded in 1802. Though the annual production of our factories in 1860 only amounted to 19,820 tons, twenty years later it had reached 260,656 tons. By a law passed in 1895, the amount of sugar allocated to the home market and the authorized reserves for export abroad were determined in advance. This law exercised a beneficial effect on the industry, which responded by extending the area of sugar-beet under cultivation, introducing better methods of refining and helping to reduce the cost of production.

In 1908 Russia joined the International Sugar Convention of Brussels for a term of 5 years and the Russian export quota was fixed at one million tons per annum. This agreement was renewed in 1913 and the quota increased by 250,000 tons.

Though an importer of foreign sugar in the nineties of the last century, Russia, by the last years before the First World War, had become the largest sugar producing country in the world.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area under sugar beet (acres)</i>	<i>Refineries</i>	<i>Annual Production (thousand tons)</i>
Russia	1,767,500	289	1,823
Germany	910,000	341	1,361
Austro-Hungary	927,000	196	1,033
France	515,000	224	0,464
Holland	125,000	27	0,246
Belgium	140,000	74	0,213
Other countries (Europe)	280,000	106	0,509
Total	14,764,500	1,257	5,649

At home the consumption of sugar rose steadily and doubled in the decade between 1900 and 1910, passing from 673,770 tons to 1,193,442 tons, the actual consumption per head rising

(a) The Russian fishing industry was the largest in the world. In 1913 the value of Russian fish amounted to 133 million roubles; American, 95 million; and British, 65 million.

by 48.44% from 12 to 17.8 pounds. The latter figure may, I think, be taken as a fair indication of the generally improved standard of living. Our export trade in sugar was also mounting even prior to the Brussels convention and showed an increase of 255% during the period mentioned above: 128,000 and 454,000 respectively.

Timber

Russia's wealth in timber needs no stressing. The generally accepted figure for the area covered by forests was 2,000 million acres of which 437.5 million were in European Russia and 1,562.5 in Asia. The immensity of this area becomes more apparent when it is compared with the combined timberlands of the U.S.A., Canada, Sweden, Norway, Austria and Hungary, amounting to 1,500,000 acres. In consequence, great importance was attached to the timber industry and timber constituted one of the main items of our export trade.

Exports of timber

<i>Year</i>	<i>Thousand tons</i>	<i>Million roubles</i>	<i>Average per ton (roubles)</i>
1901	3,471	55.680	16.04
1903	4,164	66.308	15.92
1905	4,429	76.867	17.35
1907	5,631	107.793	19.14
1909	6,960	126.575	18.20
1911	6,767	141.589	20.92
1913	7,607	162.796	21.36

Russian exports in the last year of this table were over a third higher than the combined amounts sold abroad by the countries previously mentioned.

Only one-fifth, however, of the total turnover was exported, the balance finding a ready market at home. Internal consumption was constantly on the increase, disposing of 9,016,400 tons in 1891 and 40,984,000 tons in 1911. During this period the number of sawmills increased from 1,430 to 1,931 and the labor

force employed, from 73,964 to 100,051, a fact which illustrates the vitality of the industry and partly explains why it was able to expand so quickly. In spite of these facts and the adoption of a better and more modern felling technique, the demand was so great that the price of timber continued to mount, as indicated in the table above.

The Russian peasant is amazingly skillful in the use of his short-handled axe, be it to dress the trunk of a felled tree or carve a cunningly modelled spoon, and carpentering was widespread both as a craft and an industry. A great variety of articles were manufactured of wood, ranging from domestic appliances to the luxurious furnishing of our passenger trains. There were factories for the building launches and boats, making packing crates and barrels along the banks of the Volga and other rivers, while many of the towns boasted of their model art schools and specialized in furniture and cabinet making and the manufacture of musical instruments.

Wood Pulp and Paper

The introduction of wood pulp for the manufacture of paper at the end of the last century quickly gave rise to a new industry in Russia. The wooded northern provinces, with convenient access to rivers, were admirably suited to supply the paper industry with the necessary raw material. In 1912, the industry, which was founded in 1901, was yearly turning out 147,560 tons of cellulose and 300,000 tons of paper against a combined original 164,000 tons. The industry was served by 1,500 paper factories of an aggregate 90,000 H.P. and employed 100,000 workers. It was mainly centered around St. Petersburg, where both wood pulp and cotton waste were used in the manufacture of paper, while Moscow specialized in cardboard casings for the well-known "Russian Cigarettes" which were exported to England, Germany, China (800 million per annum) and many other countries.

Leather

The tanning industry was at all times a flourishing one in Russia and "Russian Leather" and dressed skins were for centuries well known abroad. Before the 1914 war, the internal supply was insufficient to meet the growing demand of the big factories, mainly situated in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Orel, and foreign skins and hides were imported from America and India. This imported raw material was turned into goods of the highest quality and re-exported abroad, the value of these re-exports rising from 345,00 roubles in 1901 to 852,000 in 1912.

Rubber

All rubber goods manufactured in Russia were necessarily made from imported raw material, synthetic rubber being unknown at the time under review. Nevertheless the industry deserves to be mentioned if only for the quality of the goods, especially tires, it produced. Trade names like "Treugolnik," "Provodnik," "Bogatyr," and "Cautchuk" had a deservedly good reputation and were familiar in many countries. (4)

The building industry

The importance of this industry, embracing a multitude of trades in a country entering upon an era of industrial expansion like Russia, is patent. Any detailed summary would require too much space and to illustrate the advances made I shall limit myself to quoting the figures relative to the output of cement which rose from 328,000 tons in 1908 to 1,246,000 tons in 1912.

Electricity

The mention of electricity at the present time in terms of its application, as it was then understood, may appear out of date. However, the use of electric power for lighting, urban traction, telegraph and telephones was extensive after the beginning of the century. All our large towns were served by powerful, up-

to-date plants, while telephone and telegraph lines linked the remotest parts of the country. The output of varied electrical appliances, such as turbines, accumulators, signalling apparatus, etc., was rapidly expanding and was mainly centered in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Industry was quick to seize upon the advantages offered by electrical power and it was put to extensive use, especially in electro-chemical processes, by its many branches.

The chemical industry

In 1913 the chemical industry with an annual output of 600 million roubles and a labor force of 40,000, had doubled its production of ten years ago. The main articles manufactured were artificial manures, paints and varnishes. We were, nevertheless, dependent on Germany to a distressing degree for the supply of a wide range of chemical goods. In 1914, at the outbreak of the war, this dependence amounted to tragedy. Our allies, more technically advanced and better equipped could, no doubt, have come to our aid, had we not been separated from them by the common enemy. Faced with the immediate necessity of creating a chemical industry independent of foreign help and able to meet the enormous requirements of the war, the government resolutely tackled the problem with the able and energetic support of the Duma and the Zemstvos.

No time was lost, but it was over a year before production was sufficiently advanced to relieve the terrible shortages at the front. By 1916 there were 400,000 employed in the industry. Thirty-three factories were manufacturing sulphuric acid, nitric and nitrous compounds, while the thirty-two factories producing benzole and toluene not only met our military demands but also supplied civilian needs. Production of shells was 83 times and that of explosives thirty times greater than at the outbreak of hostilities. The ruthless demands of war thus

helped to create a self contained and self-supporting chemical industry which would doubtless have further developed under normal conditions of peace.

Before closing this chapter, I shall briefly mention a few branches of Russian industrial activity of secondary importance but nevertheless worth noting, such as the dressing of furs, processing of fats, perfumery, the cutting of precious stones, gold and silversmith work, the manufacture of fine china and porcelain. The articles produced by the Imperial Porcelain Factory at St. Petersburg, founded in 1746, were on a par with those of the famous factories of Copenhagen, Sèvres, Meissen and Berlin.

The remarkable advances made by Russian industry in the last 20 or 30 years preceding the First World War will not have escaped the reader. It was a period of sustained expansion and, for those of us who witnessed the last decade of this period, breathlessly exciting. Under our eyes a transformation was taking place which year by year increased the prosperity and wealth of our immense and much loved country. All of us realized that it would inevitably be brought to a temporary halt by the war, but we foresaw an even greater surge forward after the termination of hostilities. The tragic events of 1917 and the ensuing mismanagement and fanatical pursuit of doctrine by the Soviet Government all but brought Russia to economic disaster. At present intensive industrialization is the "mot d'ordre" of Moscow and much indeed has been achieved in recent years. The price paid is the ruin of agriculture and the sacrifice of millions of innocent lives. (5)

Whether the new industries would be as efficient as their predecessors was, for a time, a matter of doubt, but the inexhaustible wealth of Russia in raw materials, the brains and skill of her scientists and technicians, were inevitably bound to place her in the forefront of the industrial world.

NOTES

(1) The statistical figures presented in this chapter, dealing with industry proper, should be linked with the quite considerable output of the "Koustari," or rural craftsmen. Their work was a Russian speciality and was mainly pursued in the northern provinces, where the long winters condemned the peasants to months of enforced inactivity. The "Koustar" is a peasant who supplements his normal income from agriculture by manufacturing at home with the help of his family, certain articles of trade easy to produce and of general utility. A reverse definition might perhaps be even more correct, as in many cases the income thus derived by far exceeded the "Koustar's" earnings from the soil.

Often these craftsmen would leave their homes and spend large parts of the years in the cities where they banded together into "Arteli" or small productive cooperative societies. Quite apart from these there was also in Russia a fluctuating population of semi-agricultural laborers who, for similar reasons, plied different trades according to the seasons. The very nature of this kind of work made it quite impossible to assess its true value. Our best authorities in economics placed it at 2500 or 3000 million roubles on the eve of war and estimated the number of "Koustari" permanently or semi-permanently engaged in the crafts, at 15 million.

The most important and popular rural industries were carpentering, wood carving, weaving, embroidery, the making of lace and leather work. These industries were encouraged and financially supported by the government, the Zemstvos and private individuals. There were over 250 government art schools in which the peasants were instructed and properly trained in art designing, embroidery, lace making, wood carving, etc.

The International Exhibition of Paris in 1900 first brought the work of our rural craftsmen to the attention to the West. The genuinely artistic value of their work was much appreciated and led to a steady export trade, particularly in carved wooden toys.

(2) The Caucasian wars are an epic of military history on both sides. Many of our generals gained fame in those mountains, while the names of the tribal leaders have come down to us in ballad and song. The last and greatest of them, Shamil, united the tribes into a confederation and led a holy war, "Gazawat," against us for many years, until final capture and exile. My English readers will not take it amiss if I say that much English gold was spent to keep up the resistance of the tribes, or that they were frequently equipped with arms manufactured in England.

(3) The distillation of alcohol had always been fairly widespread in Russia and in some places was pursued on a relatively large scale. The national drink of "Vodka" is a spirit, 40% proof, brewed from potatoes, which replaces other kinds of spirits and wines consumed abroad.

The sale of "Vodka" was controlled by the State and was a government monopoly. It was founded on January 1st, 1895 and lasted until July 30th, 1914, when it was abolished by Imperial decree and the whole country was placed on a "dry" regime. (The sale of wines was not prohibited) This monopoly of the sales of spirit by the government had been for many years the subject of controversy and sustained criticism. M. Ed. Théry, the author of the book I have previously mentioned, made a special study of the manner in which the monopoly operated, of its effects on the health of the people and its financial aspects. After showing the revenue derived from the sale of "Vodka" (p. 63), he goes on to say . . . "the fact that sales are controlled by government agents is an important factor, as it does away with any possibility of fraud or adulteration, a point of hygiene to bear in mind." In spite of an increase in output, the actual quantity of alcohol consumed per head showed very little change, the balance being largely exported abroad. Between 1900 and 1911 these exports rose by 945%, while the increase in output amounted to 43% and consumption per capita by 14.5%. The last figures compare favorably with the 48% rise in the consumption of sugar, mentioned earlier in this chapter.

Judging by what one hears and reads abroad it is easy to imagine the average Russian as an inveterate drunkard. It was in keeping with the usual policy of our revolutionaries to seize upon the introduction of the state monopoly as an effective weapon of propaganda. "The Czar was inebriating his people;" "drunkenness, encouraged by the State, was widespread and Russians were drinking more than anyone else in the world." In actual fact the opposite is nearer the truth. For confirmation see "The Russian Year Book" pp. 262-264, London, 1911; "The Times Russian Supplement," 1914; A. Raffalovitch, "Russia, Its Trade and Commerce," pp. 431-432, London, 1918.

M. Théry compares individual consumption of alcohol in Russia with the amount consumed in France which was twice as great and says he would gladly see a similar monopoly introduced if it could ensure comparable results. (*Ibidem*, P. 64).

A few more details about the monopoly: The role of the State was confined to that of selling agent or distributor of a uniform, perfectly rectified and triply distilled form of alcohol throughout the Empire. It was on offer to the public in the minimum number of state controlled premises, on the minimum number of days in the year and during a minimum number of hours of an average working day. From 1900 to 1908 the price of all food commodities, especially sugar, showed a steady decline. The price of spirits, of the only kind on sale in Russia, rose by 20%. Further, this price was uniform throughout the whole of the Empire and did not vary, whether spirits were bought wholesale or retail, sold over the counter in the State Monopoly shops or in private establishments. In most countries the sale of liquor is highly profitable and

yields anything from 25% to 100% to the vendor. In Russia it was the item which afforded the merchant, or saloon keeper, the smallest profit, consequently neither he nor the salaried employees of the monopoly were in any way interested in pushing or increasing the sale of "vodka."

A powerful temperance movement, organized and directed by the Church, together with the purely commercial factors I have just mentioned, contributed to reducing drunkenness and keeping Russia well down the list of alcohol drinking nations.

The general effects of the Monopoly are best judged from a statement made by Count Kokovtsev, Minister of Finance, in his explanatory notes to the budget of 1913. "While the State Monopoly in the sale of spirits has not eradicated drunkenness, it has directly: (a) caused the disappearance of adulterated spirits and done away with the dishonest saloon keeper who sold them; (b) put an end to the sale of spirits on credit and the practice of payment in alcohol in lieu of salary; (c) permanently closed an outlet for the produce of illicit stills and imports of contraband liquor; and lastly (d) brought an increase of revenue to the State."

Commendable as all this may have been, the Emperor inclined toward total prohibition. Mr. Bark, the new Minister of Finance in 1914, was ordered urgently to enquire into possible means of implementing the attendant loss to the treasury. The declaration of war in July 1914 presented the Emperor with an immediate solution. By Imperial Decree, prohibition was at once introduced, not as a temporary measure, but by a "ukaz" which later would become State Law.

One of the first acts of the leaders of the 1917 revolution was to rescind this decree and re-introduce the State Monopoly so strongly criticized by them while in exile. According to the Soviet Press of today drunkenness has become a national scourge. The new "upper classes" now drink "Vodka" by the glass where good wine was once enjoyed with discernment, while the "happy" Russian people drown their misery in drink.

(4) In 1912 a Russian car, driven over 2000 miles of snow-covered and ice-bound roads, won the Grand Prix d'Endurance in the Monte Carlo Rally. The car was a racing model of the "Russo-Baltic Works" of Riga. It was Russian built throughout and shod with "Provodnik" tires. The whole run was accomplished without a single mechanical breakdown and without a single puncture. As the car was a two-seater racing model and consequently not eligible for the "Concours d'Elégance," the driver, the late Mr. A. Nagel, a pioneer of Russian motoring, though first to reach Monte Carlo, was debarred from the Grand Prix.

(5) The industrial achievements of the Soviets are afforded much prominence today and the impression is gained that the Soviet régime took over the government of a country still floundering in a morass of mediaeval agriculture.

The general outline I have drawn depicts the considerable scope and wide range of Russian pre-war industry and the statistical figures I have presented stress the growing tempo of industrialization within the last decades of Czarism. This expansion was proceeding normally and at a pace which favorably compares with the industrial development of the United States in the eighties and nineties of the last century.

The rate of progress in Soviet Russia today differs but slightly from the days of "reactionary and feudal" Czarism, the capitalist system and private ownership, in spite of all the technical advances of modern science, the nationalization (or expropriation) of the means of production and slave labor.

This is confirmed by an article published in "Rousskaia Mysl," Paris, Sept. 8, 1956, by V. Tatarinov, who quotes some interesting figures from a paper on pre-revolutionary Russian Industry read by E. M. Allais to the French "Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques." M. Allais is a mining engineer of considerable repute and reader of Political Economy in the "Ecole Supérieure des Mines," as well as author of several works on science statistics.

M. Allais analyzes in his paper the period from 1880 to 1913 and bases his comparative figures on production in 1880. Within this period the production of coal rose by 9.5; oil, by 23.5; general industrial power by 12.5; steel, by 16.

The latest available official figures give the following increase in production between 1913 (the last year of normal conditions under the Czarist régime) and 1955; coal 13.5; oil 7.4; general industrial power 11.3; steel 9.4.

CHAPTER V

TRADE AND THE MARKETS

The course of early Russian history was shaped to a great extent by the flow of trade between the Baltic and the Black Sea and the pursuit of commerce was held in great esteem by the people and the old noble families of Moscow. (1) A lively and active commercial intercourse was in operation long before the slow expansion of agriculture, so repeatedly arrested by the many invasions I have earlier mentioned. The whole period of greatness and decline of Kiev, as well as the rise of Moscow, was to a large extent governed by the trends of trade and commerce, while it will be remembered that the solid basis on which Peter the Great founded industry rested upon the trading capital of the old Muscovite merchant families.

The remarkable expansion of Russian trade in the years preceding the First World War and the Revolution, consequent upon an increase in the variety and volume of production, was mentioned in the previous chapter; the origin of this expansion lies in the economic evolution then taking place in Russia and the growing prosperity of the nation. Though both these factors may be accepted as overall and inner reasons, there were others which directly contributed to the increase of our trade turnover: the decentralization of commercial credit, the setting up of local exchanges and the formation of committees and associations with a view to regulating the flow of merchandise both at home and abroad.

The increase in bulk, from 85,246,000 tons in 1900 to 258,426,000 tons in 1912, of commercial goods annually handled inside the country, demonstrates the changes taking place in our internal and external commercial dealings. During the

same period the number of trading concerns rose from 861,000 to 1,221,000. And here I must mention the astounding development in Czarist Russia of the most democratic form of commerce, the consumer cooperative marketing societies. In 1900 there were 200; in 1913, 1589; and 20,000 on January 1, 1917, with a total membership of over seven million.

From an economic viewpoint Russia, perhaps, is best described as an autarchy. Nevertheless, her external trade, like that of the United States, was rapidly expanding in response to increased economic activity at home. During the second half of the 19th century, the volume of foreign trade rose by 108% from an annual average of 525.3 million roubles between 1850 and 1874 to 1,092 million between 1875 and 1899. After the close of the century, the rate of acceleration was even more marked: in 1898 the total volume of Russian international trade was valued at 1,340 million roubles. By 1913 it had risen to 2,895.3 million, an increase of 116% in the brief course of fifteen years.

Taken by itself, this is an impressive figure; it is enhanced if we consider that during this period the increase of the population amounted to 35%, thus bringing the per capita increase in foreign trade to 60%, a remarkable achievement for a country with a growing birthrate. It is, of course, understood that Russian and American per capita exports should not be compared with those of predominantly trading nations, like Belgium, the Netherlands or Britain.

On the other hand, the dependence of Russia on her trading relations with foreign countries was limited and made her relatively immune to those fluctuations which disrupt the economic life of nations dependent for their existence on commerce with the external world.

An important feature of Russia's foreign trade was the maintained excess of exports over imports; this favorable trading balance facilitated the payment of commitments on foreign loans and other currency obligations both by the State and private interests.

Russian External Trade Between 1899 and 1913

	(Million Roubles)		
<i>Average</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Balance</i>
1800-1903	793.3	630.2	163.1
1904-1908	1,046.0	769.5	276.5
1909-1913	1,505.4	1,139.6	365.8

Ninety per cent of our exports went abroad over the land frontiers of the Empire. Our chief customers in order of importance were Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, France and the United States. The advantages derived by all the countries concerned were mutual: a remunerative market for the West and a very profitable outlet for our own exports. The varied nature of these exports was detailed in the previous chapter on industry and particular attention drawn to their increase in pre-war years.

The average value of our export trade, divided on broad lines into groups, between 1909 and 1913 is shown in the table below.

	<i>Million roubles</i>	<i>% in relation to total</i>
Articles of food (bulk and processed)	924.4	61.3
Raw materials and semi-finished goods	496.2	33.0
Manufactured goods	84.8	5.7
Total	1,505.4	100.0

Before the First World War, Russia was the largest grower and exporter of cereals in the world and was justly referred to as the "Granary of Europe." She was also the main source of supply of a number of other commodities such as flax and oil, while a virtual monopoly was enjoyed by Russia in platinum, manganese and matchwood.

From exports we now pass to imports. Special importance is attached to this section in view of the "colonial" theory regarding Russia, contradicted in Chapter IV. It is still popularly accepted abroad but, like the majority of current notions on our past, is unsound.

The important point to consider is the nature of the goods we imported. The bulk of these goods was not, as commonly supposed, intended for consumption or direct use, but was essential to the requirements of industry and mainly consisted of ores, metals and associated manufactured articles, textiles, certain kinds of fuel, bitumen and tar. The distribution of imports under this heading was as follows:

	<i>Million Roubles</i>	<i>% in relation to total imports</i>
Ores, metals and related manufactured articles	339.6	27.8
Textiles	283.3	23.2
Fuel, Bitumen and Tar	142.2	11.7
Total	<u>765.1</u>	<u>62.7</u>

There followed a category, intermediate in nature, of goods concerned with means of production, various animal products, foreign timber, pottery, etc., amounting in all to 19% of our total imports.

Lastly, consumer goods proper, such as articles of food, clothing, stationery, etc., amounted to 18.3%.

The whole range of imports is summed up in the following table:

	<i>Million roubles</i>	<i>% in relation to total imports</i>
Category 1. General industrial needs	765.1	62.7
Category 2. Intermediate	232.1	19.0
Category 3. Consumer goods	223.2	18.3
Total	<u>1,220.4</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The preponderance of imports governed by the requirements of industry thus becomes apparent. Instructive information is derived from a comparison of increased imports in their respective categories between the years 1906 and 1912, given below, when the importance of category 1 is further emphasized.

Imports in million roubles

	1906	1912	Balance
Ores, metals, etc.	142.1	291.4	149.3
Textiles	161.1	250.4	89.3
Fuel	64.9	99.7	34.8
Increase Category 1, industrial			273.4
Animal products	33.6	77.9	44.3
Timber	24.3	42.3	18.0
Pottery	11.6	27.5	15.9
Chemicals	39.7	53.8	14.1
Increase Category 2, intermediate			92.3
Articles of food	107.2	142.8	35.6
Sundries	29.8	48.7	18.9
Increase Category 3, consumer goods			54.5

The relative insignificance of the last figure, compared with the combined total of 365.7 million roubles in the first two categories, substantiates what has been said above.

The whole structure of Russia's foreign trade, which had more in common with the American pattern than any other, was governed by and exemplified the whole system of the nation's economy. The Russia of yesterday was an agricultural country with a well developed industry, geared to the needs of a vast internal market not only capable of absorbing the entire national industrial output but also of utilizing goods manufactured or purchased abroad. In this connection two salient features of our external trade should be noted: the variety and volume of our food exports and the somewhat astonishing fact that we imported a larger amount of raw materials than we ourselves sold abroad.

The economy of Russia constituted a homogeneous entity in which the development of agriculture was accompanied by a parallel development of industry. The combined progress of these two branches served to raise the standard of living of the rural population. Further, the purchasing power of the countryside increased in direct proportion to the growth of industry. This interdependence of agriculture and industry was strength-

ened by that typically Russian peculiarity, where a large section of the rural community derived a considerable income from work wholly unconnected with the soil.(a) There was also in pre-revolutionary Russia a striking coincidence between the formation of industrial capital and the progressive growth of our exports of an entirely agricultural nature. This is witnessed by the simultaneous improvement in the standard of living of the peasants due to industrialization and the extension of our trading relations with other countries. In future years this would have led to sustained harmony in our commercial dealings with the rest of the world, as our external trade was based on lasting and permanent foundations determined by the normal evolution of our national economy. In peaceful conditions these fundamental principles would have continued to exercise their beneficial influence and raised our trade to heights undreamed of in the past. Speculation on what might have been is profitless, but the continued and amazing expansion of the American export trade in the years following the 1914-1918 war to the present day may, to some extent, serve as a pointer to our former export potential, as well as the fact that by 1914 Russia was the sixth largest trading country in the world.

At the present time our country is no longer a governing factor in international trade. The reason lies in the economic policy of the Soviet Government which has not only ruined agriculture in Russia but severed its connection with industry. The links connecting town and country are broken for good.

The loss to the world is immense and is acutely felt by all nations, particularly those of Western Europe for whom the restoration of the Russian market is an urgent and vital necessity. How else can one explain the repeated and often frustrated attempts of the West to come to an understanding with the emissaries of the Soviets?

Slowly the world is beginning to recognize that the dis-

(a) Vide Chapter IV. Note (1) "The Koustari."

appearance of the Soviet régime is the condition sine qua non of universal economic (not to mention political) stability; that this longed-for stability can only be achieved by the reintegration of a peaceful Russia into the orbit of international relations. The rehabilitation of Russia's economy will require colossal investments both in capital and goods and will offer a remunerative field for commercial activity to the West. Vast resources will have to be diverted to agriculture in particular and the countryside, blockaded by the Soviets, will be wide open to the influx of imports from abroad.

Because of her immense natural riches, Russia is still a "new" country. Human capital and material wealth have been insanely squandered by her present government. In the Russia of tomorrow a brilliant future lies before East and West in friendly and productive economic collaboration.

NOTES

(1) Commerce was repugnant to the feudal mentality of the West. In ancient Moscow, on the contrary, some of the oldest branches of commerce and industry were handled by the great boyar families, as, for example, the trade in furs which was the particular domain of the Shuiskis. Foreigners who visited Russia in the 17th and 18th centuries were struck by the flair and aptitude for commerce of the Russians as a whole. "Everyone, high and low, is busy acquiring riches here, there and everywhere," says de Rodes in his "Reflections on Russian Commerce in 1653." Another foreigner, the Dane Haven, in 1740 was so impressed by the business acumen of the Russian peasants that he went as far as comparing them with the Jews. These observations do not tally with the repeated assertions of some modern authors about Russian incompetence in business or the disdain of the upper classes for trade.

In the 17th century, visitors from abroad were astounded by the number of shops and variety of goods to be found in Moscow. According to German sources, Amsterdam and Venice, then in their hayday, were not so wealthy as Moscow with its "Gosti," those famous Russian merchants, so honored by the Czars.

Under the circumstances one is inclined to ask why Peter found it necessary to lecture his subjects on the advantages of trade. The reason lies in his fear lest the youthful members of his nobility become contaminated by Western views on the indignity of commerce and his desire to encourage a national trait useful in furthering his ambitious plans for industry.

CHAPTER VI

TRANSPORT

The importance of an efficient system of communications in a country like Russia need hardly be emphasized, yet we have suffered from a dearth of good roads all through our history because of the difficulty of building roads with a lasting surface, owing to the nature of the soil and the lack of stone for metalling. (1) This drawback might have been overcome by the abundant waterways, but here again nature seems to have conspired against us, for our rivers and numerous watercourses are icebound during many months of the year, even in the southern parts of the country. There remain the railways, more vital to us than to other countries, as the distances are enormous and the coasts far removed.

As in France, the first railway in Russia was built in 1837. It was a suburban line, 16 miles long, and linked St. Petersburg to Czarskoe Selo and Pavlovsk. Initially, progress in railway building was slow and the first trunk line, linking the two capitals, St. Petersburg and Moscow, was opened in 1851, a dead straight line, in compliance with the expressly stated wish of Nicholas I. Ever since, "The Nicholas Railway" has taken pride in being the premier line in Russia and as late as 1917 was described by the American expert Stevens as one of the best built and best maintained in the world.

The Nicholas, and subsequently all other Russian railways, were built and operated by Russian engineers. This fact is important, as recently I have come across the following lines in a French technical publication dealing with present day conditions on the Soviet railways: "Before the war (1914) most of

the railroad engineers in Russia in the administration, building and repair shops were foreigners."

The article explains the prevailing chaos on the Soviet railways by the absence of these engineers. The above quotation is quite contrary to the truth and the initial disorganization in Russia after the 1914-1918 war and Revolution was caused by a lack of properly qualified technicians and engineers who were either massacred or who had fled the country.

Up to the year 1857 the railways were built and operated by the State. The results were judged unsatisfactory and another policy was adopted. Recourse was had to private companies, sponsored by the Government and subsidized either by guaranteed profits or enforced subscriptions, while the State limited itself to the building of a few small lines.

This policy of subvention, pursued with great vigor after 1867, resulted in a rapid expansion of the railway network. However, its drawbacks soon became apparent. By 1881 only 7% of the entire railway network was owned by the State; the remaining 93% were in the hands of 43 private companies, with divergent operating policies and all competing against one another. Freight and passenger tariffs were chaotic and the burden of minimum guaranteed profits was a heavy drain on the Treasury. Efficiency of construction left much to be desired.

A remedy to these ills was sought in a new approach to the question. The State again reserved to itself a leading position in the operation and construction of railways and the provisions laid down in 1881 remained in force, with temporary modifications, up to the Revolution of 1917. It was during this period that railway construction reached its peak.

Between 1881 and 1891 no further concessions were granted to private interests. In addition to building the majority of the new lines, the Government bought back 4300 miles owned privately and by 1890 held 29% of the network.

A uniform tariff was introduced and a law, passed in 1899, made it illegal to impose new tariffs without prior sanction by the relevant offices of the Ministry of Finance.

The problem of freight and passenger charges was common to all countries at the time. While it took the French and Germans some 20 years to introduce an orderly system of tariffs, the Russian railways solved their difficulties in just under five. In 1893 a tariff regulating the carriage of slow and fast freight was introduced and a year later this was followed by one for passenger traffic. Both were founded on a preferential and progressively diminishing scale. The charges then fixed, with the exception of a slight rise in passenger fares in 1913, remained unchanged up to 1917 and were the lowest in operation anywhere in the world.

Between 1891 and 1901 the same policy of buying out the private companies was followed by the Government and a further 10,953 miles of railway lines were acquired. The State now owned 69.6% of the entire national network, including all the newly laid lines, thus leaving 30.4% in private ownership; the balance between State and privately controlled companies remaining virtually unchanged throughout the following years up to the Revolution.

Henceforth the attention of the Government was mainly centered on the construction of the Asiatic network. (2) In European Russia several large amalgamated companies now maintained the existing private railways, scrapped obsolete and non-paying lines, constructed new ones and established a uniform and easily administered system. The six companies (a seventh was taken over by the State in 1912) were responsible for 97% of privately owned railways. They were all formed between 1891 and 1895 and were still operating in 1917.

At the beginning of this century the railways were faced with a very difficult situation. The rapid extension of the network over European Russia was reflected by a marked economic development and resulted in a consequent increase in railway traffic which the carrying capacity of the railways could no longer meet. Between 1908 and 1914 this annual increase amounted to 6.5% in Russia while in France, Germany and the United States it was between 2.5% and 3%.

In 1911 the Government under Count Kokovtzev brought out a five year plan for the construction of 20,000 miles of railways. This plan was never realized because of hostilities which broke out in 1914. Nevertheless, the mileage completed in two odd years of peace and during the war bears witness to the earnest intentions of the Government.

Railways operated by the State and private companies in European and Asiatic Russia from 1844 to 1914. (The Finnish, East Chinese Railways and local lines are excluded.)

Triennial Periods	Mileage completed during period	Total mileage operated at end of period
1844-1846	155	172
1847-1849	64	236
1850-1852	385	621
1853-1855	27	648
1856-1858	76	724
1859-1861	637	1361
1862-1864	804	2165
1865-1867	768	2933
1868-1870	3679	6612
1871-1873	3363	9975
1874-1876	1977	11952
1877-1879	1827	13779
1880-1882	430	14209
1883-1885	1361	15570
1886-1888	2235	17805
1889-1891	797	18602
1892-1894	2661	21263
1895-1897	3439	24702
1898-1900	7056	31758
1901-1903	3022	34780
1904-1906	3215	37995
1907-1909	1683	39678
1910-1912	2044	41722
1913-1915	6821	48543

The overall position on January 1, 1916, according to the latest statistics of the Czarist period was as follows:

	State Network Miles	Private Network	Total
Fully operational	29775	15801	45576
Partly operational	1963	1426	3389
Under construction	2425	4856	7281
Authorized construction	850	4648	5498
Finnish Railways	2528	—	2528
East Chinese Railway	—	1073	1073
Local Lines	—	1494	1494
Total	<u>37541</u>	<u>29298</u>	<u>66839</u>

After the Revolution some 6000 odd miles of railways were handed over to the countries which separated from Russia.

During the war, from 1914 to 1917, a total of 6700 miles of new lines was completed and brought into operation. These included the famous Murmansk railway, 928 miles long, which linked Petrozavodsk with the ice-free port of the Kola Peninsula on the Arctic Ocean, the doubling both of the single track Vologda-Archangel line and the whole of the Trans-Siberian line. The building of the Murmansk railway merits special attention. It was, indeed, a remarkable feat of engineering completed in one year across marshes and wastes previously considered impassable and great was the pride of the builders when the first locomotive shrilly announced its arrival on the shores of the Arctic in 1916. The London "Times," writing on the subject called it a "gigantic task" and considered Russia's pride in a remarkable achievement fully justified.

In 1912 the rolling stock of the Russian railways consisted of 25,505 locomotives; 29,268 passenger coaches; and 535,654 goods wagons. Only two lines, the Nicholas and the South-eastern, possessed building yards of their own. Otherwise, the entire stock, both State owned and private, was built by big private engineering works located in the large manufacturing centers.

Annual Production of Rolling Stock

	<i>Locomotives</i>	<i>Goods Wagons and Fuel Tankers</i>	<i>Passenger Coaches</i>
1913	535	19,042	1488
1914	816	31,855	1500
1915	903	33,124	1307

Complete production figures subsequent to 1918 are not now available, but in 1918 the Commissariat of Transport of the USSR estimated the output capacity of these works at 1402 locomotives per annum.

A table showing the operation of Russian Railways (State and private network) in 1902 and 1912 is given below:

	<i>1902</i>	<i>1912</i>	<i>Increase</i>	<i>%</i>
Number of passengers (Millions) per "versta" (a)	0.241	0.405	0.164	68
Goods (thousand poods) per "versta"	38.3	58.7	20.4	53.2
Total Receipts (thousand roubles)	622,915	1,124,284	501,369	80.4
Receipts per "versta" (roubles)	11.950	18.384	6.434	53.8
Total expenses (thousand roubles)	434,791	666,985	232,194	53.4
Cost per "versta" (roubles)	8.341			
Coefficient of operation (b)	69.7	59.3	-10.4	-14.9

While passenger and freight charges in Russia were extremely moderate, in fact the lowest in the world, the accommodation on the trains was excellent and even luxurious on the great trunk lines. Though our network of railways was far less de-

(a) A Russian "versta" is equivalent to 3500 English feet.

(b) Formula establishing relation of costs to revenue. The Russian coefficient was lower than that in other countries. France, Conceded network 59.5%, State Retreat 85.8; Germany 70%; Great Britain 63%; Austria 78%; Belgium 70%; Italy 96%; Netherlands 70%; Switzerland 67%; Serbia 75%; Figures relate to 1913.

veloped than in Western countries and the volume of traffic per mile less heavy, one nevertheless looks back with pride at the efficiency of the system in the "old days" and pays tribute to the high degree of competence of the railway industry.

To complete the analysis of our railways, let us look at the relation between capital expenditure and net revenue so as to establish the interest earned on the money invested.

	<i>Capital Investments</i> (State and Private)	<i>Gross</i> <i>Revenue</i>	<i>Cost of</i> <i>Operation</i>	<i>Net</i> <i>Yield</i>	<i>Interest</i> <i>earned</i>
		(In Thousand Roubles)			
1908	6,534,427	827,250	650,028	169,222	2.59%
1909	6,723,781	902,036	650,169	251,867	3.74%
1910	6,784,239	968,026	644,314	323,712	4.77%
1911	7,093,043	1,052,523	649,999	402,524	5.67%
1912	7,334,469	1,124,284	666,985	457,299	6.23%

An interesting sidelight on the importance of the net yield of the State owned railways is obtained by relating it to the annual charges of the public debt. The capital value of the State Railways in 1912 amounted to 5,389 million roubles, though its actual financial value, capitalized at the rates paid by the State on interest and amortization of the public debt, amounted to 7,380.6 million roubles, while in the same year the entire public debt totalled 8,857 million roubles. In 1912 the net yield of the State owned railways amounted to 321.5 million roubles; the charges on interest and amortization of the public debt included in the budget to 384.5 million roubles. Thus 82.9% of the Russian public debt were covered by the net yield of the State owned railways.

During the war the whole operational system of our railways was subjected to the severest possible strain and passed the test with flying colors. The mobilization of our armies went through in perfect time and normal traffic was barely interrupted, while in the next two or three years a marked increase in civilian and freight services was registered. The German economist Seraphim, in a fundamental survey of Soviet Railway Administration ("Eisenbahnwesen in Soviet Russland") rec-

ognizes the efficiency of the pre-revolutionary system and comments on the way the Russian railways were able efficiently to meet and surmount all the many difficulties occasioned by the war, proving a high standard of organization and quality of maintenance. If any further proof were required one has only to study the brilliant manner in which the railways handled the appalling chaos which resulted from the desertion of the front by entire armies bent on reaching their homes in time to divide the spoils of wholesale robbery, euphemistically called "egalitarianism."

Soviet management was apparently the only instrument capable of wrecking a system so well and truly laid. We are told that matters are now improving and earnestly hope this is so. One is, however, entitled to certain misgivings when one reads the most recent descriptions of journeys in Soviet Russia, generally couched in lyrical terms, where travel on Soviet railways is presented as a form of slow torture in primitive conditions and a total lack of elementary comfort. Further, one is, I think, entitled to ask why, given previous figures, the railways should now operate at a loss, the permanent way be incapable of really fast traffic or the number of accidents be so unreasonably high, when, in proportion to the volume of traffic and length of lines, Russia had at one time the lowest accident rate in the world. The answer to these questions lies, perhaps, in the concluding sentences of Mr. Seraphim's book: "An end to the crisis of the Soviet Railways is as improbable as a truly healthy and sane system of Soviet economy or fiscal policy."

As far back as 1926 I drew attention to the Soviet Government's mismanagement of its railways in an article published by "The Wall Street Journal" on June 15th. I based my figures on Soviet statistics and deplored the acknowledged 50% increase in the rate of accidents. I further estimated the probable cost of restoring the system to any degree of efficiency at something like 500 million dollars and added that this amount did not take into account the replacement of the existing rolling stock,

which would demand the attention of both Russian and foreign workshops for many years to come.

For centuries the only means of long distant transport were the natural waterways which flow across the Russia plain from the Carpathian mountains in the west to the Ural range in the east. These great rivers largely influenced Russian history in the past and many of our great cities gained predominance and flourished, thanks to the busy traffic that flowed through them, like Novgorod and Kiev which lay along the great route followed by the Scandinavians to Byzantium.

Before the Revolution, the length of these waterways (rivers and canals) totalled 240,565 miles and of these 181,485 miles were navigable (180,011 miles, rivers, and 1474 miles, canals).

Even before the advent of the Soviet Government, which by utilizing forced labour on a grandiose scale, has greatly extended the system linking the various rivers and seas, it was possible to travel by water from Astrakhan on the Caspian to St. Petersburg (2652 miles); from Archangel to Astrakhan (3060 miles); Ekaterinoslav to Riga (1061 miles); Irbit, in the Urals, to Kiachta on the Chinese border (3978 miles), etc. It is not therefore surprising that Russia owned the largest river fleet in the world.

Russian river fleet (European Russia) in 1900	11,330,000 tons
United States River fleet 1900	4,338,000 tons
German river fleet 1897	3,427,000 tons
French river fleet 1892	2,966,000 tons

Comparative figures of merchant navies of other countries

British	1900	10,750,000 tons
German	1892	1,737,000 tons
French	1897	970,000 tons

The following figures, giving details of the Russian river fleet are taken from the register of the Ministry of Communications for the years 1884, 1900, 1906 and 1912 and refer to European and Asiatic Russia.

	<i>European Russia</i>	1884	1900	1906	1912
a) Steamers: Units		1,246	3,295	3,897	4,884
Steamers HP.		72,105	165,004	192,284	238,626
Steamers Value in Mil. Roubles		48.9	133.3	153.2	183.5
b) Other craft: Units		20,095	22,859	23,175	22,751
Value in					
Mil. Roubles		32.1	60.6	71.5	90.
c) Total value of fleet					
in Mil. Roubles		81.	193.9	224.7	273.5
	<i>Asiatic Russia</i>				
d) Steamers Units					672
Steamers HP.					35,041
Steamers: Value in					
Mil. Roubles					37.990
e) Other craft: Units					1641
Value in					
Mil. Roubles					12.500
Total value of fleet in Mil. Roubles					50.490

The extensive mileage of the waterways, abundance of craft and low cost of carriage could not, however, compete with the facilities offered by the railways which, in 1913, carried 210,220,670 tons of goods against 49,034,000 tons transported by water, while between 1892 and 1912 the railways increased the volume of the goods they carried by 202% and the waterways by 195%.

Government interest in developing transport by water is shown by progressively increased yearly allocations averaging 12.188 million roubles between 1900 and 1905; 14.266 million roubles 1906-1910; and 18.976 million roubles and 21.889 million roubles in 1911 and 1912 respectively.

Archangel, on the White Sea, visited by Chancellor in 1553, on his trade mission to Moscow, was the only harbor owned by Russia before the reign of Peter the Great. Under him and his successors, Russia gradually acquired the costs of the Baltic and Black Seas and finally of the Pacific Ocean, and reached her natural maritime boundaries. How essential was the possession of suitable harbors may be judged from the fact that

over two-thirds of our foreign trade went by water. Between 1903 and 1913, the tonnage of shipping rose by 64.6% (18,163,000 to 29,834,000 gross tons). Vessels flying foreign ensigns were in the majority, though the Russian share rose by 111% within the same period and by 1914 our mercantile marine consisted of 3700 ships. The whole question of an adequate merchant navy was much to the fore in the last decade of the Czarist régime; public collections and subscriptions were launched toward the building of a fleet of large ocean going ships, while the Government lent its support by direct financial aid for the purchase of ships, grants and subsidies to shipping companies with fixed operational schedules and a variety of other means.

In 1913 a plan, estimated to cost 217 million roubles, was drawn up for an extensive program of harbor works which included the building and equipment of new ports and the modernization of existing installations.

NOTES

(1) In 1913 the total length of Russian roads is given as 495,261 miles of which only 31,161 were metalled. The balance of 464,100 miles was made up of plain earth roads, and sometimes well worn trails, which were unusable in the spring and autumn.

(2) The longest railway in the world, the Trans-Siberian, was the most important line in Asiatic Russia. The first plate was laid on May 19, 1891, and the whole completed on January 1, 1906. The annual rate of progress established a record in railway construction, averaging 376.5 miles per annum. The nearest approach was achieved by the great Canadian trunk line completed in ten years at an average annual rate of 322 miles. Though this line runs through 40 tunnels and over 5 great bridges, the Trans-Siberian can boast of 33 tunnels around the southern end of Lake Baikal alone and 29.5 miles of bridges spanning some of the biggest rivers in the world, like the Lena, the Yenisey, the Irtysh and the Ob. The 126 miles section round the tip of Lake Baikal was the most expensive to build of the whole line and cost an average of 323,000 roubles per mile, while the average for the entire railway was 102,594 roubles.

The whole railway, the Eastern Chinese branch excluded, is 3785 miles long and is divided into the following sections: the Siberian, 2081 miles; the

Trans-Baikal, 1114 miles; and the Ussuri, 590 miles. After the completion of the railway it was possible to travel by rail direct from Moscow to Vladivostok, a distance of 5363 miles, and the heart of Russia was permanently linked to her distant outposts on the Pacific.

The influence exercised by the line on life in Siberia and its effects on immigration were truly remarkable. For proof one need only consider the growth of the population in some of the Siberian towns between 1897 and 1910:

	1897	1910
Omsk	37,400	129,700
Tomsk	51,000	111,400
Cheeta	15,000	43,500
Vladivostok	11,500	76,400

It is a matter of great regret that the epic story of the Trans-Siberian has never been properly told. Most of us are acquainted with the fascinating history of the main trans-continental lines of the Western hemisphere. Red Indians, prairies, the battle of man against nature, have come down to us in legend and literature and been recreated on the screen. We know next to nothing about the trials, the hardships and setbacks, the poetry and final grandeur of the mightiest civilizing link in the world. Even the Russian people know very little about one of their main life lines and certainly the present day rulers of Russia will do nothing to dwell on this magnificent achievement of the former régime.

CHAPTER VII

FINANCE

The economic development of Russia during the 19th century brought about the monetary reform of 1897, which finally stabilized Russian currency. In 1894, as a preliminary step designed to regulate the circulation of currency, the charter of the State Bank was totally revised. Under this charter, Russian economy enjoyed a prolonged period of uninterrupted development till the general disruption of all ordered life in 1917.

Prior to the reform and ever since the Crimean War a compulsory rate of exchange of currency notes into gold had been in force. One of the main reasons why the reform was so successful lay in the fact that currency transactions could at last be conducted under healthy conditions guaranteed by a considerable gold reserve. The rates, hitherto artificially maintained, had fluctuated according to the amount of gold in reserve, and other financial and economic factors. The government, however, never lost sight of its original intention to accumulate an adequate reserve of gold and by 1890 470 million roubles worth of gold had been accumulated in the form of bullion held by the State Bank (including credit balances abroad) and gold in circulation. These reserves mounted steadily: at the date of the reform they stood at 1,095 million roubles and in 1914, on the eve of war, totalled 2,257.8 million. By a wise and farsighted financial policy, the Czarist Government succeeded in increasing the national gold reserve by 380% in the space of some twenty odd years.(a)

(a) The depletion of these reserves is described in my article published by "The Economist," London, May 30, 1925.

The confidence of the general public, business and industry, in the financial policy of the government, and the soundness of our currency were particularly manifest during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1906 and the internal disturbances by which it was followed: there was no panic, no run on the banks, while paper money remained convertible on call into specie at face value throughout the Empire. I believe that I am correct in saying that this is a fact unique in the annals of state finance, other countries being invariably compelled to introduce an enforced rate of exchange and to suppress the convertability of paper currency into gold during periods of national crises or prolonged wars.

Coverage in gold of notes in circulation. Russia and other countries.

(1st January, 1913. In millions of roubles) (a)

	<i>Gold</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Russian State Bank	1,550	1,494
Bank of France	1,193	2,196
Bank of the German Reich	411	930
Bank of England	331	263

As regards the total amount of currency in circulation, both in coin and notes, there was a difference of 100% between 1897 and 1913. In 1897 the total equalled 1,133.8 million roubles of which 36 million roubles were in gold; 29.9 million roubles, in silver; and 1,067 million roubles, in notes. In 1913 it amounted to 2,244.8 million roubles of which 628.7 million roubles in gold; 120.5 million, in silver; and 1,494.8 million, in notes.

It may, perhaps, be argued that a larger increase would have been reasonably justified as a result of the economic expansion that had taken place during the same period. In view, however, of the increased facilities that had gradually come to the aid of business, such as an extension in the volume of banking operations, a more widespread use of cheques and the activities of an increasing number of clearing houses, it was adequate.

(a) The rouble quoted is the golden rouble equivalent to one-tenth of the golden sovereign.

Regarding the latter it is worth noting that in 1906 there were only five clearing houses in the whole country, with a turnover of 12,000 million roubles. In 1912 there were 32, handling a total of 31,000 million roubles, thus practically eliminating any considerable displacement of currency.

Among the measures introduced by the Czarist Government to raise the standard of living of the peasants, agricultural credit, the manner in which it operated and its beneficial effects were described in an earlier chapter. A very similar influence on the commercial and business life of the country was gradually being exerted by the rapidly developing activities of our commercial banks. On January 1st, 1908, these banks, including their branches, numbered 374. On the same date in 1914, there were 790, while other banks, operating on somewhat similar lines but serving customers of a lower income bracket, like the Mutual Credit Societies, increased in number from 304 to 1108. A new type of bank, known as "Municipal Bank," was also made available to the public. The first of these banks was opened in 1909 and by 1914 319 were established.

By comparing the figures presented in the following table, showing the capital and reserves of Russian credit institutions on January 1st, 1908 and 1914, a general idea of the increase in the volume of their operations will be obtained.

Capital and Reserves of Russian Credit Establishments
(In Millions of Roubles)

	1908	1914	Increase	%
Joint Stock Banks	352	836	484	137.8
Mutual Credit Societies	55	151	96	174.5
Municipal Banks	—	60	60	—
Totals	<u>407</u>	<u>1047</u>	<u>640</u>	<u>157.3</u>

Both industry and commerce, expanding year by year, called for larger credits from the banks. In 1908 the State Bank and other banking establishments had granted 1,983 million roubles. In 1914 the total rose to 5,191 million roubles, an increase of 161.7%

The banks were also called upon to serve many more clients and private bank deposits rose sharply: in 1907 they totalled 818 million roubles; by 1913 they had risen to 2,539 million roubles, while the overall total of deposits in all our banking establishments, the oldest founded barely fifty years ago, State and private, on the eve of the Revolution amounted to 4,280 million roubles.

It must be conceded that an increase in deposits in the State and private banks does not necessarily indicate an increase in the prosperity of the middle and lower classes. Savings, securely deposited in Savings Banks, are on the other hand a fair indication of an improvement in the living standards of these classes, as they represent the tangible financial assets of the broad masses and are set aside only in times of sustained economic expansion and stability.

Between 1900 and 1914 the number of branches of the State Savings Banks increased from 4,781 to 8,533, and the number of certificate holders from 3 to 9.5 million of which 70% were peasants, laborers, domestic servants and sundry employees; and 30% either small merchants or cooperative societies.

*Balances due to Holders of Savings Banks Certificates
on 31st Dec. of the following years. (In millions of Roubles)*

	<i>Deposits in Currency</i>	<i>Stocks in Shares</i>	<i>Total</i>
1899	608.3	71.6	679.9
1909	1,282.9	279.9	1,562.8
1910	1,396.9	286.9	1,683.8
1911	1,503.0	299.7	1,802.7
1912	1,594.9	318.3	1,913.2
1913	1,685.4	348.6	2,034.0
1914	1,835.0	401.0	2,236.0

The significance of a rise of over one thousand five hundred million roubles, or 228.8%, in fifteen years is underlined by the fact that during the same period the population increased by 35% and therefore it is fully attributable to a general improvement of economic and social conditions. I have already outlined the steps by which it was brought about. At the time

under examination there was, in fact, no other country in the world under any form of government where the general prosperity of the broad working masses was improving more rapidly than in Czarist Russia. (1)

In contrast to those days, the Russian nation has now endured forty years of the greatest form of oppression and collective slavery that the world has ever known. Millions of killed, tens of millions dead of famine, epidemics and disease, were sacrificed to establish this barbaric system which poses as the protector of the world proletariat. Is there anyone who can conscientiously say that this dreadful holocaust was either necessary or justified? No, not even the bitterest critics of Czarism, or the supporters of the present régime in Russia, irrespective of the arguments by which they seek to justify the Revolution, or to defame the source of the historical power in Russia.

It is generally conceded that the administration of the Empire's finances was one of the brightest aspects of the Czarist régime. This admission is explained by the fact that any financial policy, be it good or bad, is rapidly translated into tangible results, whereas the reasons and purport of a long term policy in other domains of government may remain obscure and its results imponderable for a considerable period and often difficult to assess correctly.

In the course of the 19th century Russia waged three wars: the Napoleonic campaigns, the Crimean War and the Balkan War of Liberation of 1877-78. These cost the nation 600, 1400 and 1076 million roubles respectively. (2) Notwithstanding this, our financial position at the beginning of the 20th century was excellent; in 1903 the Treasury wound up the financial year with a surplus of 149 million roubles (revenue 2032 million, expenditure 1883 million) and in 1904 had in hand 331 million roubles, consisting of the yearly surplus and those of preceding budgets.

This satisfactory situation was undermined by the Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the first onslaught, by far more terrify-

ing, of Bolshevism. Omitting the losses inflicted by the abortive revolution and the subsequent economic depression, the war alone cost the nation 2,500 million roubles. In order to meet this heavy charge, the Government was compelled to deplete the exchequer, increase taxation and resort to borrowing. All nonessential expenditure was curtailed and credits restricted. Thanks to the general economic expansion of the nation previously described, by 1913 not only was full stability restored but the finances of the country had reached a level of prosperity never before attained. The Treasury drained to the last rouble only a few years previously, now had a record surplus in hand of 512.2 million roubles, (subsequently utilized to cover the tremendous cost of the first months of the First World War).

The progressive rate of increase from year to year between 1903 and 1913 compels attention in an analysis of Russian State revenue and is illustrated below.

	<i>In millions of roubles</i>		
	1903	1908	1913
Revenue collected	2,032	2,418	3,417
Increase within five years	—	386	999
Per cent	—	19	41

If a longer period, 1867-1913, is examined, this fact is brought into greater relief, as thirty years elapsed before an increase in revenue of 1,000 million roubles was registered; eleven, between the first and the second thousand million; and five, between the second and the third.

<i>In millions of roubles</i>	
1867	415
1897	1,410
1908	2,418
1913	3,417

There were, of course, two factors which contributed to the increase in the rate of revenue between 1897 and 1913; receipts from the State-owned railways and the yield from the government monopoly in the sale of spirits; however, in the

aggregate it was principally due to the general expansion of our national economy.

If we now turn to examine State expenditure, we witness a parallel rise, but one which was controlled and never allowed to exceed revenue. For instance, in the last decade before the First World War, 1904-1913, there was never an exception to this rule and the cumulative surplus during this period totalled 2,122 million roubles. Together with another 270 million from the preceding decade, the Treasury thus had at its disposal a total excess of 2,392 million roubles. Much of this money was utilized in investments of a capital nature, such as 763 million roubles on the construction of new railways, 18 million roubles on improvements to the existing railway network and 73 million roubles in advances to concessionary railway companies. 445 million roubles were spent on national defense. All in all, a sum of 1,879.8 million roubles was devoted to extra-budgetary State expenditure and, on the eve of war, the actual surplus held by the Treasury amounted to 512.2 million roubles, as previously stated.

A point which is important and which I wish to stress is the fact that the entire naval reconstruction program, launched in 1908, was financed out of excess revenue and not by loans or increased taxation.

A description of the highly satisfactory, even brilliant, state of the Russian pre-Revolutionary financial situation would not be complete without a reference to the reduction in the public debt which in 1909 stood at 9,083 million roubles and by the end of 1913, at 8,824 million roubles.

I draw the attention of my readers to the budgetary crises of England, France and Germany in the years preceding the Great World War and remind them that these countries were free from financial burdens similar to the one imposed on Russia by the aftermath of events in 1904, 1905 and 1906.

A very striking feature of sustained improvement, stabilization and the finally superb condition of our finances is the relatively negligible increase in the level of taxation, and the

fact that among the principal European states taxation per head of population was lowest in Czarist Russia. The official Journal of the Russian Ministry of Finance gives us the following details for 1912:

Direct Taxation
(In roubles per inhabitant)

	<i>State Taxes</i> (as per budget)	<i>Local Taxes</i> (Approx. figures)	<i>Total</i>
Russia	1.28	1.83	3.11
Germany	5.45	7.52	12.97
Austria	5.12	5.07	10.19
France	6.44	5.91	12.35
Great Britain	10.01	16.74	26.75

Indirect Taxation
(In roubles per inhabitant)

	<i>Custom & Excise</i>	<i>Local Taxes</i>	<i>Total</i>
Russia	5.95	0.03	5.98
Germany	9.31	0.33	9.64
Austria	9.90	1.38	11.28
France	13.11	2.89	16.00
Great Britain	13.86	—	13.86

The prohibition of the sale of spirits at the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, imposed by Imperial decree, temporarily threw the budget out of balance. In 1913 the monopoly yielded a gross income of 899.3 million roubles, or, if administrative and other expenses are deducted, a net sum of 664.3 million roubles. The Minister of Finance was thus faced at the outbreak of the War with two problems: one, common to all the belligerents, of procuring the necessary means for the prosecution of the War, and second, particular to Russia, how to eliminate the deficit caused by the abolition of the monopoly. The solution adopted, and one which had the desired effect, was the imposition of new taxes and an increase in existing taxation. During the first two years of hostilities, the deficit was gradually reduced and in the third year revenue exceeded expenditure. In 1914-1915 this debit balance amounted to 1,105

million roubles, of which 801 million were due to the abolition of the monopoly. In 1915-16, the total adverse balance had fallen to 227 million roubles, thus practically wiping out in the space of two years the fall in revenue due to the abolition of the monopoly, while the estimated overall increase in revenue for 1916-17 was placed at 966.5 million roubles. This sum exceeded by 581 million the revenue of the 1913 budget and not only covered the deficits of the first two years of the war but was also used mostly to defray the increased changes of the war debt, entered in the ordinary budget.

After the termination of hostilities, Great Britain was the first among the European nations to restore the equilibrium of her finances. From what we have just read, it is obvious that the financial position of Russia was not unduly affected by the War and it is certain that after joint victory with her Allies, Russia would have recovered as quickly had not the Revolution dealt a death blow to the whole structure of Russian life. (a)

A remarkable feature of Russian financial policy, and one to which attention has often been drawn by economists, is the way in which a considerable portion of extraordinary expenditure was met out of current revenue. (b) The desire and effort to do so were more pronounced in Russia than in other countries, while some economists have reproached the Government for not having greater recourse to loans, especially in the second half of the 19th century, in order to develop more rapidly the natural resources of the country,—a debatable, but nonetheless tenable, point of view. Indeed, the total sum borrowed

(a) See my article "Russian Finances in the Past and Present," *Revue Economique et Internationale*, Brussels, March 1928.

(b) For foreign literature on the subject see: A. Raffalovitch "Russia, Its Trade and Commerce," as above pp. 342-3; G. Pavlovsky "The Russian National Debt," in *"Russian Economist"*, Sept. Oct. pp. 40-50, London, 1920; "Report and Documents on Russian Economic Problems," published by the "Committee of Representatives of Russian Banks in Paris," pp. 85-99, Paris, 1921.

by the Imperial Government, both internally and abroad amounted only to 15,000 million roubles between 1769, under Catharine the Great, when a Russian loan was floated in Amsterdam, and 1914, before the outbreak of war.

In 1914, the Russian public debt amounted to 8,825 million roubles. The major portion of this debt was contracted in Russia, as witnessed by the fact that out of total annual interest of 398 million, only 172 million roubles were due abroad. Our chief foreign creditor was France, an ally since 1892. England was at the time engaged in supplying large credits to America, while Germany did everything in her power to weaken Russian credit and so disrupt the Franco-Russian Alliance, while Bismark personally opposed any loans to Russia by a vigorous campaign, both open and secret, among the leading financiers of Europe.

Let us pause to consider some of the reasons which had, nevertheless, compelled the Government to resort to borrowing. Chief among them in the second half of the 19th century were the advances made to the peasants after the abolition of serfdom in order to enable them to compensate the landowners for the land of which the latter had been dispossessed in their favor. The total of these credits amounted to over one thousand million roubles. Next in importance were the sums needed for the construction of new railway systems and for compensating private interests in pursuance of the policy of nationalizing the railway network. At the outbreak of war in 1914, the amounts borrowed by the Government under this heading totalled 3,000 million roubles and were responsible for 35% of the public debt. We must bear in mind that by the same year, 1914, the amount paid toward the establishment of State owned railways amounted to 5,400 million roubles. I make this point once again to emphasize the manner in which extraordinary items of state capital investment were met by budgeted revenue. Lastly, part of the national debt was incurred to pay for our wars. The Balkan War of 1877-78 and the Japanese War of 1904-05 cost the nation 3,900 million roubles.

The Japanese War alone accounted for two thousand million of the public debt, the balance having been met by Treasury holdings and a budget surplus. Examination of other headings under which money had been borrowed, such as "General Requirements of the State," reveals that in the majority of cases the purposes of these loans were productive. I refer in particular to the funds used to increase the Government's reserve of gold, required at the time of the currency reform with all the beneficial results it exerted upon our national economy, the assistance it rendered in developing external trade and in attracting foreign capital to Russian industry. This portion of the public debt also included government borrowing to pay for the development of railways, port and harbor works, etc., when there was no budget surplus as well as considerable sums, always lavishly assessed and paid to the peasants in times of poor harvests.

Immediately after the liquidation of the costs of the Japanese War, it was found possible annually to reduce the capital figure of the public debt, as shown below:

1910—	9,055 million roubles
1911—	9,030 million roubles
1912—	8,957 million roubles
1913—	8,858 million roubles
1914—	8,825 million roubles

Great Britain, which at the time was considered a model of financial administration, is the only other European country which pursued a comparable policy of vigorous amortization of the public debt.

The reductions shown above were accompanied by a corresponding reduction per head of population in the public debt, a remarkable feature when considered in relation to Russia's high birth-rate. The following details are taken from the explanatory report on the 1915 budget.

<i>January 1st</i>	<i>Capital outstanding of Nat'l Debt (In Roubles)</i>	<i>Annual Interest Paid on the Debt</i>	<i>Total</i>
1910 per capita	56.34	2.53	58.87
1911 per capita	55.10	2.48	57.58
1912 per capita	53.35	2.41	55.76
1913 per capita	51.83	2.36	54.19
1914 per capita	50.72	2.31	53.03

A comparison between the figures representing the share per head of population in the total of the public debt in Russia and a few other countries yields interesting information. The figures are given by S. Krulev in "Russian Finances" and relate to 1908.

National Debt per capita in roubles

France	288.
Italy	189.
Netherlands	178.
Belgium	172.
Great Britain	169.5
Germany	135.5
Russia	58.7

Furthermore, these figures taken by themselves do not fully portray the situation as they are related to factors difficult to assess and coordinate, such as the general standard of living, the overall burden of taxation, national wealth as a whole, potential economic development, etc. It would seem that a country industrially and economically young, like Russia, with a rising birth-rate and great natural resources, as yet hardly developed, might face the future more confidently than an ancient state whose wealth and resources have long crystallized into a definite pattern.

We should also bear in mind that at the time the railways of France, Great Britain and the Netherlands were privately owned. If, in analyzing the Russian Public Debt, we deduct the appropriations reserved for the construction and repurchase of the privately owned railways, the average share per head of population is reduced by one third.

On the other hand, as I have pointed out in the previous chapter, over four-fifths of the annual interest and amortization paid on the debt were covered by the net yield from the State owned railways.

This fairly exhaustive analysis leads to the conclusion that even if the immense potential riches of the "Russian Continent" are not taken into account, compared with other countries, the public debt, as it stood before the Great World War, was relatively small and, on the whole, negligible for a country the size and wealth of Russia.

The credit transactions to which the Government had recourse during the War altered the situation and brought the capital figure of the national debt from 8,825 to 32,579 million roubles. In actual fact, this figure is rather nominal as the operations to which it was due were never completed in full, comprising as they did the valuation of the pre-war internal and total external debts at the rate of gold.

The external debt, as it now stood, comprising State-guaranteed loans, totalled 12,750 million roubles, of which 5,070 million represented pre-war State loans, or loans guaranteed by the State and 7,680 million credits opened to Russia by her allies for the requirements of the War. (a)

The whole question of settling this external debt will, needless to say, remain closed for as long as the Soviet Government is in power. (3) If and when negotiations are opened, certain facts will, however, demand consideration. (4) It is obvious that any future, non-communist, régime in Russia will have to accept responsibility for the financial commitments of the Czarist Government, following the accepted international no-

(a) Eighteen per cent (18%) of the Russian pre-war and 19% of the war external debts figure in France's claims on Russia. If France's capital investments in private and municipal undertakings are added, the total standing to her credit equals 14,712,998,691 gold francs. For particulars see my article in "The Economist," London, 27 December, 1925, reprinted in "La Vie Financière," Paris 3rd January, 1926.

tion regarding the continuity of the State. A legal Russian Government will ipso facto recognize previously contracted debts and annul the Communist Government's decrees by which they were repudiated, treating it as an anti-national and hostile power, temporarily in control of the nation. (a)

The economic rebirth of Russia, following the collapse of Bolshevism, will enable the future government to resume payments within a short time, though certain facilities will presumably be requested with proper regard to compensation for holders of Russian funds to cover the chaotic period of change-over. In the opinion of certain economists, to quote but Mr. H. G. Noulton, Director of the Institute of Economics of New York, this period should not be of long duration and he foresees a striking likeness within a brief space of time between the budgets of the Russia of yesterday and the one of tomorrow. (b)

The extent of Russia's heritage, the wealth and abundance of her natural resources having been detailed, there seems little need to question her potential solvency.

In closing this chapter, I present a table showing the prewar budgets of England, France and Russia and the approximate figures of their respective public debts after the 1914-1918 war. The Russian figure is necessarily a theoretical maximum, which takes the national public debt into account and one which should, no doubt, permit of considerable reduction.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Budget</i> (In million roubles)	<i>Public Debt</i>	<i>Volume of debt over budget</i>
Russia	3,300	33,000	10
France	2,150	75,000	35
England	2,000	70,000	35

(a) See my article "Bolshevism, Russia and Europe," Nos. 44, 45 of "Vers l'Unité" and, in particular the chapter on "The International Character of Bolshevism" reprinted by "L'Echo de Paris," Paris, 16 Aug. 1926.

(b) "Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction," Chapter on the future budget, pp. 60-66.

The extension of the Russian budget (under normal government) is, of course, a matter of the future, but it may confidently be predicted that within ten years of reconstruction the annual charges of her public debt will once again be reduced to the modest 13% of the budget in the distant pre-war days.

NOTES

(1) This statement refers to progress during the period under examination, i.e., 1900-1914. Since then, of course, the remarkable expansion of the whole economic life and structure of the United States have brought about an improvement in the standards of living of its population which are unique and far beyond anything that has occurred in other countries. The prosperity and wealth of the United States are a subject of general admiration (sometimes tainted with envy): a salutary thought and one to keep in mind is the fact that at the end of the last century the deficits in the annual American budgets often exceeded 500 million gold francs.

(2) The costs of our wars and the manner in which they affected the nation's finances were examined by General Goulévitch in 1898 in a work entitled "War and National Economy." His conclusions were remarkably prophetic in many respects and attracted the attention of Western readers. The book was translated into French and reproduced the same year in "Bulletin de la Presse de Bibliographie Militaire" of Brussels. It was referred to, under the same title in 1917 by Mr. Prokopovitch, a well-known Russian economist, and has since been quoted by other political students in dealing with contemporary problems which seemed far removed from actuality at the time.

(3) The policy of the USSR regarding the Russian public debt was examined by me in an article, "The Finances of the USSR and the Public Debt" which appeared in "Revue Politique et Parlementaire," Paris, March 1928. It provoked an immediate reply by Prof. Lubimov, delegate of the Soviet Commissariat of Finance. In reply, a second article was published by the same review in August, 1928. In this I stressed the magnitude of the Soviet expenditure on Revolutionary propaganda in foreign countries, founded on statements made by such communist leaders as Kamenev and Sokolnikov. I then pointed out that part, at least, of this money could be properly used to repay Russian creditors.

(4) Concerning this subject I quote below, four points suggested in the French edition of this book, at the same time stressing the importance and contemporary relevance of point V.

I. *Pre-War debts*, i.e., those contracted for internal requirements and productive undertakings. Repayment of this portion of the public debt, whether to private interests or states, which assumed the responsibilities of the Russian Government for repayment during hostilities, should have priority over other claims.

War debts, contracted during World War I, acquired the form of advances made by the Allies. Including the amounts allocated for repayment of the items mentioned above, relatively small, these advances were consented for the purpose of furthering aims common to the Allies and not for any particularly Russian needs. The Allies were rewarded by common victory and appreciable gains. Russia alone derived no benefits and was even compelled to cede great regions of her territories. There would appear to be a case of establishing a relation between these gains and Russia's commitments. Some form of compensation might be requested of the Allies, especially Great Britain, the latter having increased her territorial possessions as a result of victory and being Russia's principal creditor. England's war credits to Russia are valued at 5,375 million roubles and constitute 70% of the total debt.

The Allies, have formally recognized Russia's right to share in reparations (Article 116, Treaty of Versailles; Article 37, Treaty of St. Germain; Article 27, Treaty of Trianon; Article 143, Treaty of Neuilly, etc.). Since the Russian State did not exist, it would be proper to deduct this share from the total amount owed by the future Russian Government.

II. In accordance with historical precedent and the principles of International Law, territories separated from a state are expected to assume an equitable share of the public debt of that state. Hence, those territories which formed part of the Russian Empire, as defined by the frontiers of 1914, should be responsible for a part of the Russian debt. Following the principles laid down in Article 254 of the Treaty of Versailles and corresponding articles of the other treaties terminating the war, a suggested basis for allocating this share of the public debt might consist in establishing the difference between the total taxation levied by the Empire over its entire territory and that levied over the separated territories.

III. In computing the total of the external debt advances made by the Russian Treasury to some of the Allies would have to be taken into account. The same would apply to expenses incurred by Russia for the defense of territories incorporated into countries deemed to have taken part in the War against the Central Powers, such as Poland and Rumania.

IV. Russian gold to the value of 680 million roubles lent to England in 1915-16 should be repaid to the Russian Government in conformity with the terms of the loan (London Agreement); likewise the gold handed over by the Bolsheviks to Germany (120 million roubles) and remitted by the latter to the Allies in compliance with the Treaty of Versailles and deposited in the

Bank of France. The repayment of these amounts would assist in hastening the economic reconstruction of Russia, the stabilization of her currency and the consequent resumption of payments on her public debt.

Russian goods, property and other assets held by the creditor nations should be evaluated and brought into account.

V. Finally, discrimination will obviously be exercised by the Russian Government in its relations with other countries according to their attitude to the Red Tyranny by which our country is temporarily enslaved.

It must further be taken for granted that those countries or private groupings which financially supported the "Freedom International" and thus contributed to the liberation of Russia will enjoy undisputed priority over all her other creditors and will, obviously, be accorded exceptional advantages in the Russia of tomorrow.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF RUSSIA

As Czarist Russia was both a European and an Asiatic power, we may begin by examining her role in inter-continental history. A rampart of the West throughout the early stages of her history, she later became a bulwark of western civilization in Asia. Or, perhaps one might say that Russia first defended Europe against the dark forces of the East and then brought civilization to the barren lands of Asia. There is another Asia to that of Alaric, Attila and Ghengis Khan, an Asia which in the course of history exerted a civilizing influences over Europe. In the days of the Roman Empire the greatest schools of medicine flourished in Asia. In agriculture and trade she gave us the cherry, the peach, the raisin, the mulberry, the silk worm, cotton and coffee, while a Europe recovering from Germanic invasions is indebted to her for numerous industries. From her we learned the art of pottery. Many more examples could be quoted. Besides, do not all our religions and all our races stem from Asia?

In science and industry, however, the Westerners have been for over a century the absolute masters of Asia, even of the civilized Asia which sought protection against the somber forces of the East behind the Great Wall of China.

In the 13th century it was Russia that stood as a barrier between these forces, represented by the Tartar-Mongolian hordes and Western civilization. It was Russia which saved Europe from barbarism and annihilation, herself shedding in this gigantic struggle three centuries of painfully acquired progress from the days of Vladimir, who converted Russia to Christianity, and his son, Yaroslav the Wise. Let us take a look

at the international position of Russia before these invasions. By his marriage to Princess Inguigerd of Sweden, Yaroslav had seven children. Four of his daughters later became queens: Anastasia, of Hungary; Elizabeth, of Norway; Marie, of Poland; and Anne of France. One of his sons, Vladimir II, was married to Guilda, the daughter of King Harold II of England; another, Isaslav I, to Marie, daughter of the King of Poland; the third, Vsevolod I, to Anne, daughter of Constantine Monomach, Emperor of Byzantium. Praxede Adelaide, the daughter of Vsevolod, became the wife of Henry IV, Emperor of Germany, and Vladimir III, his son, who inherited the title of Monomach from his grandfather, was allied to Christine, the daughter of the Swedish King, Inge IV.

Vladimir Monomach left his children a testament of great historical interest. In it he exhorts his heirs to acquire the best education possible and points to his father, Vsevolod, who, though burdened with the duties of government, still found time to learn five foreign languages. He talks of hospitality, which he says should be shown to all alike without distinction and should always be generous. Lastly, he wants to see capital punishment abolished forever. On the threshold of the 12th century, it would be difficult to find in Western Europe a document as lofty in conception as these admonitions left by a Russian prince to his children.

The Tartars first appeared on the Russian approaches in 1223 during the lifetime of Ghengis Khan. Bruised, despoiled and mutilated by successive waves of terrifying invasions, the Russian nation withdrew into itself and patiently awaited the hour of revenge and liberation from the cruelties of its oppressors and the hardships imposed by fate. That hour dawned at last, after more than two hundred years of thralldom, and the nation took its revenge under John IV, the Czar Alexis, Peter I and Catherine II. By then it was our turn to penetrate into the Asia of Ghengis Khan and to bring civilization to the wastelands of the Mongol Empire, as well as to establish over the

continent of Asia the supremacy and influence of the White Race.

The West, once saved by Russia in the Middle Ages, soon forgot the fact and instead chose to misread the role of Czarist Russia in the East. And, in an attitude of haughty ingratitude and wilful ignorance, persisted in regarding Russia as a barbarian nation.

The collapse of Czarist Russia was witnessed with ill-concealed satisfaction by many countries of the West and especially by England who persistently regarded Russia as a dangerous rival in Asia whose fall could but serve the interests of the British Empire. This was a gross miscalculation: the disappearance of imperial Russia dealt an irreparable blow to the prestige and might of all European nations, but for none were the consequences more severe than for England.

“When an empire emerges victoriously from a great war, writes Guglielmo Ferrero, it should, in all logic, inspire its subjects with a greater sense of fear and respect. The opposite occurred after the Armistice. Afghanistan demanded complete independence, similar tendencies were brutally awakened in China, and India. In Persia England found no support for the reapplication of the 1909 Treaty. The Assembly of Ankara contrived to build up a new army . . . and the Treaty of Sèvres remains a dead letter . . . In a word, everywhere Asia is in revolt against Europe.” (a)

Can any explanation be found for this strange contradiction? The answer is supplied by the same historian:

“There is a debit and a credit side to all outstanding human events—alliances, wars, revolutions, victories, de-

(a) Guglielmo Ferrero, “Entre le Passé et l’Avenir” (“Between the Past and the Future”), Paris, 1926, pp. 87-90.

feats. Man is compelled to draw up his accounts and balance his books. But we, instead, have only looked at the profit and credit side of our war accounts and never bothered to subtract the debit and the losses which weigh down our victory. We have thus forgotten that the Russian Empire no longer exists.

"The Allied victory in the West was total, but not so in the East, where a great ally has collapsed. If Italy, France, England, America and their allies have destroyed Austria and beaten Germany, these two countries prior to their defeat had destroyed Russia. In the balance sheet of the war the complete ruin of the Russian Empire must be regarded as a serious debit item to the victors, a fact the latter failed to take into account. They drew up the Peace as if the Russian Empire was on its feet, still mighty and capable of action . . . Therein lies the key to all our Asiatic setbacks." (a)

As long as Czarist Russia was in existence the unity of Europe was so complete that, as a whole, it was never weakened by internal antagonisms or, what is more important, its influence in the world affected.

The rivalry between England and Russia was in reality only apparent as the influence of both countries in Asia rested upon the mutual prestige they enjoyed. The respect paid to all Europeans, in the broad sense of the word, and in particular, the position they enjoyed in Constantinople, was due, directly or indirectly to the existence of Russia.

Distant countries, like England and France, owed the compliant and accommodating attitude of the Chinese largely to Russia and to the influence she exerted.

When Czarist Russia fell, the prestige and influence of all European nations in Asia were lost forever.

Things being what they are, the position of Europeans in

(a) Guglielmo Ferrero, *Ibid.*

Asia, none too good at the present, cannot but worsen rapidly to a point where it may endanger the continent of Europe, while Russia, having lost the positive character of her influence in international politics, has been transformed into a base for world révolution.

More than thirty years ago, G. Gautherot, another farsighted historian of our times, wrote:

"In the midst of the Chinese anarchy and across the revolt in India, we begin to discern the new masters. The Soviet Union, spread over half the continent of Asia, is injecting its poison directly into a human mass of eight hundred million beings. Even if it does not succeed in uniting them against Europe, it can at least use them to chase out the white colonialists, to sever international lines of communication, to disrupt effectively the stability of the world, to strike an indirect but mortal blow at Europe." (a)

In 1926, I wrote:

"We must bear in mind that a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the white and colored races, a conflict only beginning, but already ominous, can only be reached with the assistance of a peaceful and firmly established Russia. No honest approach to this problem is possible before the total eclipse of Bolshevism with all its recognized subversive activities in Asia." (b)

It is a matter of pride that these lines have been repeatedly quoted by the press in commenting on the development of events in the Far East.

(a) Gustave Gautherot, "Le Bolchevisme aux Colonies et l'Imperialisme Rouge," Paris, 1930, p. 14.

(b) "Le Bolchevisme, la Russie et l'Europe," Revue "Vers l'Unité," Paris, Sept. 1926.

Voltaire is perhaps guilty of exaggeration in his "History of Charles XII" when he describes Russia as "a country hardly known to Europe before Czar Peter." Nevertheless, "it was in the 18th century only that the State of Môscovy joined the family of European nations as an active and fully fledged member and first took part in international relations." (a)

At this period, in the South and East, unaided by, but in the interests of the entire West, Russia had triumphed over the hostile forces of Asia and had removed a constant threat to her existence as a nation. In the West, Poland, in the 17th century, was no longer a mighty state and a source of danger to Russia, leaving the way clear to intercourse with Europe. A series of defensive wars had cleared the Swedes out of the northwest. In a word, to quote Pushkin, "a window had been opened into Europe."

The individual and salient characteristic trait of Russian military history is a form of strategy based on defense (b) so brilliantly applied by Field Marshall Kutuzov who led our armies in the Napoleonic Wars. The whole trend of Russian diplomacy, aimed at preserving the peace and often pacifist in character, was in strict accordance with this strategy. In international relations the Russian Government has invariably worked for peace. After the 17th century on those occasions when our armies have crossed our borders, it was either to maintain a proper balance in Europe or to free Christian nations from the Mohammedan yoke. Furthermore, most of these campaigns were waged in the concerted interest of Europe and not of Russia alone.

Russia helped to maintain the balance in Europe against Frederick II in the course of the Seven Years War and in 1759 her armies occupied Berlin. But for this timely and decisive intervention, the disturbing influence of "Prussianism" would have made itself felt a century earlier.

(a) Kliuchevsky, "Course of Russian History," Moscow, 1910. Vol. 4 p. 66.

(b) "Outcome of Russian Wars," General Leer, St. Petersburg, 1898.

In order to free Europe of the tyrant, Russia joined in the coalition against Napoleon (1805-1806; 1812-1814) though offered a tempting share in his sphere of influence. (a) At the time, England, in particular, was rescued by Russia.

Napoleon's supremacy once broken, Russia intervened with the greatest wisdom in favor of France. Alexander I successfully opposed every effort at despoiling and dismembering France, foreseeing that a policy of this nature could only lead to a war of revenge; and after Waterloo, thanks to his influence, Europe enjoyed forty years of uninterrupted peace.

In 1849 it was the turn of Austria to be saved by Russia, who, in compliance with the principles of the Holy Alliance, intervened and helped to suppress the Hungarian revolt. (1)

The constructive policy of peace, fostered by Russia, and the disinterested assistance she gave to nation after nation in distress, were strangely rewarded by the Crimean Campaign. (2) Austria, in particular, "astounded the world by her ingratitude" in preventing the Russians from undertaking operations on the Danube; Napoleon III tried to avenge Napoleon I and thirsted for military honors, while England was already haunted by the idea of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. The European coalition saved Turkey from Russia who regarded herself as the rightful protector of her brethren by faith living under intolerable conditions of oppression. In 1854 Western Europe prevented Russia from carrying out her great historic mission in the Balkans. This was never abandoned, only postponed. Protection, once assumed, was not to be swept aside by intrigue or the machinations of European diplomacy and the victorious crusade of liberation was achieved a few years later. We shall return to this subjeect.

When the main achievement of the Congress of Vienna, the equilibrium of Europe, was once more jeopardized by Bismarck,

(a) Regarded by some as an error. See work by D. Merejkovsky, "Napoleon, the Man," translated from the Russian by M. Dumesnil de Gramont. Calmann-Lévy, pub., Paris, 1930.

Russia, in 1875, prevented Prussia from crushing France. (3) It is fairly evident that but for the Crimean War and the unhappy policy of Napoleon III toward Russia, the latter would have intervened in 1870 and saved France from the ignominy of Sedan. But Bismarck's followers still persevered in their pursuit of world supremacy. The dark shadow of future events began to spread over the European horizon. In a last attempt to disperse the gathering thunder clouds, Russia took the initiative and convened a peace conference at the Hague in 1898. She tried to induce the member nations to resort to arbitration in the settlement of their disputes and to create an international instrument of justice at the Hague, which, had the Russian efforts borne fruit, would have averted World War I. As a first step to stopping the armaments race, Russia proposed (1899) that the twenty-eight assembled nations should agree not to increase their armed forces any further. This proposal was turned down by Germany and England and the Russian prophecy that the prolongation of the existing situation would inevitably lead to war was realized fifteen years later to the great misfortune of the world and the greater misfortune of Russia. (4)

At the time of the Hague conference, Russia found herself compelled to intervene in the affairs of China. On the eve of the conference, the European Powers (Russia and France, followed by Germany but not by England) brought pressure the bear on Japan to stop an offensive war on an unarmed China. By this intervention further bloodshed was averted and the aggressor nation prevented from pursuing a policy of conquest on the Asiatic mainland. This action did not coincide with the views of Downing Street and Japan, openly encouraged by England, promptly commenced preparing for war. In 1904, powerfully armed, assured of English support and secretly encouraged by Wilhelm II and the wealthy New York banker, Jacob Schiff (a), Japan, without warning, attacked

(a) See Israel Zangwill, "The Problem of the Jewish Race," New York, p. 14.

Russia. Anxious to shorten the conflict she availed herself of American mediation a year later (5) and so terminated a war which it might have been to Russia's interests to prolong. (6)

In her external relations, Imperial Russia has always followed a policy of moderation and sought a peaceful solution to existing problems. An approach of this nature best expressed the temperament of the nation as the Russian people are the most peace-loving and peace-minded in the world.

The most brilliant pages in the history of Russian international relations are those which relate to our policy in the Balkans aimed at protecting Christian minorities under Turkish domination.

As early as 1828, seconded at the time by England and France, we waged war on the Turks in an attempt to put an end to their atrocities in the Balkans and terminated a victorious war by a peace treaty signed at Adrianople. The Turks recognized the independence of the Greek Provinces in the southern end of the Balkan Peninsular which, in 1830, were formed into the Kingdom of Greece. The principalities of Moldavia, Valakhia and Serbia, though remaining under Turkish suzerainty, were granted a measure of internal autonomy and placed under Russian protection. Thus as a power entitled by treaty to watch over the welfare of its brothers by religion under the Sultan, Russia gained a right to intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey. Though Greece gained her complete independence and emerged as a kingdom, only a beginning was as yet set to the final liberation of the Serbs, the Rumanians and the Bulgars. Thwarted both in 1828 and 1854 from attaining the aims to which she was dedicated, Russia finally succeeded in 1878.

The Treaty of Paris which put an end to the Crimean War did little to solve the "Eastern Question" and merely underlined the existing difficulties. Russia remained obdurate in her unwillingness to relinquish the moral obligation of protecting the Christian subjects of the Sultan, while the other signatory

powers, now endowed with equal protective rights over the Balkan Slavs, showed no interest in their fate. The obstinacy of the Sultan in maintaining his barbarous methods of administration in lands inhabited by the Serbs and Bulgars evoked the repeated intervention of Russian diplomacy, progressively less effectual, thanks to the position adopted by England under Disraeli, now more Russophobe than ever. Lord Beaconsfield, the fierce enemy of Russia, was firmly convinced that an increase of Russian prestige in the East, or, as a matter of fact, any advantage or success gained by Russia, was nothing but a defeat for England. There gradually arose between England and Russia a permanent state of ill feeling over Balkan affairs, where Turkey was encouraged and upheld by English diplomacy and the Sultan given a sense of freedom to pursue his tactics.

In 1875 rebellion broke out among the Balkan Christians. The events that followed and the threat of total annihilation to Serbia compelled Russia to declare war on Turkey in 1877, after exhausting all peaceful means, in spite of unfavorable conditions at home and an adverse international situation. (7) I quote Mr. Gladstone's comment at the time: "If Russia is beaten it will be a misfortune for Christendom and humanity. If she is victorious she will reap immortal glory."

In the summer of 1877 Turkey and Russia clashed both in Europe and Asia. By December of the same year Turkish resistance was broken and the Russian armies were advancing on Constantinople. The Sultan sued for peace.

An armistice was signed on January 19, 1878, but the ensuing peace talks were embittered by the intervention of England. On the orders of Lord Beaconsfield, an English squadron anchored off Constantinople on January 26th. On February 3, the squadron entered the Sea of Marmora, stood off the Prince's Islands, threatened the Russian flank and rendered open support to the policy of procrastination and bad faith which the Turks had adopted since the Armistice. Alexander II replied to this provocative behavior by moving his headquarters

to within ten miles of Constantinople. The Turks at once became accommodating and peace was signed in San Stefano on February 19, 1878.

The Sublime Port recognized the independence of Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro and agreed to cede a few provinces to the two last named countries. Turkey further accepted the creation of a new state, composed of all her Bulgarian and some Macedonian provinces, to form Bulgaria, which was thus given an exit to the Aegean Sea and was permitted to organize a national army of her own. Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted a broad measure of autonomy. Russia regained Ismail, at the mouth of the Danube. She acquired the possession of the port of Batum on the Black Sea and of Kars and its surrounding region to the South of the Caspian range, where a numerous Armenian minority was freed from continued atrocities and massacres by the Turks. England and Austria both violently objected to these terms, primarily from a desire not to see Turkey excessively weakened, but equally in the hope of gaining concrete advantages for themselves. The firm resolve of Alexander II to maintain peace in Europe was the only reason why war between these two countries and Russia was averted. The pacifist policy of Russia was skillfully used to impair the results of the war of liberation and to provide Russia's opponents with territorial gains, while Germany seized on the opportunity to further her plans in Europe and to extract from the existing situation the greatest possible profit. Bismarck was now in a position to make Russia pay dearly for her intervention in favor of France in 1875. Assuming, according to his own definition, the role of "honest broker" between Russia, England and Austria, he convened the famous Berlin Congress, where he firmly sided with England and Austria and forced Russia into accepting extremely humiliating modifications to the **Treaty of San Stefano**. Serbia and Montenegro were deprived of a major portion of their territorial gains; Bulgaria was cut in two; instead of one united country, two states were created, a small principality of Bulgaria and an autonomous province,

to be known as Eastern Rumelia. Both were placed under Turkish suzerainty. Lastly, Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed to Austria.

Future peace in the Balkans was obviously threatened by the terms of the new treaty, but it would appear this was precisely what the "honest broker" desired. English support was gained by her acquisition of Cyprus, while the humiliation of Russia was a personal triumph for Disraeli. The "Iron Chancellor" led Austria to believe that Russian public opinion was particularly angered with her and Germany, and forced her into a secret alliance, later joined by Italy. He thus gained his second objective, the creation of the Triple Alliance with a view to crushing France and Russia. For the latter, the outcome of the Berlin Congress was a matter of great disappointment; a frustrated nation sought consolation in the knowledge that the initial purpose of the war had at least been achieved and the fate of the Christian population in the Balkans to a great extent improved.

An assessment of Russian policy in the Near East was made by Professor Ch. Sarolea. This is what he says:

"As heir to the Byzantine Empire and natural protector of her Slav brethren and co-religionists, Russia may have been guided by motives and ambitions of a national character, but, in the final analysis, the Balkan policy of the Russian monarchy, resulted in the liberation of Christian nations from Turkish domination and opposed the bid for world supremacy of the Austro-German coalition. In the largest public square in Sofia there stands an impressive monument to the great Liberator, Czar Alexander II. Never was a title better deserved.

"English writers who criticize the "aggressive" nature of Russia's Balkan policy must surely be devoid of any sense of humor. They seem to forget that during a whole century when English politics were helping to maintain the cruel tyranny of Turkey over defenseless peoples in

the Balkans, Russian politics brought freedom to Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria and Serbia. Four nations thus owe their freedom to the "tyrannical" Moscovite State. No country could improve on this record." (a)

In 1914, as in 1876, the existence of Serbia was once again threatened, but this time by a new and more formidable enemy. In her distress she appealed for help to Czarist Russia and unhesitatingly we went to the assistance of our sister nation. The political and economic situation inside the country was definitely unfavorable to armed intervention, but, when presenting their unreasonable demands to defenseless Serbia, both Germany and Austria rightly foresaw the course of action Russia would follow and correctly assessed her sense of honor and her loyalty to international obligations. (8)

As time goes on and more documentary historical evidence comes to light, it becomes increasingly evident that the timing of the European conflict was deliberately planned by the Central Powers. In the preceding chapters I have described the immense process of transformation that was taking place in Russia toward 1914. The transitional period of development tended to weaken the nation's normal forces of resistance and militarily we were not sufficiently prepared. But the pace and rhythm of this development was such that a few years later an anti-European aggression would have had no chance of success.

The sheer logic of events drove Prussian Imperialism into forcing the issue. If the opportunity presented in 1914 had been missed, a Russia internally strong in 1920, for example, would by her mere presence have dispelled the somber machinations of Germany.

Prussian militarism was broken by the 1914-1918 war and the Slav nations freed from Turkish and Austrian oppression. By a cruel turn of fate the greatest of the Slav nations, their natural protector and defender of Slavism in the world, perished in

(a) "English Review," June 1925.

the struggle. In helping to remove one yoke, Russia found herself burdened by another, unsurpassed in history for its brutality and infamy.

In closing this chapter on the role of Russia in international affairs I venture to suggest that had any of her allies been subjected to the suffering imposed upon her by Communism or any other kind of political upheaval even approaching it in brutality she would have intervened against the oppressors regardless of the cost to herself. I do not want to dwell on the culpable indifference of the majority of nations to Russia at the time of her ordeal, but only to stress the paramount necessity, dictated both by reasons of humanity and self-interest, of helping her people to throw off the yoke of Communism. I need not repeat that there never will be the slightest chance of restoring stable and lasting conditions of peace to the world or of social tranquility in any nation as long as the Soviets continue to exist and Russia is not restored, alike in her own interests and those of Europe. A future Russia, freed from the oppression of this tyranny, will exercise a stabilizing and moderating influence on international affairs, as peace and tranquility are the two conditions she herself will most urgently require.

NOTES

(1) In 1849 Austria was saved by Russia whose troops quelled the revolt of the Hungarian separatists. By doing so she was fulfilling an obligation imposed upon her by the Holy Alliance, though by this time the original spirit of the Alliance had been vitiated by the Convention of 1833. The fact that this unselfish intervention was a serious mistake was appreciated by the knightly Nicholas I from the start of military operations, i.e., long before the treacherous conduct of Austria at the time when Louis Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor of the French and consequently many years before the Crimean War.

When the revolt was put down the Russian commander-in-chief Count Paskevitch, guaranteed the safety of the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution. The execution of these leaders, with Count Teleky at their head, by the Austrian Government, in cowardly breach of this undertaking, enraged Nicho-

las I. To his Secretary of State, Nesselrode, the Emperor dictated a letter addressed to Francis Joseph beginning with these words: "The foul and infamous conduct of your government," and continuing in the same vein. His reaction is a measure of the chasm separating the two governments and the difference of approach to contracted solemn obligations.

On the monstrous butchery of Budapest in 1956 I would refer the reader to a study of the facts, entitled: "An analogy favored by Mr. Khrushchev: The two interventions in Hungary of 1849 and 1956," written by the ablest Hungarian historian, Bela Menczer and published in the October and November, 1960, issues of "Exil et Liberté."

(2) The Crimean War was a defeat for Russia. It has become a commonplace of orthodox revolutionary propaganda to attribute this defeat to defects of administration and internal shortcomings. It may well be asked what would have been the fate of any other European state faced with the necessity of fighting a similar combination of powers? The aggressor nations, to use a modern term, were successful in delaying the fulfilment of the fixed aim of Russian policy, that of liberating Christian countries from Turkish rule. The abandonment by Russia of this policy, temporary only, was, on the whole, the only concrete result gained by the Allies as, after the fall of Sebastopol, the coalition was quite willing to come to terms with Russia. It was realized that a prolongation of hostilities would benefit no one but Russia and it was Russian pacifism that put an end to a war which would have turned to her advantage.

This contention is sustained by one of our most celebrated historians, S. Soloviev, a contemporary of the events then taking place. Let us see what he says:

"Peace was signed after the fall of Sebastopol and yet Sebastopol had as much significance as Moscow in 1812. It was precisely then that we should have declared that the war, far from ending, had in reality just started in order to make the Allies abandon their undertaking . . .

"External affairs were by no means in such a desperate state as to preclude the possibility of an energetic monarch withdrawing from the struggle with essential gains in hand. Inside the country there were no signs of lassitude or distress and the young sovereign beloved by everyone, could have mustered an imposing array of forces had he appealed to the devotion and patriotism of the people. The war was irksome to the Allies and they were longing to see it terminated. Faced by a Russian sovereign determined to prolong it till final victory, they would have retreated."

Many Russian military writers share this opinion. General Kuropatkin says: "Had we but followed the example set us by Peter I and Alexander I, we should have continued to fight and eventually pushed the enemy back into the sea."

Whether the decision of the young Emperor was right or wrong at the time

and I, for one, think it was correct, the policy of Russia was vindicated in 1877-78. The main point to retain is that the alleged "vices" of our internal administration had nothing whatsoever to do with the defeat of 1856.

(3) In mentioning the events of 1875, which lay at the root of the Franco-Russian Alliance, I quote a few extracts from a speech delivered by the former Prime Minister, Count W. N. Kokovtzev on the subject of "The Russian Problem and France," at a luncheon given by the French Union du Commerce et de l'Industrie:

"I should like to remind you, *pro memoria*, of two unforgettable dates: the first, 1875, when a second war against a France, injured and hurt by the disaster of 1870-71, was avoided by the decisive words of Emperor Alexander II; and the second, 1891, when the national policy of Alexander III helped to lay the cornerstone of the Franco-Russian Alliance. I shall also remind you of an event in which I took a personal share on orders from my sovereign, the late martyred Nicholas II, and one with which the French public is probably unacquainted. It was in December, 1905; the Russo-Japanese War had come to an end and the fires of the first Russian revolution were dying out. Russia was weakened and France threatened by imminent danger in Morocco. It was at this moment that I was entrusted personally to convey to the French President of the Council, Mr. Rouvier, my sovereign's decision to stand by France and to support her by every means at his disposal.

"We come now to the last historical event, the War of 1914. Russia entered the war with the firm intention of doing all within her power to help the Allied cause and at once altered her own strategic plan of campaign and so rendered possible the victory on the Marne. You will permit me to say that this victory changed the whole course of the war."

"The few instances I have quoted should confirm us in the conviction that this unforgettable past has not been swept aside by subsequent events and will explain why, without presuming too much, I foresee that the future of both our countries will be based on the legacies of this past."

(4) *Russian Circular Note Proposing the First Peace Conference*

Handed to the diplomatic representatives accredited to St. Petersburg on August 12-24, 1898, by Count Muraviev, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, during the weekly reception at the Ministry.

"The maintenance of general peace and the possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations present themselves, in the existing conditions of the world, as the ideal towards which the endeavors of all the Governments should be directed.

"The humanitarian and magnanimous views of His Majesty the Emperor, my august master, are in perfect accord with this sentiment.

"In the conviction that this lofty aim is in conformity with the most essential interests of the legitimate aspirations of all the Powers, the Imperial Government believes that the present moment would be very favorable for seeking, by means of international discussion, the most effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and above all of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments.

"In the course of the last twenty years the longings for a general state of peace have become especially pronounced in the consciences of civilized nations. The preservation of peace has been put forward as the object of International policy. In its name great states have formed powerful alliances; and for the better guarantee of peace they have developed their military forces to proportions hitherto unknown and still continue to increase them without hesitating at any sacrifice.

"All these efforts nevertheless have not yet led to the beneficent results of the desired pacification.

"The ever increasing financial charges strike and paralyze public prosperity at its source; the intellectual and physical strength of nations, their labor and capital, are for the most part diverted from their natural application and unproductively consumed; hundreds of millions are spent in acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which though today are regarded as the last word of science, are destined tomorrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field. National culture, economic progress, and the production of wealth are either paralyzed or perverted in their development.

"However, in proportion as the armaments of each power increase, so do they less and less attain the object aimed at by the governments. Economic crises, due in great part to the system of amassing armaments to the point of exhaustion, and the continual danger which lies in the accumulation of war material, are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident then, that if this state of affairs be prolonged, it will inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the impending horrors of which are fearful to every human thought.

"In checking these increasing armaments and in seeking the means of averting the calamities which threaten the entire world lies the supreme duty today resting upon all States.

"Imbued with this idea, His Majesty has been pleased to command me to propose to all the Governments which have accredited representatives at the Imperial Court the holding of a conference to consider this grave problem.

"This conference would be, with the help of God, a happy presage for the century about to open. It would converge into a single powerful force the efforts of all the States which sincerely wish the great conception of universal peace to triumph over the elements of disturbance and discord. It would at the same time cement their agreement with a solemn avowal of the principles of equity and law, upon which repose the security of States and the welfare of peoples.

Count Muraviev

August 12, 1898.

All subsequent efforts to ensure peace among the nations right up to the events of 1914-1918 were but a continuation of the magnificent work commenced at the Hague by Czar Nicholas II. Therein lies the importance of this document.

(5) It appears appropriate to say a few words on Russo-American relations. The unbroken friendship which has hitherto united the two countries dates back to the earliest days of American history. During the American War of Independence the Union's cause was sustained by Russia, who, by heading the League of Northern Powers, made England respect the rights of neutral nations.

In the years following the Congress of Vienna, Russia endeavored to bring America into the general system of balance which she had helped to create with a view to the maintenance of peace in the world. With singular political perspicacity, Alexander I foresaw the grand development of America in the future and consistently extended his friendship to the United States. During the Civil War (1860-65) Russia firmly sided with President Lincoln and a squadron under Admiral Lissovski was dispatched to New York with a supply of arms and ammunition. The gratitude of the Federal Government for the support rendered to the Union forces was referred to in a speech by the late American Ambassador in Paris, Myron T. Herrick, when, in 1927, he said: "We shall never forget the Russian ships which sailed into New York harbor during our Civil War bringing strength and confidence to a country exhausted by strife. We cherish the hope that the message conveyed by those ships still expresses the feelings of the vast masses of the Russian people toward the Republic of the United States. It would, indeed, he continued, be an evil thing to allow a band of men who have gained mastery over a gifted race

and who, with diabolical cunning are trying to introduce the poison of their teaching into our country and are endeavoring to undermine the institutions which have assured the happiness and prosperity of our continent, to proceed unhindered with their dreadful activities."

Russia is the only world power with which the United States have never come into serious conflict though they have in turn fought England (the War of Independence and 1812), France (under the Directoire), Spain (1897) and Germany in two World Wars. In contrast, the cordial relations between the American and Russian peoples have never been upset.

Let us hope that the loyal stand taken up by the Government of the United States toward the Russian people after the Revolution and the distinction it draws between the people and its present "Government," which is least qualified to speak in the name of the Russian nation, will reap its just reward in the future. No single factor in international relations could render a greater contribution to the establishment and maintenance of world peace than a friendly entente between the United States and Russia.

(6) There is a certain analogy between the fate of Sebastopol and that of Port Arthur. Both were distant points on the immense territory of Russia lying thousands of miles from the capital, and both were fortresses which surrendered after a prolonged and heroic siege. On the other hand, at the time when President Theodore Roosevelt put forward his offer of mediation for the negotiation of a settlement, Japan, according to her own subsequent admission, was well-nigh exhausted, while Russian resources had been strained to a far lesser degree in spite of the treacherous activities of our revolutionaries.

It is now quite apparent that Russia's weakness in the Pacific was one of many, if not the leading, factor which contributed to the war. Faced by the rapid militarization of Japan, the latter's designs in Korea and, in 1895-1896, brutally manifested desire to complete freedom of action in Manchuria, the Russian Government committed several grave mistakes in its Far Eastern policy.

The initial error lay in the guarantee by Russia of the Chinese loan raised for the payment of the contribution imposed by Japan after the Sino-Japanese War. The proceeds of this contribution allowed Japan to build in English dockyards a powerful modern fleet which in 1905 destroyed the Russian fleet in the Far East. At the end of the 19th century Japanese credit on the international market was to all intents non-existent and, without this Sino-Russian aid, she never would have mustered a comparable fleet in the space of a few years. It was a mistake to construct and equip Dalni (now Dairen), a splendid commercial harbor in the proximity of Port Arthur, as yet not properly fortified. After the capture of this undefended harbor, the Japanese were able to unload their heavy guns, without which the siege of Port Arthur would have been impossible. The third mistake committed was the decision temporarily to

cease work on the construction of the Amur Railway. The last, and perhaps the gravest, lay in restricting credits for the creation of a powerful squadron capable of defending our possessions in the Far East and for strengthening the defenses of our fortresses on the Pacific. After the Second World War and the whole Pacific campaign, the errors of which we were guilty become abundantly clear.

Japan hastened to take advantage of Russia's strategic inferiority, fully realizing that this weakness was temporary. My readers will remember that the single track Trans-Siberian Railway was not yet completed when, on the night of February 8th, 1904, as a dress rehearsal of Pearl Harbor, Japanese destroyers sank three of our largest battleships at Port Arthur without the declaration of war.

A few military critics have suggested that had the Trans-Siberian Railway been completed in 1903, instead of 1906, the Japanese would never have attacked. In my opinion this underrates the military strength of Japan and overlooks the importance of the conflict. One thing, however, is quite clear. With a new army one million strong, poised in Manchuria, we could have prolonged the war to victory had the Japanese delegates at Portsmouth, U.S.A., been less moderate in their terms or shown less willingness to reach a settlement.

(7) A detailed account of events preceding the "War of Liberation" is given in the "Memorial to the 1877-1878 Crusade," published in Russian by the Old Comrades Association of the Preobrajensky Regiment to mark the 50th anniversary of the War.

(8) As tension mounted toward the end of July, 1914, the statesmen of the Triple Entente made repeated efforts to avoid the catastrophe which was about to burst over Europe. All their efforts failed against the stonewall opposition of the Triple Alliance, bent on war at any price. In a last minute attempt, Emperor Nicholas II, true to the dictates of his heart and the principles he had always followed, sent Wilhelm II a personal telegram offering to place the whole question at issue before the Tribunal of the Hague. Had Germany accepted, the war would have been averted. Instead, the appeal remained unanswered and in lieu of reply, Belgrade was bombarded a few hours later.

Could the war have been really avoided? When events were unrolling with terrifying rapidity in July, Nicholas II told the French Ambassador, Mr. M. Paléologue that "unless Germany has completely taken leave of her senses, she will never dare to attack a united coalition of France, England and Russia." (M. Paléologue, "La Russie des Tsars Pendant La Grande Guerre," vol. I, p. 3.) Unfortunately, England had not yet definitely stated her position when Wilhelm sent up his last trial balloon by ordering the Austrians to shell Belgrade. Instead, she elected to wait for events to develop before taking her stand when it was too late and Europe was already ablaze. We may now

regretfully ponder upon the fact that Russia's endeavor to bring about a general reduction of armaments in 1899 at the Hague was frustrated by the combined opposition of Germany and England.

The responsibility borne by Russia for precipitating the world crisis in 1914 is one of the many imputations made against Czarism by the Bolsheviks, the Germans and pro-German writers and sympathizers. The injustice of any such assertion is by now well established; it is mentioned merely as an example of biased anti-Czarist propaganda.

CHAPTER IX

THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION OF RUSSIA TO THE GREAT WORLD WAR, 1914-1918

1914. The outbreak of hostilities came with overwhelming suddenness to Europe, stunned by the ominous course of events following upon the drama of Sarajevo and the general threat of war. The fact that it was almost inevitable under the circumstances was reluctantly admitted by the Triple Entente (England, France and Russia), as long as Germany, the principal partner of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria and Italy) regarded resort to arms as a necessary step to her policy of expansion.

When war was actually declared, every nation in Europe was overwhelmed by a sense of stupefied surprise. Russia was no exception. Up to the last fateful hours there still had lingered the faint hope that some means would be found to appease the intractable Central Powers. When the blow fell, the nation bowed to fate and, in a spirit of glowing patriotism, with the exception of a minority of left wing politicians (a) wholeheartedly responded to the summons of the Czar. There was a feeling, confined to no particular section, but quite universal in Russia, that something immense had been unleashed and that the destiny of the Empire, and in fact of the whole world, would depend on the final issue.

The original plan for the disposition of the Russian armies in the event of hostilities called for the total abandonment of the salient formed by Poland. Consequently, as soon as mobiliza-

(a) See Chapter XI, Note 1.

tion was completed and in order to secure freedom of action for orderly concentration, the troops of the Warsaw military district were withdrawn further East and deployed in front of Belostock. With the armies so disposed, provided with fortified rear zones prepared in advance, the whole front from north to south would have presented a strategic line tactically in accord with the elaborated plans of campaign. Why the armies never took up these positions will soon become apparent.

At the outbreak of hostilities the forces of the opposing sides were fairly evenly matched, though the Germans and Austro-Hungarians had the advantage of a central position and internal lines of communication, whereas the Allies held two distinct and separated fronts.

The decision where to strike first lay with the Germans and Hindenburg in his "Memoirs" tells us what partly inclined the German High Command to select the West. "Eastward or Westward? That was the great question. Our fate depended on the answer. Germany instinctively turned to the West for a final solution, by what had now become a national process of reasoning and tradition."

"Nach Paris!" Thirteen divisions were dispatched to reinforce the Eastern Front and eighty-three thrown into the battle against France.

The conviction of the German Staff that Russia would not undertake any active operations before completing the concentrations of her armies no doubt influenced the High Command, but as an additional safeguard, thirty-seven Austro-Hungarian divisions were ordered to advance into the South of Russia.

Meanwhile, in the West, the German onslaught was about to reach its peak and the opening stages of a decisive battle were in progress, with the English and French in full retreat, though fighting stubbornly. On August 31st, at the very height of battle, the Germans unexpectedly withdrew two army corps and one cavalry division from the battle and dispatched them to Eastern Prussia. The whole situation was at once radically

altered and what looked like a triumphal advance on Paris was transformed a few days later into defeat on the Marne.

Why did the Germans make this dramatic move? What overwhelming factor could possibly have compelled them to take such a step at the height of a battle which they confidently anticipated would settle the fate of the war?

The answer to this question is supplied by the situation as it had developed in the East.

As soon as the first alarming news from the West reached Russian Headquarters, Grand Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief, at once decided to take the most drastic measures to succor his allies. On his own responsibility, he reversed the entire Russian strategic plan and, disregarding the incompleted concentration of his armies, ordered a full scale advance into Eastern Prussia.

With singular insight and breadth of vision, he realized that the final outcome of the war would never depend on success or failure on any particular front, but would come as a result of a concerted strategy, when national interests might have to be sacrificed to the common good.

General Cherfils in "La Guerre de la Délivrance" (p. 172) writes:

"The spirit in which this offensive was undertaken is something which demands the greatest attention. It was conceived as an intervention, a diversionary operation, to assist and relieve the French Front. As Russian Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke behaved more like an ally than a Russian and deliberately sacrificed the interests of his own country to those of France. In these circumstances his strategy can be termed as "anti-national."

The East Prussian campaign entailed very heavy losses for Russia and ended in retreat and a major military disaster. It was redeemed by the fact that Paris and France were saved. Referring to it later, Marshal Foch used these words: "*We are*

primarily indebted to Russia for the fact that France was not wiped off the face of Europe."

The Germans were so alarmed by this totally unforeseen offensive and the initial Russian successes in Eastern Prussia that fresh formations from inside the country were rushed to the front to strengthen the original thirteen divisions and the two army corps and cavalry division withdrawn from the Marne. Simultaneously other vigorous counter measures had to be taken by the Germans, as a new threat to the Central Powers developed at the Southwestern end of the Russian Front, where the routed Austrians were clamoring for help.

After concentrating three army corps on the west bank of the River San, the Austrians, according to plan, set out to capture southern Poland. They were met by hastily assembled Russian formations, thrown piecemeal into battle, halted and eventually forced into retreat. Further south and east two Russian armies entered Galicia and captured the capital, Lwow (Lemberg). By mid September the Austrians were retreating along the whole length of their battle front and by the end of the month the Russians were in the foothills of the Carpathians. Beaten in Poland and in Galicia, the Austrian Army was in desperate straits.

The first of many subsequent rescues was effected by the Germans. Hindenburg was instructed to relinquish pursuit of the Russians in Eastern Prussia and to transfer the greater part of his troops into upper Silesia and toward Cracow. There, after incorporating a few Austrian divisions into his forces, he was ordered to advance to the Vistula, the central sector of the Russian front. A situation of the gravest danger now arose for the Russians. There were no troops on the left bank of the Vistula and, in fact, the whole line of the river was virtually undefended. Once across, there was little to stop the Germans from making a clean break through, fanning out and severing the Northern and Southwestern ends of the front. The exceptional bravery of the troops engaged and the promptitude with which orders were executed saved the day. Within less than

a day's march from Warsaw and as the German cavalry patrols were probing into the outskirts of the city, the enemy was met by unexpected stiff Russian resistance. A few hours later, another surprise awaited the Germans. Troops, somehow transferred from farther south and in the process of deployment on the right bank of the Vistula, instead of defending the river, forced their way across, attacked the Germans and stemmed the advance. Giving the enemy no time to recover, they drove the bewildered Germans before them and never halted until they had thrown them back into Silesia, the initial starting point of the offensive.

With Hindenburg temporarily out of the running and nursing his wounds, the Russians were free to turn on the Austrians. These they defeated and drove back 125 miles to the border along the line Warthe, Czenstohow, Cracow. "The situation is again tense on the Eastern Front," writes Ludendorff in "Conduct of the War and Politics." "The issue of the war hangs once more on a thread."

The drive west, to Silesia and southwest to Cracow in turn, uncovered the right flank of the Russians. Never slow to attack, Hindenburg at once took advantage of the opportunity offered, concentrated von Malkensen's army to the west of Thorn and threw it against the sector between the Vistula and the Warthe. There ensued a period of nightmarish and chaotic fighting, later known as the battle of Lodz. Concerning it, Hindenburg writes: "Attacks and counter-attacks, encirclement and the threat of oneself being encircled followed each other in succession, the whole a picture of utter chaos unsurpassed in savagery by any of the previous fighting on the Eastern Front."

This last offensive of 1914 brought no gain in territory or strategic advantage to the Germans in spite of very heavy casualties. By the end of the year they were brought to the reluctant conclusions that the Eastern Front demanded the constant presence of a far larger number of divisions than they

had foreseen and consequently additional new formations were dispatched to the East.

1915. By the beginning of 1915 the fighting in France had settled into positional warfare. In the East, where the Germans never abandoned their attempts to secure a strategic advantage over the Russians, a war of manoeuvre was still in progress. In the early months of the year, the Russians, with the initiative firmly in their grasp, opened a large-scale offensive at the southwestern end of the front. In February, the Austrian province of Bukovina was captured and in mid-March Przemyśl surrendered, with a garrison of 120,000 men and 1,050 guns. The time was fast approaching when the Commander-in-Chief could reasonably hope to deal the Austrian army a coup de grâce by destroying it in the Carpathian passes and completing the debacle by pouring his troops into the Hungarian plain. Severed from Germany, Austria would be compelled to sue for a separate peace. On the verge of imminent collapse, she once again turned to Germany for succor.

At the time when these events were developing, Germany, in the hope of forestalling the deployment of the British armies in full strength and of knocking out France before the supply of munitions improved, was about to stage an all-out attack in the West. The front was to be broken at the junction of the Allied Armies, the British and French separated and Paris captured.

The offensive was cancelled at a Council of War in Lille in March, 1915, where the necessity of first dealing with the Russians, now threatening the very existence of Austria, was given priority over any other operation.

Immediately elite German formations, among them two corps of the Guard, began to move to the East where the number of divisions was brought from forty-four to seventy. Preparations, on an unprecedented scale, for a break-through, were set in motion and a sector between the Carpathians and the Vistula was chosen for the initial attack. A new technique,

later adopted as a standard pattern for any major operation in trench warfare, was also introduced. This consisted of an intensive bombardment on a narrow front, followed by waves of assault infantry.

On May 2nd, 250 guns, half of them heavy, placed practically wheel to wheel, heralded the opening of the offensive. After a few hours of bombardment the Russian defenses were obliterated. Succeeding waves of specially trained "sturmmtruppen" overran the lightly manned lines and frustrated any attempt by hastily summoned reserves to close the gap. Units in the Carpathians, now in imminent danger of being cut off, made speed to join the main body of the army and the whole front in Galicia was forced into retreat, sustaining the most grievous losses. An overwhelming superiority of artillery and fresh reserves, unceasingly transferred from the West, enabled the enemy to sustain his relentless pressure, while in the South an Austrian offensive, bolstered by German divisions, caused a further worsening of the situation.

Not content with a regional success, the German High Command decided that the situation warranted an attempt to finish off the Russians and ordered a general offensive along the whole front, stretching for over two thousand miles from north to south, with the main objective of encircling the central group of Russia armies in the region of Brest-Litovsk.

A period of unprecedented trial faced the Russians. A deep strategic withdrawal was executed in order, the enemy prevented from breaking through at any point, cohesion and liaison between neighboring groups maintained. Warsaw, Ivangorod and Brest-Litovsk were ceded to the enemy. Kovno fell, after experiencing the full weight of massive shelling and finally Vilno was threatened.

Both Hindenburg and Ludendorff speak with feeling of those days in their memoirs and deplore their failure to destroy the Russian army. In one passage Hindenburg says: "If ever high hopes were centered in the heart of an impatient and worried man, it is my case today. Are we in time? Have we the means?"

What does it matter! Forward! To Vilno! And then, right about, South! The cavalry will shortly lay hands on the main artery of Russian supplies. A squeeze . . . and death to the bulk of the Russian forces. However, our foes have apparently foreseen the danger and by skillful manoeuvre are trying to avert the threat. Intensive fighting is developing in the approaches to Vilno. Every hour gained by the Russians means so many more of their troops saved and allowed to withdraw to the East! Our cavalry is being driven back by the counter-attacking foe! The road to the East is again open to the Russians. We have arrived too late and we are utterly exhausted." The grandiose plans for destroying the Russian armies in one all-embracing offensive had failed.

General Goulévitch, my father, as Chief of Staff of the group of Russian armies fighting the Germans, was largely instrumental in correctly assessing Hindenburg's intentions and in insisting on the timely adoption of measures that helped to avert what might have been an irrevocable disaster; the possibility of a general debacle was not even considered by the majority of the Russian Commanders and the real magnitude of the peril in which Russia stood was fully appreciated only after the publication of the quoted "Memoirs."

Across marshes and impassable roads, lacking artillery support and exhausted to the point of collapse after an interminable retreat, the Russians were again attacking. By a superhuman effort the enemy advance was checked, then brought to a halt and the front line stabilized.

Summarising the campaign of 1915, Hindenburg wrote:

"For our G.H.Q. the end of 1915 was no occasion for the triumphal fanfare we had anticipated. The final outcome of the year's fighting was disappointing. The Russian bear had escaped from the net in which we had hoped to entrap him, bleeding profusely, but far from mortally wounded, and had slipped away after dealing us the most terrible blows."

The successes gained by the Germans were mainly due to their overwhelming superiority in artillery, especially in heavy calibre guns, their lavish expenditure of ammunition, their combat equipment and general abundance of supplies. The Russians, in contrast, were desperately short of ammunition in 1915. Batteries were often silent for lack of shells; each round was counted and even small arms fire was restricted to a minimum. Relieving units came up to the battle line unarmed and took over the rifles of the formations being withdrawn. The fact that the national war industry was all but rudimentary and that no improvement could reasonably be expected before 1916, or deliveries from abroad reach us any earlier, was fully appreciated in higher circles. On the other hand the nature of the country enabled the Russians to take advantage of the depth of their theatre of war and establish defensive positions far removed from the frontiers and so lengthen the enemy's lines of communication, retarding and restricting his means of manoeuvre.

Under these conditions, in 1915, the Russian army might have been kept uncommitted in major operations and strengthened while waiting for improved supplies of ammunition and war materiel. Brought up to full strength and properly equipped it could have engaged in a general offensive in the spring of 1916.

Had the Russian higher command not reckoned with the interests of the Western Allies or only considered national aims, such a course would no doubt have been justified. At the beginning of 1915, the Allied means of defense and the formation of their forces were still incomplete and their battle zone unprovided in depth. The Russian spring offensive which, as we see, was dictated by a desire to further the common cause of the Allies, compelled the Germans to cancel the projected assault in the West and transfer considerable forces to the East. The Western Allies were thus given time in which to perfect their dispositions and supplies and consolidate their

lines. They were further strengthened by the entry of Italy into the war.

To sum up, in 1915, in the West, Britain and France were given the possibility of building up their forces and improving their position both tactically and in the matter of war supplies; in the East, the Central Powers made a bid to knock Russia out of the war at the cost of enormous casualties to themselves, while in a fighting retreat of several months and over hundreds of miles into national territory, the Russian army lost over two-thirds of its cadres.(1)

“... We come to the conclusion,” says General Cherfils, “that the Russians saved us from disaster by diverting to themselves the full weight of Germany’s offensive potential. The hazardous advance into the Carpathians in the depth of winter brought Austria to the brink of dissolution and absorbed the active attention of the Germans when they came to the rescue. We were saved by the sacrifice of the Russian armies, by the Grand Duke Nicholas and shall never be able to repay the debt of gratitude we owe Russia.”

1916. In February an inter-Allied conference set down in general outline the proposed operational plans for the year. It was decided that the Russians would take the offensive in mid June, followed fifteen days later by the Allies. On the Eastern Front a sector between Baranovitchi and Vilno was chosen for the initial attack and the necessary preparations were at once set in motion. At the end of February the Germans upset the Allied calculations by strongly attacking at Verdun. Immediately all the available French forces found themselves committed to battle. To relieve the mounting German pressure an urgent appeal was made to Russia with a request to advance the date of the proposed offensive. The Russians at once attacked at Narotch and staged a series of operations along the northern end of their line from Riga to

Baranovitchi. This diversionary offensive, conducted by scratch contingents, insufficiently trained, over roads and marshes made virtually impassable by the spring thaw, failed to draw the Germans; no extensive transfer of troops resulted and consequently the main objective was not achieved.

Later in the spring another surprise was in store for the Allies. The Austrians attacked on the Italian front and completely routed the Italian army. Venice was in danger and another request was dispatched to Russia to save an ally in distress. Russia complied, yet it was obvious that the success of any operation so hurriedly staged and large enough to necessitate a massive withdrawal of troops from the Italian front would depend solely on the suddenness and vigor of the attack and not on minute and detailed preparation.

The Russians now switched their attention to the opposite end of the line. In May they fell upon the Austrians. For the sake of speed in mounting the attack all the accepted rules were discarded. The troops went straight into the assault. Yet so magnificent was their dash, so unforeseen and unheralded the attack, that within the first few hours the success obtained exceeded all expectations. By June, when the first phase of the battle was over, the armies of General Brussilov had captured 1240 officers, 71,000 other ranks, 94 guns, 167 machine guns, 53 trench mortars and "minninwerfers," as well as a vast quantity of military booty.

The consequences of this victorious operation were at once manifest on the other theatres of war. To relieve the Austrians in Galicia the German High Command took over the direction of both armies and placed them under the sole control of Hindenburg. The offensive in Lombardy was at once abandoned and seven Austrian divisions withdrawn to face the Russians. In addition, eighteen German divisions were brought from the West, where the French and British were strongly attacking on the Somme. Further reinforcements of four divisions were drafted from the interior as well as three divisions

from Salonica and two Turkish divisions, ill as the latter could be spared. Lastly, Rumania threw in her lot with the Allies.

Unfortunately within a few months the Rumanian army was destroyed and its remnants sought refuge behind the Russian lines. As a result the front in the East was lengthened by three hundred miles and brought into contact with Bulgaria and Turkey, while Russia's liberty of action on other sectors was severely handicapped by the necessity of despatching thirty infantry and five cavalry divisions to mar the new "Rumanian Front."

1917. In November 1916 an inter-Allied conference reached agreement on the general outline of a combined offensive in the spring, and at the turn of the year the Russian army, in common with the other Allies, was preparing for the tasks that lay ahead. It was now technically in a better state of preparedness than at any time during the war and abundantly competent to tackle the problems assigned to it. As a result of the heavy losses it had sustained in the previous years, a slight deterioration in the personnel of the army was, however, noticeable. The young recruits were not as well trained, there was a serious shortage of regular officers and noncommissioned officers and the traditional perfect cohesion was sometimes lacking in individual units. Nevertheless the morale of the army was excellent and as a whole it presented a more effective and formidable fighting machine than ever before.

"Few episodes of the Great War," writes Sir Winston Churchill, "are more impressive than the resuscitation, re-equipment and renewed giant effort of Russia in 1916. It was the last glorious exertion of the Czar and the Russian people for victory before both were to sink into the abyss of ruin and horror. By the summer of 1916 Russia, which eighteen months before had been almost disarmed, which during 1915 had sustained an unbroken series of frightful defeats, had actually managed, by her own ef-

forts and the resources of her allies, to place in the field—organized, armed and equipped—sixty Army Corps in place of the thirty-five with which she had begun the war. The Trans-Siberian railway had been doubled over a distance of 6,000 kilometers, as far east as Lake Baikal. A new railway 1,400 kilometers long, built through the depth of winter at the cost of unnumbered lives, linked Petrograd with the perennially ice-free waters of the Murman coast. And by both these channels munitions from the rising factories of Britain, France and Japan, or procured by British credit from the United States, were pouring into Russia in broadening streams. The domestic production of every form of war material had simultaneously been multiplied many fold.

“The mighty limbs of the giant were armed, the conceptions of his brain were clear, his heart was still true, but the nerves which could transform resolve and design into action were but partially developed or non-existent. This defect, irremediable at the time, fatal in its results, in no way detracts from the merit or the marvel of the Russian achievement, which will forever stand as the supreme monument and memorial of the Empire founded by Peter the Great.”(a)

From the point of view of the enemy the situation at the beginning of 1917 is best summed up by Hindenburg who says in his “Memoirs” that “the only solution to relieve a desperate state of affairs is a policy of defence on all the fronts, in the absence of some unforeseen and untoward event.”

This event, alas, was at hand. The revolution so painstakingly and methodically prepared by the Germans and others, broke out in Russia at the end of February. Its causes and immediate effects will be examined in a later chapter. We are now merely

(a) W. Churchill. “The World Crisis, 1916-1918.” Vol. I, pp. 102-103, London, 1929.

concerned with the fact that when it came, it struck at the army from the rear and that the immediate consequences was irreparable and resulted in military disaster. In Western Europe the Revolution was, on the whole, hailed as an event likely to further the prosecution of the War. Allied public opinion, utterly devoid of any factual knowledge either on the Czarist régime or on the origins and character of the Revolution, was inclined to follow a chain of reasoning, seemingly plausible at the time, and loudly voiced at mass meetings at home. "If the soldiers of a Czarist oppressor were able to gain such striking victories, what limits may one set to the achievements of a Russian soldier set free?"

These ill-founded hopes were soon shattered by the ruthless march of events.

At the end of March, Russian headquarters requested the Western Allies to postpone the date of the proposed offensive to June 1. In June the army, still alive to the memory of its glorious traditions, made a single and final effort to serve the common cause. This local advance of several divisions under General Kornilov fully demonstrated the demoralizing effect of revolutionary defeatist propaganda; successful in its initial stages, it faltered, halted and ended in disorderly retreat.

The general collapse of the army proceeded with incredible rapidity after this abortive offensive, and the death warrant of Russia was signed by the troops abandoning their positions at the front and fleeing back to the towns and villages in millions. The Bolsheviks made haste to comply with the terms of their contract with Germany, and, after throwing the front wide open, signed the traitorous peace of Brest-Litovsk in the name of the "Soviet Government."

The best elements of the army, both troops and leaders, refused to recognize this monstrous act of treason and withdrew from the frontal zones to the Southern Steppes and other parts of Russia. The avowed aim of the "White Armies," as they were later called, was to overthrow the Bolshevik Government, repudiate the shameful surrender to Germany and in so doing

keep the pledged word of Russia by fighting with the Allies to the last.(2)

The events that took place in the West subsequent to the Russian Revolution are irrelevant to this narrative. Mortally wounded, Russia took no part in the ultimate triumph of the Allied arms and at Versailles her former Allies barely deigned to remember the existence of their sister nation who had contributed so much to final victory. Yet it was the measure of her contribution and the magnitude of the sacrifices it entailed that had weakened the internal structure of the nation and prevented Russia from holding out to the end.(3)

Resumed briefly, these then were the main stages of the campaign on the Russian front: at the outset of the war the sudden incursion into Eastern Prussia and the consequent withdrawal of German formations from the West were the deciding factors of the victory on the Marne.

A series of offensive operations between November 1914 and January 1916 conducted with sustained tenacity by the Russian armies and the all-out advance of the Germans and Austrians in 1915 resulted in a period of relative calm on the Western Front by engaging the attention of the bulk of the enemy forces. During those fifteen months the Russians presented their allies with a vital factor, time, in which to strengthen and organize their forces.

In March 1916 the Russians, though not fully recovered from the wounds sustained during the retreat of the preceding summer and autumn, were once again on the attack, this time to relieve the German pressure on Verdun.

In May, General Brussilov's offensive saved Italy from annihilation and later in the year Moldavia was wrested from the Germans and preserved for Rumania.

In Asia, on the Caucasian front, an aggressive campaign and Russian victories over the Turks, forced the enemy to concentrate his forces for over two years on this theatre of war

and paved the way for British successes in Mesopotamia and Palestine.

The Russian Imperial Army knew both the bitter taste of defeat and the exhilaration of victory, but to the last day of its existence, no matter what the situation, it never failed to respond to the call of its allies. This generous approach to the interests of the common cause, this spirit of sacrifice and abnegation, common to the entire army from the last private to the supreme commanders, was the outstanding characteristic of the Russian military effort during the whole course of the World War. Among all the Allies of Britain and France, none served them more faithfully, with greater loyalty and greater disregard for selfish interests, or equal generosity.

Two and a half million Russians fell on the battlefields of Prussia, Galicia, Poland and Asia Minor. Their graves lie abandoned, unmarked, forgotten. We still hope their blood was not shed in vain. An army that can fight as the Russians fought is a great army and the people by which it was created is a great people.

A régime of terror and sordid crime was the fate of Russia after the war. Amid the gloom of terrible tribulations and awful trials the spirit of endurance, self-sacrifice and the steadfastness of her armies in the course of two world wars shine forth like a bright ray of hope for the future in which Russia will be called to serve the loftiest ideals of humanity, to the utmost of her spiritual ability.

NOTES

(1) A French military mission, under General Pau, visited the Russian Front in 1915. Subsequently a member of this mission, Colonel Melot, wrote a book summarizing the results of the visit entitled "The Mission of General Pau to the Balkans and Czarist Russia," prefaced by General Pau and published in Paris in 1931. On page 107 he says: "We are now in a position to give a considered opinion on the battle-worthiness of the Russian armies in 1915, based on what we saw, and have no hesitation in insisting emphatically on the excellency of the impression we gained," and further, on page 110: "In the general review of the situation, now submitted, we shall, no doubt,

be accused of unpardonable optimism. Nevertheless, the statements we made were in strict accordance with the truth at the time. In that case we may well be asked how was it that an organism so remarkably resilient and vital in 1915 could later have collapsed and disintegrated in the brief space of two years? The answer to this question lies in the powerful influence exerted by the sombre forces behind the scenes, of which the general public is completely unaware. The elaboration, however, of this aspect of the situation is outside the scope of the present review."

Colonel Melot describes his book as a "token of gratitude to loyal and noble Czarist Russia of 1914-15." Many things in Russia were open to criticism, but the same might be said of other countries. He admired "the organization, unity, might and faith which were peculiar to her and which had been brought into being in the course of three hundred years by the Romanovs." "The nobility, dignity and tact, exercised by Russia, have gone forever and have been replaced by barbaric Bolshevik methods. The love of Russia for France was sincere and Nicholas II was our devoted, loyal and faithful ally, a true friend, whom it would be despicable to misjudge, forget, or defame." (Ibid p. 12)

(2) The policy followed by the Allies toward the patriotic elements of the former army fighting the Bolsheviks was never consistent and consequently the military assistance, dependent on the authors of this policy, was uncoordinated, sometimes withdrawn, often withheld, and never decisive. Whatever its value in terms of effectiveness or succor to the anti-revolutionary forces, it possessed one positive aspect, in so far as it preserved Europe, weakened by the war, from a probable invasion. The "White Armies" fighting a losing battle for the sake of true democracy and to uphold the honor of their country's word, confined and localized at a critical moment militant Bolshevism to Russia. In so doing they helped to avert a cataclysm which might have reduced the ideals of western civilization to nothing but a sad memory for many generations to come.

Since then many states have refused to react against the disruptive influence of International Communism. This negative attitude is often expressed in passivity (the minimum required for self-preservation) but more generally takes the form of active cooperation and submission to influences emanating from the secret sources of Bolshevism.

This lamentable and, on the whole, despicable policy of cooperation may well be qualified as intervention into the internal affairs of Russia, in as much as it is directed against the Russian people in favor of its worst enemies. It is an affront to the honor of the nations whose governments pursue this abject course for the sake of immediate, material, but nonetheless ephemeral, gains. They become the accomplices of the Bolsheviks and must, to a certain degree, share the responsibility for their crimes.

These lines appeared in the French edition of "Czarism and Revolution," some years before the last war. Today we need only consider the "Iron Curtain," "NATO," "SEATO," the Baghdad Pact, the effects of the Communist veto in the Security Council of UNO, etc., etc., to question the wisdom of policies condemned more than twenty years ago.

(3) *Number of German and Austrian Infantry Divisions on the Western and Eastern Fronts*

	<i>West (France)</i>	<i>East (Russia)</i>
August 1914	83	50
January 1915	81	82
September 1915	83	137
September 1916	113	150
March 1917	135	164

Allied Losses (in round figures dead and missing)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Per cent in relation to total</i>
United States	50,000	1.0
Rumania	100,000	2.0
Belgium	100,000	2.0
Serbia	150,000	3.0
Italy	450,000	8.3
British Empire	700,000	13.1
France	1,300,000	24.2
Russia	2,500,000	46.4
	<u>5,350,000</u>	<u>100.0</u>

CHAPTER X

THE INSURRECTIONARY MOVEMENT AND ITS RESOURCES

"The great Russian nation," says Dostoievsky, "is composed of two distinct and absolutely different elements. The majority, the vast majority, consists of generous and kindhearted people, gentle, easy of intercourse, very intelligent, astute and industrious, but carefree. They willingly and cheerfully conform to the strictest discipline and are easily moved to acts of the greatest nobility, or the most sordid crimes. I shudder at the thought of what these good people might do were they to be abandoned to themselves, even for a moment, and allowed to cast off the discipline which they so vitally require.

"But, side by side with these obedient lambs, there are others whose hearts are deadened by egoism, whose souls are filled with the most degrading passions. These are the true perpetrators of the crimes being expiated in Siberia and the prisons of Russia. They have invariably exercised an extraordinary, mysterious and quite unaccountable influence over the Russian masses and this influence has always been fatal. Of this I have myself had the most startling proof as, for example, the occasion on which the inmates of an entire prison, numbering about four thousand, were bent to the will of one of these devils, who put the moral ascendancy he exercised over his fellow prisoners to evil use and to the obvious detriment of the good.

"For the Russian to be led is a necessity. Free him from the authority to which he willingly submits and he will accept the yoke of evil leaders.

"My poor country! You are torn in two by those who love you, often subconsciously, and by wicked leaders, whose one desire is to satisfy their own immediate interests and who only heed the promptings of their unhealthy minds.

"May God protect us in His mercy! May He spare us the fatal ordeal of the time when the multitude of the weak will fall to their domination! What horrible scenes shall we then witness, what atrocities, what senseless massacres! We shall see Russia laid waste by famine. We shall know physical and moral disease, treason to our country and our faith. We shall feel the heavy hand of the foreign enemy upon us, we shall taste material servitude, we shall lose all we possess and forget all we love."

These were the reflections of Dostoevsky in the second half of the last century, on the psychology of the Russian masses and the possible influence over them of evil leaders.

It would thus seem that the Russians, though in no way inferior to any other people, stand more in need of authority and discipline than other nations, while this fact becomes increasingly evident at the present time, when Dostoevsky's sombre prophecies are being so amply fulfilled.

Nevertheless, it is equally true that the picture painted by him, in its broad outlines, applies to other countries as well as Russia. After all, the great mass of humanity, in spite of all the differences between nations and the manifestations of their individual characteristics, tends to conform to a single pattern.

The problem which preoccupied Dostoevsky was taken up toward 1895 by Dr. G. le Bon, the French psychologist. He made a special study of the reactions and the psychology of human beings when they are grouped together and in his classical work, "*La Psychologie des Foules*," came to much the same conclusions as the Russian author. Since then these conclusions have been justified by world events. In this connection and in subsequent works, Dr. le Bon has abundantly proved

that under existing conditions in France, a communist revolution might well succeed either temporarily, as the first revolution in Hungary, or permanently as in Russia.(a)

Though the overthrow of the existing order in Russia was the openly avowed aim of the Russian revolutionary movement from the early days of the 19th century, yet the actual fall of the monarchy and all it stood for in February 1917, was overwhelmingly and surprisingly swift.(1)

The great reforms of Alexander II (1860-65) and the rapid spread of education, especially at university level, were followed by a determined attack on the social structure of the nation. Herzen, Nechaiev and Bakunin were the original organizers of the revolutionary movement which, at the time, was represented by the Nihilists, beginning with Dobrolubov, Pissarev and Chernishevsky. Bakunin was among the most active members of the First International, though later he angrily tried to undermine it after the failure and fall of the Paris Commune.

The first Russian revolutionaries, though differing on some points of revolutionary theoretics, were unanimous in maintaining that the primary condition of any form of social improvement was the complete overthrow of the existing order and consequently directed their activities to preaching "destruction for destruction's sake."(b)

The general trend of Russian life has always been toward egalitarianism, and, as I have earlier pointed out, this particularly national trait was strengthened by the social reforms

(a) See "La Psychologie des temps nouveaux" and "L'Evolution Actuelle du Monde," published in 1923 and 1924 respectively. (Flammarion, publ., Paris.) In the last named work particular attention is drawn to the following chapters: "Defense against Communism" and "Why Europe Is Moving Toward Dictatorship."

(b) In 1848 Herzen called for "destruction of the world by which the 'New Man' was being strangled. Hail chaos and destruction! Hail death! Make room for the future!" ("From the Other Shore"), Geneva, Page 64.

of Alexander II. Therefore, a good many revolutionaries considered Russia a difficult target for developing their propaganda. Herzen and his Nihilist friends, on the contrary, thought that this national egalitarian bent and especially the peasant "mir" were factors which could help the Russian revolutionaries in being the first in the world to succeed in a complete overthrow of an existing social order. They freely admitted that Czarism, taken by itself, was an eminently social form of power and that, as far as Russia was concerned, it was the best and only possible form of "bourgeois" government. Hence, for the Russian Revolutionaries, from the very beginning, the destruction of Czarism was not an end in itself, but primarily a means leading to the overthrow of the generally existing social order, first in Russia and subsequently in other countries.

This line of reasoning is illustrated in correspondence exchanged between Herzen and the English writer, Linton: "If we," wrote Herzen, "succeed in bringing about a revolution (in Russia) it is not for the sake of exchanging the tyranny of a Czar for that of a president or a parliament; we have no use for either. We must gain true and complete freedom."

In his turn Bakunin too, wanted to see "all existing institutions destroyed: State, Church, the Courts of Law, Banks, Universities, etc. It is not enough, he claimed, to abolish them in one particular country. They should be abolished everywhere because, among them all and transcending the boundaries of individual countries, there exists a growing bond of solidarity and a powerful international alliance."

In spite of, or rather because of, the factors I have just enumerated, the Russian revolutionaries set about organizing a campaign of intense propaganda with the primary aim of discrediting the Czarist regime. Abroad in particular, it was presented as the most odious form of tyrannies and this in "bourgeois" countries and to "bourgeois" governments, no less detested by them than Czarism itself. These tactics were mentioned in the "preface" of this book; let me now say that they were eminently successful.

Among the reasons for the success of the campaign, and one which cannot be sufficiently stressed, is the different interpretation of the term "revolution" abroad and in Russia. In the 19th century "revolution" to the average Westerner implied a struggle for greater liberty and constructive reforms; to the Russian revolutionary it meant "destruction." From Herzen and the Nihilists of the seventies down to Lenin, this ambiguity of interpretation has been skillfully exploited in order to mislead the West. Besides, it is useful to dwell on the fact that Russia's enemies have repeatedly made use of her revolutionaries as an arm against her. The defeatist and treasonable behavior of the 1905 revolutionary leaders was by no means a new departure, no more so than the activities of Lenin and the Zimmerwald comrades, when they trafficked with the Germans. They were following in the footsteps of Herzen who, while living in London during the Crimean War in 1854, spent his time writing and publishing seditious leaflets designed to undermine the morale of the Russian troops at Sebastopol.

The Russian revolutionary movement, known as "Narodnichestvo" was based on political theories which, on the whole, were neither novel nor original: economically they were those of Fournier and Robert Owen, while politically they were inspired by the works of Auguste Blanqui. Together with the latter the Russian Nihilists held that a small, well-organized, revolutionary group could, at the appropriate time, launch a successful attack on the existing régime. But the "Narodniki" went further than their teacher. Blanqui, in spite of all his revolutionary enthusiasm, used occasionally to exercise a restraining influence over his too impatient followers. The leaders of the Russian version of "Blanquism," on the other hand, maintained that:

"The people are always ripe for revolution. Should we wait? What for, and by what right? We cannot and do not wish to wait. Let every man pick up his belongings and set out on his journey."

"The Journey" meant a direct appeal to the people, a call to rebellion, a resolution to push the masses into revolt to the sound of exploding bombs.

The people, however, are not deemed capable of seizing power. This is no obstacle, for government is the exclusive prerogative of the "revolutionary minority!" Starting from 1875 the mouthpiece of the "Narodniki," "Nabat" (the Tocsin) gave this premise the following interpretation:

"It is evident that the activities of the revolutionary minority, the amount of power and the influence it exercises, are in inverse proportion to the revolutionary potential of the masses. In the event of a weak potential the share of the masses in bringing about a social revolution must of necessity be restricted, while the importance of the revolutionary minority becomes increasingly great. Once having freed the people of the fear inspired by constituted authority, it will offer them the opportunity of demonstrating their full revolutionary strength. By making use of this destructive force the revolutionary minority will, first, annihilate the enemies of the revolution and then proceed to lay the foundation of the new social order, based on the ideals of the people." (a)

What was claimed as "ideals of the people" was in reality the concept of a social order, conjured up by unhealthy and hate-ridden minds. These ideologists of freedom so mistrusted the masses which they had set out to liberate that they quite frankly stated:

"Neither today, nor at any future date, will the people, if not suitably guided, be capable of producing a social revolution. Only we, the revolutionary minority, possess

(a) Quoted from P. Lavrov, "Narodniki (1873-1878)" pp. 173, 174. St. Petersburg, 1907.

this ability and it is our duty to create a revolution at the earliest possible opportunity.”(a)

Propaganda of this kind soon led to the foundation of small terrorist circles, mainly composed of young university students like “The Society of the People’s Judgment and the Terror,” founded by Nechaiev in 1875, and “The People’s Freedom,” five years later. Lenin’s elder brother (Ulianov) was one of the most active members of the last named society. “The People’s Freedom,” which accurately interpreted the spirit of the “Narodniki,” was the most virile and important of these revolutionary circles.

The fiftieth anniversary of “The People’s Freedom” was celebrated with great solemnity by the Soviet Government in 1930. During the ceremonies the veteran “Narodniki” and Bolshevik leaders of today toasted each other and exalted the services they had respectively rendered to the common cause.

On the square, in front of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, there now stands a monument to the oldest member of the society, Geliabov, the assassin of Emperor Alexander II.

The foundation of “The People’s Freedom” was immediately followed by repeated attempts on the life of the Emperor, but each time the fatal blow was averted by what seemed a miracle. Of a total of fourteen attempts at assassination the penultimate was the most daring.

On February 17, 1880, at about 7:30 p.m., the inhabitants of St. Petersburg were startled by the sound of a terrific explosion. A dense cloud of smoke rose over the Winter Palace where a powerful bomb had blown up the dining room of the imperial residence. Once again the life of the Emperor, who had stayed later in his rooms than was his habit, was spared, but the casualties were very heavy among the staff of the palace and the soldiers on guard. The effect on the public was one of stupified horror and deep apprehension.

(a) Ibid.

Thereupon Alexander II ordered the formation of a "Supreme Committee for the Preservation of Social Order" and placed it under General Loris-Melikov. No sooner had the latter assumed his duties than he himself was the object of an attempt at assassination. The "Narodnik," Molodetzky, fired three revolver shots at him in the street as he was driving by in his sledge. Fortunately for the general the bullets lodged in the thick fur wrap he was wearing. In one bound he was out of the sledge, had thrown himself upon his assailant, seized him and handed him over to the police to the loud cheers of the onlookers. Next day, after a summary trial, Molodetzky was publicly hanged before a crowd several thousand strong who had gathered to witness the first public execution in Russia for over fifty years.

In spite of the intensified activities of the revolutionaries Loris-Melikov, who was as liberally minded and as generous as his master, the Emperor, wanted at all cost to persevere with the proposed policy of liberal reforms. The Supreme Committee was dissolved, Loris-Melikov became Minister of the Interior and at once drew up the draft of a constitution which was examined and approved by a special commission. On March 12th the Emperor signed the manifesto which was to announce to the nation the creation of a representative body, joined to the Council of Empire, and ordered Melikov to publish the manifesto on March 14th.

On March 13th, when the Emperor was returning in his carriage to the Winter Palace from a Sunday parade of his Guards, a young man in the front row of the crowd lining the quays of the Catherine Canal, threw a bundle wrapped in paper at the horses' feet. There was a blinding flash and the sound of an exploding bomb. A cloud of acrid smoke and snow rose into the air, followed by the sound of splintering wood and glass, the cries and moans of the wounded. The Emperor stepped out of his carriage unhurt and ran to their assistance. The crowd surged forward and somebody cried out: "Is Your Majesty hurt?" "No, thank God! I am safe," replied the Emperor. "Your thanks are, perhaps, premature" shouted an on-

looker who had been leaning against the railing of the quay a few yards away. With this he tossed another bundle into the air. There was another explosion, another whirlwind of smoke and snow. When it had cleared, wounded, dying and killed were lying on the bloodstained snow. The Emperor, the lower part of his face smashed, his legs bare and shattered and bleeding all over, was vainly trying to raise himself on his hands.

This Czar, whom his people had christened "The Liberator" could well repeat the words of our Saviour: "Many good works have I shewed you from my Father; for which of those works do ye stone me?"

A few days after his father's death, Alexander III, the new Emperor, summoned a Council of State to reexamine the question of the constitution. Many of the high officers of state at the council considered that the proposed representative body would fittingly crown the policy of great reforms introduced by their murdered monarch. In view, however, of the tragic circumstances of his death, they showed some hesitation in pressing their opinion. The problem was solved by Pobedonostzev (2), an eminent lawyer and former professor of the University of Moscow who was Procurator (President) of the Holy Synod.

"If the measures proposed by Loris-Melikov are adopted," he said, "the only thing we can do is to say 'Finis Russiae!' A constitutional form of government is being suggested for Russia! The example of Western Europe proves that the idea is based on false premises. If it took root in Russia it would at once be a misfortune and a catastrophe."

He followed this statement by giving particular reasons why the proposed measure was not only untimely but dangerous, and ended by saying:

"What we are being asked to do is to assent to the creation of one more 'chattering hall' at a time when the mortal

remains of a generous Russian monarch, murdered by Russians in broad daylight, lie still unburied in the Cathedral."

Pobedonostzev's speech deeply impressed Alexander III and the constitution was not granted.

As a result of these tragic events, the government took a firm hand with the revolutionaries. Members of "The People's Freedom," the authors and perpetrators of the crimes committed in recent years, were arrested, tried and some of them executed.

After the accession of Alexander III, acts of terrorism were a rare occurrence and during his reign the nation enjoyed an unbroken period of peace and increasing prosperity.

A severe defeat had been inflicted on the revolutionary campaign of the "Narodniki." Their subsequent forays into the countryside produced no results and their efforts to stir the peasants into revolt proved fruitless. The "moujiks," allegedly the possessors of a "communist cranium," according to the agitators, either refused to budge, or "revolted" against the propagandists and handed them over to the authorities with hands bound behind their backs. As a result of their campaign of political murder the "Narodniki" had alienated the sympathies of the broad masses of the "intelligentsia" and the progressive elements of Russian liberalism. In fact, the whole nation was against them, while the repressive measures of the government gradually removed their most dangerous members. The majority sought refuge abroad and there settled down to analyze the causes of their failure and to hatch plans calculated to succeed in the future.

Precisely at this time Russian industry was, as we know, entering a period of great expansion: railroads were being built; mining, metal, oil and a host of other industries were either springing up, or expanding with astounding rapidity. The birth or development of huge industrial concerns with the conse-

quent increased demand for manpower was bringing into being a new class of society—the labor force.

The revolutionary exiles turned to the study of the labor movements in Europe and the teachings of Karl Marx and of Engels. They came to the conclusion that the young Russian labor class offered fertile ground for propaganda and that by utilizing this class to the exclusion of any other they could reach their goal.

In 1883, Plekhanov, Axelrod, Ignatov, Deitch and Zassulitch, some of them old terrorists, founded the "Group for the Liberation of Labor" and published a series of pamphlets popularizing the teachings of Karl Marx under the general heading of "The Library of Modern Socialism."

In fact, the real beginning of the Russian Social Democratic Movement, wholly imported from Germany and messianic in trend(a) dated from the foundation of this society, as well as the introduction into Russia of the Marxist concept of class warfare.(b)

Two books by Plekhanov, "Our Differences" and "Socialism and the Political Struggle," heralded the dawn of the new party. These works contained a criticism of the principles of "The People's Freedom" and a broad outline of the party program. Whereas the "Narodniki" had based their hopes on the "mir" and the peasants, Plekhanov now showed that the "mir," by tending toward peasant private ownership and thus giving rise to a petty bourgeoisie, was essentially hostile to any form of revolutionary spirit. Consequently, in order to lead Russia to communism, reliance would have to be placed solely on the labor class. Suitably indoctrinated by the revolutionaries, this class would soon discover the existing antagonism between its own interests and those of the bourgeoisie and would pave the way to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

(a) The theory of modern neo-messianism is clearly defined in "Jesus," a work by the communist writer, Henri Barbusse.

(b) Among others the works of General A. Spiridovitch and R. Labry (Payot. publ.) contain useful information on Russian Social Democracy.

The influence of these two books on the militant section of Russian youth was enormous. At once political circles were formed where the good Marxist gospel was discussed and debated by an initially small clan of young "intelligentsia." The first of these groups was founded in St. Petersburg by the Bulgar, Blagoiev, and was composed of sixteen university students of both sexes, two engineers, a journalist, and two former "Narodniki." Others sprang up in all the Russian university towns and copies of "The Library of Modern Socialism" were circulated among them in large numbers.

The political program of Russian social democracy was beginning to take shape: to free labor from the yoke of capitalism by the common ownership of the means of production. The realization of this program depended on the seizure of power in every country by the workers, only feasible by "international revolution," directed by an "international of labor." Such, then, were the definitely communist principles as formulated in the "Draft program of the Russian Social Democrats" published in 1885 by the "Group for the Liberation of Labor."

After 1894 this period of preparatory revolutionary work, so far largely theoretical and intellectual, was succeeded by a new and more active stage. Social democrat university students started mixing with the labor classes in order to "organize" them and incite them to direct political action. Their task was facilitated by the bad harvests of 1893 and 1894 which, by depriving industry of an internal market, produced an economic crisis and restlessness among the workers. Rioting occurred in many cities. The social democrats, always at the head of the movement, were guided in their activities by the rules contained in a clandestine pamphlet "On Agitation," published abroad and prefaced by Axelrod of the "Group for the Liberation of Labor." In it strike action was urged as the grand means of educating the workers: by striking they would be brought to realize that their demands could not be met under the existing political and economic conditions. Henceforward they

would be ready for the struggle which, in turn, would overthrow the Czarist régime and destroy the bourgeoisie.

This kind of propaganda resulted in a marked increase in the number and size of strikes as, for instance, that of the textile workers in St. Petersburg in 1896. It was organized by the "Union for the Struggle to Liberate the Working Class," founded by a group of young social democrats, one of them Lenin (Ulianov) who, after graduating at the University of St. Petersburg, had just returned from Switzerland where he had been in contact with Plekhanov. The years 1895 and 1896 witnessed the formation of numerous leagues and syndicates of workers. In 1897 an organization was formed which exercised a decisive influence on the development of the Social Democratic Party and served as a model for its internal organization. This was the "Bund" or "Jewish Workers' General Union of Russia and Poland," governed by a central committee and possessing its own mouthpiece, the "Arbeiterstimme." Labor centers emerged from their recent isolation and united into groups; a vast network of affiliated branches, all moved by a common inspiration, rapidly spread over the country. These tactics resulted in the first congress of the Social-Democratic Party, held at Minsk in March 1, 1898.

There were only nine delegates present, yet the event was one of great importance because of the manifesto issued by the congress. Entitled "Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Party," it both gave the party an official name and explicitly laid down the aims it was to pursue: "The Russian proletariat will throw off the yoke of Czarism in order to fight capitalism and the bourgeoisie, until complete victory of socialism is achieved." Hommage was also rendered to the "glorious work" of "The People's Freedom," whose heir, on new foundations, the Russian Social-Democratic Party now proclaimed itself to be.

After the congress of Minsk the party propaganda agents continued their work of organizing the working classes all over Russia. Experience had taught them that it was easier to in-

fluence the labor classes by appealing to their individual and immediate interests than by initiating them into the theory of communism. A number of agents were of the opinion that the best method was to incite the workers to fight for the improvement of their conditions and then utilize the inevitable opposition of the owner class to further the doctrine of socialism. This particular approach caused a certain amount of friction inside the party. Some members wanted to see collectivism attained by evolution and after agreement with the radical opposition, others feared that the revolutionary zeal of the working class might weaken when it realized that the betterment of its lot did not solely depend on the existing political situation. The supporters of this latter view contemptuously called their opponents "economists."

Plekhanov and Lenin were openly hostile to the "economists." Together with Martov (Zedelbaum) and Starovier (Potressov), they founded abroad a political journal called "Iskra" (The Spark), the first copy of which was printed in December 1900. From then on the Social Democrats who took their lead from this periodical, were known as "Iskrovtsy." Lenin, a member of the central committee of the Party and who since 1900 was installed abroad, in 1902 published a pamphlet entitled "What Should We Do?" bearing the imprint of the political conceptions which were to remain distinctively his until the time of his death: Social democracy was a revolutionary party. Its members were conspirators and revolutionaries who should, unreservedly, resort to any and every means leading to the overthrow of the government and of the bourgeoisie. The campaign conducted by "Iskra" was so intense that the lukewarm supporters and the "Economists" faded out and were no more heard of.

After 1903 the wave of strikes increased and all now bore a definitely revolutionary stamp. There were imposing processions of strikers who chanted revolutionary songs and carried immense red banners. Serious clashes with the police were a common occurrence. The conviction that an armed conflict with

the government was both inevitable and necessary was taking root in the mind of the workers. Success, however, depended on the support of the armed forces and propaganda among the officers and in the ranks was intensified. As early as 1902 a league of revolutionary officers had been reported. The Social-Democratic Party was making increasing preparations for armed rebellion.

In order to strengthen the unity of the Party the organizing committee of Bielostok convened a second general congress of the party. It met in Brussels in 1903, was banned by the Belgian government and moved to London. Out of a total of 43 delegates, 30 represented 20 local organizations. The majority were intellectuals and 13 were professional revolutionaries on the staff of "Iskra," or in its pay. Only four were of the working class.

This congress drew up the main lines of the Party program. "The proletariat is international in character. Power must be vested in the proletariat in order to establish a socialist order of society. Social democracy will turn the proletariat into an independent political party, it will reveal the existing contradictions between the interests of the exploited and their exploiters, point out the complete hopelessness of the situation to the workers and the consequent necessity of a social revolution."

However, there was present in Russia a factor which was an obstacle to the successful development of class revolution. This was Czarism, the only effective check to the realization of the revolutionaries' plans. The following targets were therefore set forth:

First: The overthrow of Czarism.

Second: An all-out fight with the bourgeoisie, thus assuring the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Third: The destruction of capitalism by the suppression of private ownership.

As regards the immediate tactics to follow, the congress decided that, in order to overthrow Czarism, a temporary accord

was possible with the bourgeois parties of the opposition, the so-called "liberal" parties.

The Party did not fail to reckon with the antipathy to its doctrines of the overwhelming majority of the people. As a result, it laid down that in the event of success the future government was to be composed of bourgeois elements. After this the section of the bourgeoisie tending to socialism should be enticed by every means into supporting the revolution, then openly turned out of office and replaced by the Party at the head of the government.

The speech made to the Congress by Plekhanov, is of interest as it shows the attitude of the Party to parliament, or a constituent assembly.

"The triumph of the revolution—this is the supreme law. It follows therefore that if, for the sake of this triumph it were expedient to abrogate this or that principle of democracy, it would be criminal not to do so. Events might, foreseeably, force us into opposing universal suffrage; in that case the revolutionary proletariat would be justified in curtailing the political rights of the bourgeoisie on the principle of "*Salus revolutionis suprema lex*." We must be guided by the same principle in our attitude to the duration of parliaments. For instance, if a "good" parliament had been elected by the people in their revolutionary zeal, we should try to keep it in being. If, on the other hand, the elections had turned against us, our task would be to dissolve parliament and that not within two years, but within two weeks."

The London congress was of supreme importance because of the political program it elaborated, so literally implemented in 1917, and the split which occurred among the members of the Party, an event which considerably affected the development of the revolution.

This split came about as a result of the elections to the cen-

tral committee and the editorial staff of the Party's mouth-piece, "Central Organ" to which three members had to be appointed. As the editorial staff of "Iskra" already consisted of six members (Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov, Zassulitch, Axelrod and Starovier), Martov and his friends proposed to maintain all the six in office. His suggestion was defeated by Lenin and his followers. Forced into a minority, Martov and twenty other delegates left the Congress. The Party was thus split into two groups: the majority (bolshinstvó), hence the term "Bolshevikí," for members of Lenin's group, and a minority (menshinstvó), or "Menshevikí," for the opposition.

Though in outward appearance a matter of internal administration, the cleavage revealed a deep rooted antagonism between opposite approaches to fundamental principles; one, essentially revolutionary, held to the spirit of "The People's Freedom," the other more evolutionary in character and tinged with economism.

The Bolsheviks regarded the Party as an organization composed of conscious revolutionaries who, while leading the "toiling masses" to armed revolt, would nevertheless maintain its own position above them. It must always be borne in mind that the attitude of the Bolsheviks to the workers was one of sustained mistrust, based on the assumption that labor lacked revolutionary awareness and was too prone to compromise with a bourgeois society at the price of trivial improvements in its standards of living. As a result, the Bolsheviks desired absolute centralization within the Party, with the machinery of administration firmly held in their grasp, and took a hostile view to the introduction of labor representatives to the "Central Organ."

The Mensheviks, who opposed this narrow conception by one more democratic in form, wished to see the workers taking part in the voting to various party committees. The struggle between these two approaches explains many of the aspects and facts of the 1917 revolution, of which the revolution of

1905 was but a dress rehearsal; unfortunately it is insufficiently studied or even totally ignored.

After the London Congress both factions competed for leadership of the Party with alternating success, while the changing pattern of events only helped to widen the gap between them.

The Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks were unanimous in their wish to profit by the Russo-Japanese War for the overthrow of Czarism. The Bolsheviks encouraged the workers to acts of sporadic revolt with the aim of tempering their fighting spirit. The Mensheviks opposed a policy which, they held, senselessly frittered away and weakened the resources of the Party. It was better, according to them, secretly to prepare for a general rising and thus enhance its chances of success. The results of this divided policy were made manifest by the miscarriage of two large-scale insurrectionary movements in January and May 1, 1905. Both came to nothing except for a few skirmishes with the police. In the approach to the elections to the Duma (Parliament), brought into being a few months later—thanks to the efforts of Count Witte and other liberal elements, the divergence of the respective policies of the two factions was once again demonstrated. Lenin and his followers, at the time, boycotted the Duma. The Mensheviks at once resolved to take an active part in its deliberations, with a view of turning it, as far as possible, into a revolutionary assembly. In the event the Duma provided them with an excellent means of propaganda and eventually was a deciding factor in the success of the revolutionary movement.

Nevertheless, both factions of the Social-Democratic Party continued with their campaign of propaganda. Plans for a mutiny in the Black Sea Fleet, timed to coincide with the fleet manoeuvres in July 1905, were drawn up by the Central Committee of the Party. A premature mutiny on the battleship "Potemkin" disclosed the conspiracy and weakened the plan. The revolutionaries were not in the least discouraged as the mutiny pointed to the possibility of bringing a part of the

armed forces over to their side. "The time has come," said "Iskra," "for us boldly to uphold the daring revolt of the soldiers. Victory is with the bold." Political agitation by the agents of the Party was everywhere intensified.

In Moscow a printers' strike, which began on September 19, 1905, and which at once assumed a pronounced revolutionary character, was the work of these agents. They induced the railway men to come out on October 4th. Immediately there followed a general strike over the whole of Russia; in large industrial centers the workmen paraded the streets carrying red banners and placards demanding a republic.

The first "Soviet (Council) of Workers' Delegates," modeled on a pattern described in issue No. 101 of "Iskra" met in St. Petersburg on October 13th, 1905. It numbered 561 delegates "elected" at the rate of one to every 500 workers. These delegates were none other than the Social-Democratic Party agents in the factories of the capital. The first chairman of the Soviet, Nossar, was soon replaced by Trotsky (Braunstein), who at the time was a Menshevik. The Soviet sat as a properly constituted workers' parliament and its first step was to elect an executive committee. The latter commenced the publication of "Izvestia (News) of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies" and of "Novaya Jisn" (New Life), bearing the motto "Proletarians of the World Unite." "Novaya Jisn," edited by the Soviet, was the forerunner of Maxim Gorky's paper of the same name which came out in 1917. At the time these events were taking place, Lenin, Zassulitch, Deitch and the others returned to Russia.

Similar Soviets sprang up in Kiev, Riga, Rybinsk and Reval. In a few cities the troops were affected. Everything was in a state of violent turmoil, while the universal unrest bore witness to the depth and efficiency of Social Democracy's propaganda.

The whole movement was directed by the St. Petersburg Soviet which was actively getting ready for open rebellion. It published twelve daily papers, distributed hundred of thousands of leaflets and supplied the workers with arms. On December 2nd the Soviet issued an appeal to the people, calling

on them to refuse the payment of taxes, to withdraw their deposits from the savings banks and to arm in view of an impending final assault on the existing régime and the proclamation of a Social Democratic Republic. At this stage the Government took action and had 69 members of the St. Petersburg Soviet arrested.

This was, however, by no means the end. In order to save the situation, the Moscow Soviet, which had in the meantime been formed, decided on an armed insurrection. Its orders were obeyed by some sections of the workers, whom it had previously supplied with revolvers, rifles and grenades. The rising started on December 8, 1905. The insurgents spread over parts of Moscow built barricades across the streets and attempted to seize strategic points, such as the G.P.O., the main railway stations, etc. The Government finally called in the army and, after a few days of street fighting, the revolt was put down and order restored.

Two points should be noted in the events described. First, that without the "rehearsal" of 1905 there would have been no victory in 1917, as witnessed by Lenin in a work published after the triumph of Bolshevism(a); second, the fact that, except for the first four days, the activities of the Soviet took place after the creation of the Duma on October 17, 1905. According to MacKenzie Wallace, the English historian and eminent authority on Russia, the grant of a parliament under duress had an effect exactly opposite to the one anticipated by Count Witte. The conciliatory attitude of the Government from the beginning of the crisis was interpreted as a sign of weakness and, far from bringing about a state of calm, merely helped to ease the task of the revolutionary forces.(b)

The defeat of the rebels in Moscow sealed the fate of the bid to overthrow the régime in 1905. But the lessons learnt

(a) "Childhood Ailments of Communism," Paris, Library of "Humanité" P. 16.

(b) MacKenzie Wallace, "Russia" pp. 717 and seq. 1912 edition.

were not to be forgotten by Social Democracy. The leaders were convinced that the methods employed were correct and that, at some future date, given a larger and more detailed organization, with a greater share in the movement by the armed forces, Social Democracy had a good chance of success.

The effects of failure caused a falling off in membership among the workers who were thoroughly disgusted with the results produced by "direct action." The leaders of the party were forced to flee abroad and there find an outlet for their energy in continuing the wrangle between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Nevertheless they combined in pursuing their seditious propaganda abroad, as well as in Russia, directed at rekindling the revolutionary spirit of the workers and at developing their own organization. Particular attention was devoted to the establishment and the activities of party "cells."

In this field three special schools were founded abroad by the Social Democrats for training propaganda agents from among the workers, for instruction in the organization of cells and the methods best suited to bring the masses nearer to revolt.

It was obvious that a revolution had no chance of success without the complete support of part, at least, of the armed forces. Somehow or other it was essential to get at the soldiers as well as the workers. As the majority in the ranks were peasants they should be shown what they stood to gain by a "revolutionary" solution of the agrarian problem. Consequently a large part of the Social-Democratic Party program was directed to solving this problem.

Though by this time there was, to all intent, no more land left to divide, the confiscation of privately owned estates in favor of the peasants was demanded by the party congress in Stockholm in 1906. Propaganda among the peasants was directed to proving that a measure of this kind would result in an immediate betterment of their lot.

In this particular field, social democracy joined hands with the Social-Revolutionary Party, not mentioned before. In its

teaching this party followed the principles of the former "Narodniki"; its activities were centered on intense revolutionary propaganda, especially in the rural districts; it resorted to acts of individual terrorism. Broadly speaking, the aims and tactics of the party differed little from those of Social democracy. The more so as, since 1905, at Lenin's instigation, numerous social democratic terrorist groups had also been formed. These terrorist groups engaged in indiscriminate and wholesale political murder of government servants. (3) Both parties aimed, after the overthrow of Czarism, at overcoming the bourgeoisie and at establishing a new social order of society based on the abolition of private ownership. It was on the subject of this new order that the two parties differed theoretically, a divergence of views outstanding in their debates in congress, but not reflected in their activities against either Czarism or the bourgeoisie. On the whole, there was little, indeed, to divide the parties.

Thus, in the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War and in spite of continued bickering between the two enemy factions, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, social democracy continued to organize, strengthen its cadres and increase its influence in the major industrial centers by means of a vast network of branches, ranging from Archangel to Baku, from the Baltic Provinces to Vladivostok, and by allying its activities to those of the Social-Revolutionary Party.

It is important to realize the extent to which the political propaganda of both parties was aimed at fostering a feeling of hatred in the masses. Directed against Czarism and the bourgeois classes, it never even stooped politically to educate these masses. The Social Democratic and Social Revolutionary parties were fighting organizations. They recruited their followers by means of primitive slogans, holding out the promise of a bright future and prepared them for a sudden seizure of power by the use of force.

The efficiency of the Party organization can easily be gauged by the rash of Soviets which broke out all over the country on

the morrow of the revolution. The 1917 revolution developed within the framework built up in 1905 and according to the formulae preached by the Social Democrats. It is therefore obvious that it was begotten by the extreme Social-Democratic Party of Russia, a direct descendent of the terrorists of "The People's Freedom" and the first nihilists.

Splendidly organized for the purpose of insurrection, the Party was pledged to resort to armed rebellion when opportunity offered. It was presented with this opportunity by the 1914-18 War. Three factors played into its hand: the enormous sacrifices demanded of the nation; the general dislocation of ordered administration; and, lastly, the formidable financial resources which, at this critical time of Russian history, were placed at the disposal of the Party.

The nature and origin of these resources is a question which must, by now, have excited the curiosity of my readers. Where did the money come from in quantities sufficient to permit a small group of individuals, acting in a spirit of devilish hatred, to undermine the Empire of the Czars, gain victory and simultaneously bring about the downfall of Russia? It is obvious that in this brief review I can only touch on the fringes of the question, one which is not easy to answer because of the complexity of the transactions involved and the secrecy in which they were shrouded.

I shall, therefore, limit myself to a short description of the threefold origin of the financial resources which helped to organize and bring about the Russian Revolution.

1) *The least important source. Funds of Russian origin* which helped to swell the revolutionary coffers and which fall into two categories:

a) A few successful Moscow business men and industrialists, descending from the people, were captivated by the teaching of the Social Democratic leaders. Flattered by alluring promises of prominent posts in the "Russian Social Democratic Republic" of the immediate future, they assumed an attitude of

hostility to Czarism and the upper classes. One of the principal go-betweens was the author Maxim Gorki. Considerable sums which helped to stage the rebellion of 1905 were provided by the rich Moscow industrialist Savva Morozov. Additional funds for the same purpose were extracted by the actress Adreyeva. Gorki's mistress, from a wealthy youth by the name of Schmidt. After order had been restored the authorities requested Morozov to take a voyage abroad, where he committed suicide under somewhat mysterious circumstances, having heavily insured his life and named the Social-Democratic Party as his beneficiary. Gorki and Krassin, the party treasurer, made haste to have the legacy collected by the latter. In 1917, a young millionaire and sugar "tycoon," Tereschenko, financially supported the revolution. He was rewarded with the post of Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government, though his abysmal ignorance in anything to do with his post gave rise to many "funny" stories in the capital.

b) The second Russian source to feed the revolution was used as pocket money by the future People's Commissars who found it convenient to be amply supplied with this useful commodity. Though less important than the first it is mentioned as typical of the spirit which prompted the Russian revolutionaries in those days and one which has not changed. It derived from the proceeds of hold-ups, euphemistically called "expropriations," by armed bands of revolutionary bandits.(4)

The robberies of the branches of the State Bank in Helsingfors (Helsinki) in 1906 and in Tiflis in 1907 were the most daring of these hold-ups. The leaders of the Tiflis raid have since gained considerable notoriety. They were Litvinov, subsequently USSR delegate to the United Nations and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and . . . Stalin. Litvinov and his brother were both arrested in Paris by the French Police; one in 1907, while trying to get rid of the money looted in Tiflis, the other in 1929 in connection with a case of forged Soviet drafts.

2) *British and American.* The main purveyors of funds for the revolution, however, were neither the crackpot Russian

millionaires nor the armed bandits of Lenin. The "real" money primarily came from certain British and American circles which for a long time past had lent their support to the Russian revolutionary cause. Thus Trotsky, in his book "My Life" speaks of a large loan granted in 1907 by a financier belonging to the British Liberal Party. This loan was to be repaid at some future date after the overthrow of the Czarist régime. According to Trotsky, the obligation was scrupulously met by the revolution. (a) The financier just mentioned was by no means alone among the British to support the Russian revolution with large financial donations. (5)

The important part played by the wealthy American banker, Jacob Schiff in the events in Russia, though as yet only partially revealed, is no longer a secret. Referring to a telegram sent by Lord Rothchild to Wilhelm II on the eve of war, Emil Ludwig, in his book "June 1914," says: "This banker, with all that amount of Jewish money behind him, could have embarrassed us as much as Schiff of New York embarrassed Russia."

From the day that he was placed at the head of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., one of the influential American banking houses, Schiff's behavior was that of an avowed enemy of Russia. A number of references to his anti-Russian and anti-Czarist activities are contained in a book describing the life of this important personality who died in 1920. (b) Written as it is, by a friendly pen and prefaced by his son Mortimer, this book deals with the avowable aspects of Schiff's financial dealings. On the other hand we are told by other writers, like A. Lambelin, D. Petrovsky, et al., that there existed in America before the First World War a veritable syndicate of Jewish bankers, formed for the purpose of supplying funds for Russian revolutionary propaganda, while in the spring of 1917, Jacob Schiff openly boasted of having been instrumental in overthrowing the Czarist régime by his financial support of the revolution.

(a) "My Life," Trotsky. Berlin, 1930, p. 281.

(b) "Jacob Schiff, His Life and Letters," Cyrus Adler. London 1929.

It is worth noting that in his "Diary of an Author," Dostoevsky foresaw the creation of a similar syndicate.

We also are in possession of more detailed information stemming, according to General A. Nechvolodov(a), from the French Intelligence Service: Twelve million dollars are reported to have been donated by Schiff to the Russian revolutionaries in the years preceding the war, while other sources confirm and amplify this fact.(6)

Mr. Bakhmetiev, the late Russian Imperial Ambassador to the United States, tells us that the Bolsheviks, after victory, transferred 600 million roubles in gold between the years 1918 and 1922 to Kuhn, Loeb & Co.

3) *German*. The very considerable financial resources mentioned above were further augmented, starting from August 1914, by 70 million marks, paid by the Germans to Lenin's organization with the object of attacking Russia in the rear and fomenting a revolution. An agreement for the payment of this subsidy, *immediately after the beginning of hostilities*, and of other sums in proportion to the results achieved and the "the work" in hand, *was signed in June 1914* between representatives of the Reich and Lenin who voyaged from Switzerland for the purpose. The existence of the agreement is admitted in principle by Generals Hoffman and Ludendorff. The latter in his memoirs says that "Germany dispatched Lenin to Russia" and further that "this step was justified from the military point of view as it was imperative that Russia should fall." (b) It is also confirmed by Lenin.

On October 20th, 1918, at a meeting in Moscow of the Central Executive Committee, under the chairmanship of Sverdlov, Lenin, the Red dictator, made the following statement: "I am frequently accused of having won our revolution with the aid of German money. I have never denied the fact, nor do I do so

(a) Quoted from A. Nechvolodov, "The Emperor Nicholas II and the Jews." E. Cheron, publ. Paris 1924. P. 98.

(b) "Memoirs of the War," Vol. II, pp. 22 and 119 of French edition.

now. I will add though, that with Russian money we shall stage a similar revolution in Germany.”(a)

I wish to underline the erroneous appraisal of the Bolshevik leaders by the enemies of Bolshevism who for years and sometimes even today, regard these men as ordinary traitors, at the time in German pay, or simply as brigands. They are criminals otherwise dangerous and of a kind never met before: criminals who today are pursuing and who will continue to pursue until the day of their doom, with devilish cunning and logic their monstrous dreams of world subversion.

Useful information concerning the transactions between Germany and the Bolshevik leaders may be gained from a collection of 70 documents, published by the U.S. Public Information Committee, under the title, “The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy.” These documents contain an account of the relations between the revolutionary leaders, the German army, big business and industry.(7)

From this information it appears that the Germans knew the exact date on which the revolution was to break out, i.e., on the eve of the combined great Allied offensive in the spring of 1917.

An attempt has sometimes been made to differentiate between the “February Revolution,” also known as the “Kerensky Revolution,” and the “October Revolution,” or the definite installation of Bolshevism. Though separated, in time, both these events represent, synthetically, two phases of one and the same historical phenomenon and to distinguish between them demonstrates a tragic and vexing lack of realistic appreciation. It is hoped that the preceeding pages and those that follow will help to dissipate this illusion; the oneness and continuity of the revolutionary movement and, especially, the oneness and continuity of the revolution, can never be sufficiently stressed.

The triumph of Bolshevism (in October 1917) was the fatal

(a) A. Spiridovitch. “History of Bolshevism in Russia,” p. 226 of Russian edition.

and inevitable consequence of the downfall of Czarism and the logical consummation of the "February Revolution." It was financed by a coalition of Russia's enemies; it was engineered by the Russian Social Democrats and seconded by the other parties of the opposition, always in tow of the Social-Democratic Party, who thus contributed to their own destruction and Russia's enslavement.(8)

NOTES

(1) The mutiny of the garrison in St. Petersburg on December 14, 1825, organized and led by a small group of young men, mainly officers of the regiments of the Guards, later known as "Decembrists" should, perhaps, be included in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement. However, a description of the causes by which it was prompted would lead us too far afield, while its effects were not such as to warrant inclusion in our necessarily cursory survey of the movement. Briefly, what occurred was this: As I have said, the mutiny broke out on December 14, 1825, but treasonable activity among the younger members of the aristocracy and in the Guards had been known to exist for some time past. When informed of this spirit of unrest, the Emperor Alexander I, himself a liberal at heart, confounded his informants by replying: "At one time I myself shared these illusions. It would ill befit me to punish the men who pursue them today." His tolerance was ill rewarded. Immediately following his death, the "Decembrists" took advantage of the confusion caused by the refusal of the Emperor's elder brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, to ascend the vacant throne. They raised the garrison of the capital on the false pretext of defending the rightful claim of the Grand Duke against his younger brother, Nicholas, the new Emperor, who, the troops were told, was a usurper. The personal intervention of the Emperor at the head of the Preobrajensky Regiment of the Guards nipped the mutiny in the bud and thus averted a period of probable anarchy. One hundred and twenty Decembrists were arrested and tried by a High Court composed of members of the Council of Empire, the Senate and the Synod. Five were sentenced to death, a few exiled to Siberia and the rest pardoned.

This tragic event never ceased to be a cause of great grief to the Emperor, who all through his life deplored the fact that at the outset of his reign he had been compelled to shed the blood of his subjects.

(2) C. Pobedonostzev was a great admirer of "the father of modern social economy," F. Le Play. In his young days, when writing his thesis on Russian Civil Law, Pobedonostzev referred to him in terms of the greatest respect and ranked him as the most outstanding authority in this field. The Frenchman re-

turned the compliment: the bulletin of the "Société d'Economie Sociale," presided over by Le Play, contain many complimentary references to Pobedonostzev. Some years ago the president of the society was the late A. Souchon, doyen of the Faculty of Law at the University of Paris and my lecturer at the School of Political Science. I take this opportunity to pay him my grateful homage for the benefit I derived from his wise counsels and his teaching. I am grateful to him for his guidance in my efforts to study events in a spirit of impartiality by establishing their primary causes.

For the benefit of those of my readers who are unfamiliar with Pobedonostzev's views and the policy he both advocated and practised, I would add that, while paying full tribute to the lucidity of his mind and his dialectical talent, I am not one of his followers. Together with M. Paléologue, the former French Ambassador to the Russian Court, quoted in this work, I am much tempted to say: "We sometimes come to the same conclusions but from widely different angles." (M. Paléologue. Vol. I p. 274.)

(3) From the early days and up to the end of 1905 the number of casualties, victims of the Russian revolutionary movement, had reached 12,000. Within the next three years it claimed as many more. The following is a list of casualties officially recorded for 1906, 1907 and 1908.

	<i>Government Officials</i>		<i>Private Persons</i>	
	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>
1906	738	948	640	777
1907	1231	1248	1768	1734
1908	365	571	1349	1384
Total	<u>2334</u>	<u>2767</u>	<u>3757</u>	<u>3895</u>

These figures relate to 4742, 12,102 and 9424 attempts in each respective year, or a total of 26,268 attempts in the period under review.

As a result of the energetic measures taken by Prime Minister Peter Stolypin, one of the most remarkable statesmen ever produced by Russia, there was a marked decrease during 1909 and 1910 in the number of attempts at political assassination. He is reputed to have said: "I have got the revolution by the throat and I shall strangle it to death . . . if I live." "If I live" was no idle statement. There had been ten attempts on his life. This great and enlightened patriot, author of the agrarian reform which would have assured the well-being of the nation, was a victim, like Czar Alexander, the Liberator, of the eleventh plot directed against him. On September 11, 1911, he was shot to death in the Opera House in Kiev at a gala performance and in the presence of the Emperor. Though mortally wounded, he yet was able to turn to the Imperial box and to bless the Emperor with the sign of the cross. "I am happy to die for my Czar and for Russia" were the last words he murmured. For his life and work see A. Stolypin: "L'Homme du Dernier Czar, Souvenirs"

(The Servant of the Last Czar, Memoirs). Alexis Redier. Publ. Paris, 1931.

In the face of these facts and the official figures quoted above, is it still possible to reproach Czarism with the few death sentences carried out, or with the orders of deportation to Siberia? Any other government compelled to deal with revolutionary assassins of the Russian ilk would have reacted in a like and probably stronger manner. The truth is that, under the circumstances, the measures taken by the State in self defense were much too mild.

So much has been heard about the "dreadful" fate of the political exiles in Siberia that a few remarks on the subject are not out of place. Lenin put the years he spent there to profit and wrote the greater part of his "Works." As a general rule the political deportees were received by local society and the authorities and were allowed to enjoy their hospitality. If credence is given to the memoirs of some of our revolutionaries, they were, on occasion, even permitted to join the local administration. On the face of it, this would appear to be a gross exaggeration, but the fact remains that a few did not find it too difficult to take French leave, fleeing abroad and then returning to Russia to continue their nefarious work.

It should further be noted that during the three centuries of Romanov reign the annual number of political deportees to Siberia never once much exceeded one hundred.

According to George Kennan, (relative of the well known diplomat) who in the 19th century thoroughly investigated the subject, only 749 such prisoners were held in detention between the years 1874 and 1884.

Let me stress that in 1913 the deportees in Russia numbered 32,750 and that of this total *only an infinitely small minority were political prisoners*, while I need hardly remind you of the tens of millions of unfortunate slaves who perished in the death camps of the Soviets.

(4) This is what G. Alexinsky, a former member of the Bolshevik party, has to tell us about the so-called "expropriations." Mr. Alexinsky, thanks to the position he held, is well fitted to give us these details. "The Bolshevik faction within the Social-Democratic Party was at the time (1906-1910) governed by a central committee. In this committee there existed a small and secret inner group, concealed both from the other party members and the prying eyes of the Czarist police. This inner group was known under the name of "The Little Trinity" and consisted of Lenin, Krassin (called "Comrade Nikitch") and a Mr. X, who has since withdrawn from politics. Constantly in search of additional funds, "The Trinity" devised a simple method of filling the party till. "Orders of expropriation" were issued to youthful enthusiasts, eager to prove their revolutionary ardour, who translated these orders into armed holdups of post officers, railway booking officers, or even of whole trains, previously derailed." ("The Tragic Life of a Bolshevik Commissar," "Le Matin," Paris 9 September 1921.)

(5) The attitude to Russia and the policy followed by Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador to the Imperial Court during the War, have been the subject of sustained criticism, especially after the publication of various memoirs and documents which reveal their true purport. As the war progressed, the suspicion that the British Embassy was being turned into one of the centers of the growing conspiracy against Czarism and consequently Russia, was gradually confirmed and left very little room for any sort of doubt.

Rodzianko, M. Paléologue, the historian James Navor, are all forced to admit the fact, while even M. Gilliard in his "Memoirs" states that the "ill-informed ambassador" had allowed himself to be misled." (M. Gilliard was the French tutor of the Heir to the Throne.) Princess Palei, the widow of the Emperor's uncle, the Grand Duke Paul, goes further and openly accuses Sir George of treachery to the sovereign to whom he was accredited. In some of his recollections, published by the "Revue de Paris," Sir George makes an unsuccessful attempt to rebutt these charges, but nevertheless concedes that they "still weigh over him and his efforts to refute them have not met with success."

On April 7, 1917, General Janin made the following entry in his diary ("Au G.C.G. Russe"—at Russian G.H.Q.—"Le Monde Slave," No. 2, 1927, pp. 296-297): "Long interview with R., who confirmed what I had previously been told by M. After referring to the German hatred of himself and his family, he turned to the subject of the Revolution which, he claimed, was engineered by the English and, more precisely, by Sir George Buchanan and Lord Milner. Petrograd at the time was teeming with English. . . . He could, he asserted, name the streets and the numbers of the houses in which British agents were quartered. They were reported, during the rising, to have distributed money to the soldiers and incited them to mutiny. He, personally, had seen in the Millionnaia Street persons who he knew were British agents, handing 25 rouble notes to the men of the Pavlovski Regiment a few hours before it turned coat and joined the revolution."

In private interviews I have been told that over 21 million roubles were spent by Lord Milner in financing the Russian Revolution.

What could have induced England to play into the hands of Germany during the War? Some day, perhaps, the archives of the Foreign Office will shed light on the subject, one of the many secrets of British foreign policy. Meanwhile, M. de Rauville suggests a clear cut answer. In "La Revue Hebdomadaire" he says: "Bolshevism was born in London on September 5, 1916. On that date England was compelled to agree to the cession of the Straits (Bosphorus) to Russia. However, she firmly decided that a 'fortuitous event' would prevent Russia from ending the war and so realizing the age-old dream of the Slav World: 'Constantinople and St. Sophia.'" This 'fortuitous event' had somehow to be brought about and Sir George and Lord Milner actively applied themselves to the task.

(6) In an excerpt from a secret report, dated New York, 15 February, 1916, (quoted from Boris Brazol, "The World at the Cross Roads," 1921, Boston, Small, Maynard and Co., Publ. p. 19) we read: "The Russian Revolutionary party in America has decided upon a policy of overt action. Risings and disturbances may, therefore, be expected at any moment. The first secret meeting, marking the commencement of this new period of violence was held on the East Side in the evening of February 14th and was attended by 62 delegates of whom 50 were veterans of 1905, while the remaining 12 were newly joined members. The majority consisted of Jewish intellectuals, some of whom were professional revolutionaries. The discussions at this meeting were mainly centered around the opportunities offered and the means available for staging a revolution on a grand scale in Russia, the present time being considered extremely propitious. As previously reported, the party had just received from Russia secret information to the effect that all the necessary preliminaries for an immediate rising had been concluded. The only question of concern to the meeting was that of a possible shortage of funds; however, as soon as it arose, several members announced that no fears should be entertained on that subject as, at the appropriate time, the necessary money would be supplied by sympathizers. In this connection the name of Jacob Schiff was repeatedly mentioned."

A copy, dated September 23rd, 1919, of "To Moscow," published in Rostov, contains further interesting facts about the part played by Jacob Schiff in the 1917 revolution. According to this paper, the information is based on a document originating from the French High Commissioner in Washington. The authenticity of this document cannot be contested as it was extracted from the archives of one of the high French government offices. Later it was quoted by Gen. Nechvolodov in his book, previously mentioned (pp. 97-104). Nechvolodov claims that it was drafted by official branches of the American Services and handed by them to the French High Commissioner. I present a few quotations:

"In February 1916, it was learnt that a revolution was being fomented in Russia and that the following persons and business concerns were engaged in this destructive enterprise: 1) Jacob Schiff; 2) Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (Directors: Jacob Schiff, Felix Warburg, Otto Kahn, Mortimer Schiff, Jerome H. Hanauer); 3) Guggenheim; 4) Max Breitung.

"It would therefore appear that the revolution in Russia, which broke out one year after this information was first reported, was sustained by Jewish interests.

"In April 1917, Jacob Schiff publicly declared that it was thanks to his financial support that the revolution in Russia had succeeded.

"In the Spring of the same year, Schiff commenced to subsidize Trotsky,

who also received a contribution from 'Forward,' a Jewish publication of New York.

"Simultaneously Trotsky and Co. were also being subsidized by Max Warburg and Olaf Aschberg of the Nye Banken of Stockholm, another Jewish concern, the Rhine-Westphalian Syndicate and Jivotovsky, a wealthy Jew whose daughter later married Trotsky. Relations were thus established between multi-millionaire and proletarian Jewry."

There follows a list of names drawing attention to the predominance of the Jewish element in the first Soviets.

This document, after stressing the ties linking Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and other Jewish financial establishments, expresses the opinion "that the Bolshevik movement to a certain degree is the expression of a more general Jewish movement and that certain Jewish banking houses are interested in its furtherance." (For exhaustive study of this problem see Salluste, "Les Origines Secrètes du Bolchevisme," J. Tallandier, Publ. Paris, 1930.)

We must, on the other hand, avoid the mistake of thinking that the Jews the world over are in sympathy with Bolshevism. Such an attitude would be doubly unfair if we consider how many of their brethren have suffered in the revolution.

This distinction is underlined by Sir Winston Churchill in an article published in the "Sunday Herald" and later reprinted by "B'nai B'rith News," No. 9 Vol. XII, the mouthpiece of international Jewish Masonry, with a lodge in Chicago.

"The conflict between good and evil, forever present in the human heart, is nowhere so markedly manifest as in the Jewish race. In no other race is this duality of human nature more forcibly, or more terrifyingly expressed. We owe the Jews the revelation of Christianity and of a moral system which, were it completely divested of the miraculous, would still remain the greatest treasure of humanity and one which, alone, is of greater worth than the accumulated knowledge of the world and of all the other teachings. And now, in our time, this astonishing race has evolved another system of morality and philosophy so saturated with hatred, as is Christianity with love; a system which, if no help is forthcoming, will overthrow all that has been created by Christianity. It is as if the Gospels of Christ and the Anti-christ were destined to be born within the bosom of a single person and that this mysterious and mystical race were preordained to be the apostle both of Divine Revelation and of the power of Satan." (Translated from the French text.)

The author of the article then goes on to examine the activities, first of the "national Jews," whom he exonerates of any blame and then of the "international" and "terrorist" Jews. "It is a conspiracy of the latter which succeeded in raising from the dregs of the large cities of Europe and America that band of individuals, which has diverted the Russian people from the straight path

and which has in fact become the absolute master of that immense Empire."

I very much fear that the Russian people might decline to accept the distinction drawn by Sir Winston Churchill, one with which I am in full agreement. It is likely that, sooner or later, the Russian Jews will be indiscriminately held responsible for the crimes committed by those of their race who took an active share in the butchering of a nation of more than 150 million. Their salvation lies in the measure of assistance given by the Jews of Europe and America to the struggle of the Russian people for its liberty; a contribution which, it is hoped, will be as generous as that afforded by Jacob Schiff to the revolution.

Caveant Consules! World Jewry must realize these facts at the earliest possible moment, both in the interests of the Russian Jews, the enormous majority of whom have nothing in common with Bolshevism, of Russia herself and the whole of humanity.

(7) Some of the documents included in "The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy" (French translation, Bossard Publ., Paris 1920) are of exceptional historical value. First, those relating to June 1914 and other data extending to August as well as preceding by some weeks the assassination of the Austrian Arch Duke, used by the Germans as a pretext for declaring war, contain an account of the dispositions taken by Germany with hostilities in view.

Second, a copy of instructions sent by the Reichsbank to representatives of German banks in Sweden on March 2, 1917. These instructions prove that the Germans were aware of the date on which the revolution was expected to break out. Here is the text: "You are hereby notified that requests for funds for pacifist propaganda in Russia will reach you via Finland. The requests will be addressed to you by one of the following: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sumenson, Kozlovsky, Kollontai, Sievers, or Merkalin, for whom current accounts have been opened by the Swedish, Norwegian and Swiss agencies of private German banks in conformity with our instructions No. 2754.

"These demands must bear either one of the two following signatures: Dirshau or Milkenberg. Demands countersigned by one of the above and emanating from any of the persons previously enumerated are to be met without delay."

The above instructions, No. 7433 of the Reichsbank are dated March 2, 1917, i.e., ten days before the outbreak of the revolution and at a time when the majority of the accredited agents mentioned were either in Switzerland or Scandinavia, or, like Trotsky, in America, while the German-Bolshevik underground work in Russia was temporarily entrusted to agents of minor importance.

(8) The Provisional Government was by no means unaware of the important part played by German money in bringing the "February Revolution" to a head. Mr. V. Nabokov, Secretary of the Cabinet, tells us: "I recall a lively

incident which occurred at one of the closed sessions of the Cabinet, some two weeks after the revolution. Miliukov was the speaker and, among other things, said: 'Of course, it is an open secret that German money was one of the factors which helped to produce the revolution.' At this, Kerensky, who was seated at the other end of the room, leapt from his seat, rushed up to Miliukov and shouted: 'What? what did you say? Repeat those words!' Miliukov did so, stressing every word. Kerensky was livid with rage, but none of the other ministers made the slightest attempt to contradict the statement that had so angered Kerensky. (Archives of the Russian Revolution, in Russian. Publ. by I. Hessen. Vol. I. Article by V. Nabokov: "The Provisional Government." pp. 22, 23.)

In an article which appeared in "The Common Cause" (Russian) on January 21, 1921, Mr. Burtzev devotes a few lines to the behavior under the Czarist regime of Mr. Kerensky, the future "Generalissimo of the Russian Land and Sea Forces," under the Provisional Government. According to him it would appear that Kerensky at the time was an active "pacifist" and was campaigning against the "defensists" and those who stood for continuing the war with Germany in conjunction with our Allies to the end. By the close of 1916 extremely heavy charges weighed over him; in spite of his parliamentary immunity he was on the point of being arrested and brought before the courts on charges of treason and relations with "persons working for the defeat of the Russian Armies." Mr. Burtzev further adds that these allegations were well-founded and that Kerensky owed his immunity to the Revolution.

CHAPTER XI

THE REVOLUTION

During the First World War, between 1914 and 1917, the Social Democratic Party was given an outstanding opportunity of intensifying and broadening the scope of its subversive activities among the workers by the greatly altered composition of the population in the capital. Within those years the labor force of St. Petersburg had doubled and now totalled 400,000, mainly concentrated in the large metal-processing plants and foundries of the city and suburbs.

In addition another element, open to skillfull propaganda, had also been introduced into the capital. It consisted of regimental "depot battalions," billeted in the large barracks of the former garrison. These battalions were made up of middle-aged men who had never before served with the colors and who, naturally enough, bitterly resented a belated call-up at the time when, more often than not, they were the sole bread-winners of their families. The losses in the Army after nearly three years of war were appalling and, as a measure of precaution, the Government had mobilized large numbers of these peasants and massed them in the barracks of the capital. Their total number amounted to 160,000. (a) Badly disciplined, as compared to old standards, half-trained and mostly unarmed, from a military point of view they were, as yet, of little value. However, as we shall presently see, they were more than adequate to bolster up a revolutionary uprising. These battalions were officered either by "praporschiki" (ensigns), generally young university

(a) "Errinerungen von General Wassili Courko." (Memoirs of General Vassili Gurko.) Berlin, 1921, p. 206.

students who, like their men, could only be called soldiers by courtesy, or by a regrettably small number of regular officers, invalided out of the Army. This dearth of properly trained officers was another factor that played into the hands of the Party. With the exception of these units there were no other troops in St. Petersburg, while the police force numbered 3500 men, armed with revolvers and a few carbines. (a)

The apparent anomaly of thousands of elderly men who had never done a day's military service and were now mobilized is explained by the fact that in Russia under pre-war conditions only 29 per cent of the yearly call-up was actually drafted into the army, whereas in the majority of other continental states the entire yearly contingent of recruits did their military service. It follows therefore that the "troops" which so largely contributed to the success of the disturbances in St. Petersburg and turned a violent political demonstration into a revolution were neither, properly speaking, soldiers, nor "reservists" as they are sometimes described in foreign literature unversed in this aspect of the Russian recruiting system.

An increased labor population and a mass of discontented and badly disciplined soldiery in the capital thus presented the Social Democratic Party with a golden opportunity of simultaneously winning over the two elements which, by experience, they knew were indispensable to success.

Detailed information as to the actual activities of the revolutionaries at this period is of necessity scant, but a few important events which occurred at the time serve as a pointer to the general pattern they followed.

On January 27/February 9, 1917, all the workers' delegates in the Committee of War Industries were arrested by order of the Government. In an official statement issued three days later the arrested men were described as "workers' delegates, all of them active members of revolutionary parties, who had

(a) E. Martynov. "The Army During the Revolution." (In Russian), 1927. p. 62.

grouped together and formed a center of those workers' organizations which aim at fomenting a revolutionary movement throughout the Empire and at establishing a social-democratic republic." It was further claimed that "the systematic revolutionary indoctrination of the labor masses is being actively pursued by this group." The majority of the arrested workers quite frankly admitted the truth of these charges. One, in particular, claimed that he was working for the revolutionary cause so as to help his country defeat "the external foe." This strange point of view, demanding a radical change of the country's political structure and holding that such a change was a necessary preliminary to any large scale offensive against the Germans, was popular among the working classes at the time. It was also shared by a few gullible and youthful members of the "intelligentsia." (1) Needless to say, ideas of the sort were welcomed by the revolutionary parties and this particular conception was only one of many defeatist and anti-social theories which they assiduously propagated among the workers and the broad masses of the population. However, the most popular of these was open incitement to end the war which "the Czar and his generals have resolved to pursue until the complete extermination of the people" and a call to the workers in the large plants to down tools and get ready to fight for an immediate peace and to join in armed rebellion in order to seize the reins of power.

On February 10/23 an article in "Russkoje Slovo" drew attention to rumors concerning Mr. Miliukov's presence at workers' political meetings and to the strange tenure of his speeches. The persistence of the rumors and their widespread character induced Mr. Miliukov, who was then leader of the Cadet Party (Constitutional Democrats) to address an open letter to the Press in which he said:

"It has come to my notice that some person of whom I am not aware, but by whom I am being impersonated, has recently indulged in active propaganda among factory

workers, in particular at the Lessner Plant. This person is alleged to have incited the workers to organize public demonstrations against the prosecution of the war. I am also informed that other persons pretending to be members of the Duma are distributing arms to the workers. I hasten to warn the public that it is being wickedly hoaxed."

This letter, while saving the face of Miliukov's Party, did little to diminish the spate of defeatist propaganda in the factories.

It was unfortunate that the Constitutional Democrats, one of the largest, if not the largest party in the Duma, should have been so out of touch with the masses or the political realities of the time. It was a party largely led by political theoreticians, professors and lawyers who disdainfully shrugged aside these realities and who suffered from many of the worst shortcomings of our "intelligentsia." As brilliant orators they were invariably to the fore in the deliberations of the Duma and formed the "professional opposition"; one the whole, however, they were neither true liberals, nor yet true revolutionaries. But, by their unbridled and venomous attacks on the Government, particularly by Miliukov toward the close of 1916, they played straight into the hands of the revolutionary parties, who were quick to seize on any advantage, especially one so gratuitously conferred. (2)

Difficulties of supply, more apparent than real, in the second half of February 1917, were used to further advantage by these parties and helped to trigger off the final rebellion.

The daily consumption of flour in the capital amounted approximately to 600 tons and on February 23/March 8 the stocks in hand totalled about 8000 tons, i.e., just under a fortnight's supply. Fresh quantities were on the way but were delayed by heavy snow storms which temporarily blocked the railway lines. The amount issued to retail dealers was slightly curtailed by the authorities and in the poorer sectors of the capital the

inhabitants had to stand in queues at their bakers' shops. (A familiar occurrence, perhaps, in the cities of the other belligerents but one unprecedented in Russia.) Revolutionary agents immediately seized upon the ensuing discontent in order to spread the most fantastic rumors and urge the workers to resort to the direct and violent action.

Proletarian Womens' Day, February 23/March 8, was marked by processions with red banners parading in the more densely populated quarters of the town. 87,000 workers downed tools and left their factories pretexting difficulties in obtaining food. A general strike was declared on the following day. In the suburbs sporadic clashes occurred between the police and the 190,000 workers who by then had joined the demonstrators. A number of policemen were killed. A bomb was thrown at a detachment of mounted gendarmes. A Council of Workers' Delegates took over the control of the movement on February 25/March 10. The chief organiser of the Council was a certain Nahamkes, a secret and well-paid agent of the Germans since the beginning of the war. For the sake of expediency at this stage he posed as an Internationalist and a Menshevik sympathizer, but soon declared his real colors as an ardent and active Bolshevik.

As soon as the Council of Workers' Delegates was formed the general strike became grimly effective. There was a complete stoppage of work in all but a few of the factories and over 300,000 workers joined their comrades already out on strike, though by this time the supply position had been fully restored and additional rations of flour issued to the bakers. On February 26/March 11 dense crowds of armed workers moved from the outlying suburbs into the center of the capital. On the way in they subverted the soldiery, already systematically "worked over" and indoctrinated. When the troops were ordered out later in the day to help in the maintenance of order they did nothing to restrain the crowds; though not openly taking sides with the rebels they stood passively by and unconcernedly watched the slaughter of the police which began on that day.

The police force was the only organized body to offer any resistance to the armed workers and fight valiantly to the end. Many policemen were killed in street fighting but the majority were foully butchered as a result of organized hunts all over the town.

By the night of February 27/March 12 the capital was virtually in the hands of the rebels.

By misfortune the post of military governor of St. Petersburg was held by General Kabalov, a weak and irresolute man. In view of the meagre resources at his disposal (3500 police) he should have taken vigorous and prompt action at the very start of the disturbances. However, he missed the right moment to intervene resolutely and after two days fighting in the streets the position was lost for good.

On February 27/March 12 enemy or revolutionary agents, disguised as soldiers, infiltrated into the barracks and on the following day brought out the men in open mutiny. The central telegraph and government offices were captured and sacked; police stations were smashed all over the town and the gates of the jails thrown open. According to Lenin: "the prisoners under Common Law, resolute and purposeful, largely contributed to the final success of the rebellion." The dregs of the population joined in the ensuing pillage of shops, stores and private houses.

Meanwhile, what was happening in the Duma, the elected body of the people's representatives? In recess at the time for the Easter holidays it hurriedly met in unofficial session to take stock of the situation. A great majority of the deputies appear to have been utterly stunned by the terrible course of events. Mr. V. Shulgin, one of the leaders of the Duma, has left us some notes in which he vividly describes the feelings of anxiety and stupefaction of the men who had themselves contributed so much to discrediting the monarchy, the traditional supreme authority in Russia.

"Something dangerous, terrifying and abominable had been unleashed which threatened all of us alike. Even the old fighters in our midst shared in the common wave of fear then sweeping over us, as we sat huddled together in a vain attempt to draw courage and support from one another. In step with the mob outside there was something else stalking down the street. Our pallor and the quickened beating of our hearts proved that we all intuitively felt it. The breath of this invisible monster was actually tangible. Surrounded by the shouting rabble, 'Death' was marching down the street."

From the very outstart the Duma lost complete control over the course of events. It was taken in tow by the movement and did not so much as try to curb the unleashed passions of the mob and the soldiery. If one is asked whether, perhaps, it was not driven into passivity by the turn events had taken the only truthful answer is an emphatic "no." The attitude adopted by the Duma was deliberately chosen and was prompted by a pious and subsequently unfulfilled desire not to lose face. In proof let me quote Miliukov's own words:

"The success or failure of the revolutionary movement depended entirely upon the degree of support it was afforded by the Duma."(a)

It is an established fact that increased freedom of action was given to the leaders of the revolution by the passivity of the Duma and it can even be argued that this enhanced freedom was a decisive factor in events as they gradually developed. This will be more apparent when we see what was the reaction of the rest of the country and, in particular of G.H.Q., to the pro-revolutionary behavior of those of our parliamentarians who were supposed to hold "moderate and enlightened" views.

(a) P. Miliukov, "History of the Russian Revolution." (In Russian). Vol. I, p. 43. Sofia, 1922.

While the Duma was only going thru the initial stages of forming a "Provisional Committee," a few days later re-christened "Provisional Government," the "Council of Soldiers' and Workers' Delegates" had taken definite shape. This was the real Soviet, the begotten child of the Social Democratic Party. The first chairman of the Council was Tscheidze, leader of the Social Democrats in the Duma and the two deputy-chairmen, Skobelev, later Bolshevik envoy to France, and the renowned Kerensky. The latter as cabinet Minister of the Provisional Government acted as liaison-officer to the two authorities born of the revolution.

As in 1905 the Soviet was entirely composed of Party cell-leaders, who had long been active in the factories, with an admixture of soldiers' delegates. Numbering 150 when it first met, its membership increased to well over 1000 within the next few days. On February 27/March 12 "Izvestia," first published in 1905, reappeared again, with Nahamkes as editor-in-chief. The first number was accompanied by a supplement containing a declaration of policy on the war, the most topical subject of the hour, definitely Bolshevik in trend in spite of the strong Menshevik majority in the Soviet.

"The most pressing task facing the Government, the declaration stated, lies in coming to an understanding with the proletariat of the belligerent states with a view to engendering a revolutionary struggle by the people against their oppressors and exploiters, the imperialist governments and capitalist groups. The next is to enforce an immediate cessation of the bloody butchery imposed by them on their enslaved peoples."

The Soviet, directed by Nahamkes, was responsible for the issue of the famous "Prikaz" (Order) No. 1, which at one fell stroke broke any semblance of military discipline in the Army. It was, of course, accepted and passed by the Provisional Government and counter-signed by the Minister of War, Guchkov,

as was all else the Soviet cared to foist on the Government.

The respective positions of the Soviet and the Provisional Government, formed by consent of the former, is brought into vivid relief by a speech of one of its Deputy-Chairmen:

"The proletariat is master of the situation; it must constantly be on the alert so as to prevent the bourgeoisie from turning the power it temporarily holds against the people. The Soviet, as representative of the revolutionary workers and soldiers, must subject the bourgeoisie to its control, inform it of the decisions it takes and lend the weight of its authority only to those measures of the executive power which conform to the political program it has adopted. We shall continue to support the present government just for so long as it stands in the defense of democracy, but on the day it wavers, we shall overthrow it as we overthrew the old order."

It is thus obvious that the Soviet assumed tutelage over the Government, that it jealously watched its every step and inspired its policy. The Provisional Government, caught between two utterly incompatible policies, divided by internal squabbles from the first day of its existence was inexorably moving toward its own downfall, the while jettisoning every day a mounting load of ballast and maintaining a precarious balance by playing a complicated game of overbidding. The mere fact that this government contrived to stay in office for seven months, not seven weeks or days as might have been expected, shows the reluctance of the nation to endorse any extreme revolutionary doctrines and is a measure of the soberness of its political feeling during the first few months of the revolution.

The guilt and the incompetence of the men who first seized the reigns of power and then so lamentably relinquished their hold stands exposed. We owe to the pen of Mr. B. Maklakov, Ambassador to France of the Provisional Government and at

the time a leading member of the Cadet Party, the following impartial appraisal:

"The leaders who deliberately chose to follow the road of revolution cannot complain. They won the match. Their numbers were small and victory would have eluded them had not the others, in whom at the time Russia had placed her trust, lightheartedly abandoned their country to the miseries of the revolution. The final triumph of total revolution is due to the policy followed by these allegedly moderate elements. The blame is theirs and theirs the responsibility."

"They may, perhaps seek comfort in claiming that the revolution was inevitable. Their actions made it so. They have redeemed their mistakes by their fate, but, in the future, history will prove a sterner judge than their unfortunate contemporaries of today." (a)

We can follow the systematic application of the Social Democrat Party theoretical program to concrete politics from the very first days of the revolution. Having attained the first objective, the overthrow of Czarism, the Soviet at once set about preparing to attack the second, the fight against the bourgeois elements of society. Meanwhile the duties of government were entrusted to the so-called moderates until such time as the proletariat would be judged adequately "conscious." The tactics employed by the Soviet were those laid down at the Second (London) Congress of the Party, described in the previous chapter. Even the bid for supremacy between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks which had started at the Congress was not allowed to lie low, but was kept boiling in the inner circles of the Soviet and paraded before the whole country. As long as the Mensheviks retained their majority, clashes between the Soviet and the Government were settled by compromise; but as soon as

(a) "The Fall of the Czarist Régime." Payot, publ., Paris, 1927. p. 87.

the Soviet and then the broad masses of the population succumbed to defeatism and the seditious poison of Lenin's organization, these clashes assumed the character of open brawls and finally resulted in the break-up and deposition of the Provisional Government. At this stage the Bolsheviks, the real actors in the political drama, after ridding themselves of their understudies and the puppets, threw out their erstwhile comrades, the Mensheviks who had, nevertheless, done so much for the revolutionary cause.

Bolshevism was the logical outcome of a trend set in motion at the beginning of the revolution: the triumph of the left wing of a party whose right, though ultimately destroyed, was no less responsible for bringing the country into a state of rebellion and unleashing the most hideous passions of the masses.

After the Emperor had assumed supreme command of the Armies at the most critical stage of the war in 1915 he chose mainly to reside at his G.H.Q. in the town of Moghilev. Here he was able to devote more of his attention to military matters and leave the direction of home affairs to his ministers. The latter failed dismally to appreciate the growing gravity of the political situation inside the country. This obtuseness and wilfull obstinacy courageously to face realities were shattered only at the time of their wholesale arrest by the revolutionary forces. That this was a tragedy is an understatement. It was rendered doubly so by the fact that in misleading themselves they withheld the truth from their sovereign. For instance, on the day the general strike was declared in St. Petersburg in February 1917, Protopopov, the Minister of the Interior, informed the Emperor that "trouble had started among the workers of the capital" but added that "the labor movement was badly organized" and that "there was every reason to hope that the men would return to work on the following day."

I should add that some of the ministers appointed during the war were not professional civil servants; as a concession to public opinion a few members of the Duma were given min-

isterial posts. Some of these "parliamentarian ministers" and, notably Protopopov, former Vice-President of the Duma and former chairman of the "Progressive Block," were bad servants of the Crown. In view of the record of some of their colleagues at the time of crisis one is entitled to ask, "was their conduct due to incompetence or deliberate design?"

Disregarding the reassuring tone of Protopopov's report the Emperor ordered General Kabalov, the military governor of St. Petersburg "to put an immediate stop to the disturbances in the capital, totally inadmissible at this trying time of war with Germany and Austria." Two days later the general reported by wire that he "had been unable to restore order in the capital." Meanwhile, on February 27, as soon as news of the disturbances had reached G.H.Q. the Emperor invested Prince Galitzyn, President of the Council (Prime Minister) with dictatorial powers. He was arrested before he was even given a chance to exercise them. Simultaneously General Ivanov was ordered to proceed by train to St. Petersburg accompanied by a battalion of Knights of the Cross of St. George(a) and there to replace General Kabalov as military governor of the capital. General Ivanov, one of our most popular generals and the battalion he was to lead, were at the time in Moghilev. General Goulévitch, commanding the troops stationed in Finland against a possible German landing,(b) was told to dispatch three battalions to St. Petersburg, where they were to come under the orders of General Ivanov, the new Governor General. The small number of troops dispatched to the capital shows how little G.H.Q. realized the magnitude and portent of the events which were developing in the rear.

The plans of the rebel leaders were carefully laid. The railway-men were, perhaps the staunchest supporters of the Social

(a) The St. George Cross was the highest decoration for valor in the Russian Army. Like the German Iron Cross it was awarded both to men in the ranks and commissioned officers and had four grades.

(b) The Germans did land in and occupy Finland after the revolution.

Democrats among the workers and were certainly the most effectively indoctrinated. By February 27 practically the whole network of railways was in their hands and all of the lines on the approaches to St. Petersburg. By dismantling the tracks to the Finnish border they checked the progress of General Goulévitch's detachment, while General Ivanov and his battalion reached St. Petersburg only in the late hours of March 1/14. By then the situation had so altered that acting on direct orders from the Emperor any further attempt at intervention was abandoned.

Toward evening of February 27/March 12 the Emperor decided to proceed personally to Czarskoe-Selo, the residence of the Imperial family within 15 miles from St. Petersburg. This decision is but another indication of the distorted appreciation of the overall situation by the Czar, his entourage and the Staff at G.H.Q. At 5 a.m. on February 28/March 13 the Imperial train steamed out of Moghilev; it was not allowed to reach its destination and was held up by the new masters of the railways.

Next, a spate of telegrams dispatched from St. Petersburg and other parts of the country started pouring in to G.H.Q. The general tone and purport of these telegrams mounted from hour to hour, while the various demands they contained increased in curtness. The majority were sent either by the President of the Duma or by some of its leaders who, though traditionally members of the opposition, were all known to be supporters of the monarchy and in favor of pursuing the war to final victory. This fact should be borne in mind, for their influence on the course of future events was immense. When they realized the extent to which their reputations were compromised by their first reaction to the rebellion and subsequent conduct, the moderate elements of the Duma did all in their power to make the rest of the nation follow them into the abyss into which they themselves were falling.

After the first two days of rioting and following the arrest of the cabinet ministers these men informed General Alexeïev,

Chief of Staff at G.H.Q., that the revolution, victorious in St. Petersburg, Kronsdat and the Baltic Fleet, was spreading all over the country and that resistance to the movement could only lead to civil strife, fatal to the prosecution of the war with Russia's external enemies. They added that the movement was mainly directed against the person of Nicholas II and demanded his abdication for the sake both of the nation and the dynasty.

This deluge of tendacious and distorted information produced the effect desired by the senders on General Alexeiev, now in sole authority at G.H.Q. after the departure of the Emperor. In a moment of fatal aberration, the consequences of which were only later apparent, he came round to sharing the views St. Petersburg wished him to accept. It was in this light that he passed on, over his own signature, the information he had received to the individual commanders of the Armies at the Front.

These events took place at a time when civil war, dreadful as it seemed, might possibly have retrieved the situation. The army on the battlefront was still sound and virtually uncontaminated in spite of all the efforts of the Social Democrats. An army corps of four divisions, promptly dispatched from the nearest point of the Front, would certainly have arrived in time to deal with the rioting factory workers, the soldiery and the disorderly mobs, even if it had had to gain the capital by route marches. By settling the account of the Nahamkeses, Kerenskis and their like the troops would have strangled at birth the evil to which Russia was to succumb only a few months later.

The suggested solution, horrible as it may sound, appears to be based on sound logic and, moreover, the only one which had any chance of success. However, it is not surprising that patriotically-minded public opinion, far removed from the capital and fed on false information, should have recoiled at the thought of civil war at a time when the enemy was on our

soil and felt that this solution was precisely the one to avoid at all cost.

In the afternoon of 1/14 March the Emperor succeeded in reaching the H.Q. of the Northern Front, commanded by General Ruzsky. There, on the following day, he was handed the telegrams addressed to him by the commanders of the five groups of front-line armies following the instructions they had received from General Alexeiev on the eve. In the latter Alexeiev had stressed that "the only possible solution was abdication" and "in order to preserve the independence of Russia and safeguard the fate of the dynasty" he requested his subordinate commanders to petition the Emperor accordingly. Deprived of any other information but that stemming from General Alexeiev and, themselves, bombarded by telegrams from the Duma direct, the army-group commanders obeyed what amounted to an order from their superior. Each one of the individual submissions, inspired solely by a sense of discipline, patriotism and loyalty to the monarchy, expressed to the full all the grief felt by the sender.

The Emperor complied with their advice. Willing to make any sacrifice for the sake of his country, informed from every quarter that his refusal to abdicate would entail civil war at a time when the independence of Russia was at stake, he relinquished the throne in favour of his brother Michael, both in his own name and that of his ailing son.

The Grand Duke Michael who was then in St. Petersburg was at once informed by members of the "Provisional Committee" that they refused to hold themselves responsible for as much as his life. Under pressure by its members, Kerensky in particular, he declined to accept the throne and handed over supreme authority to the Committee.(a) It was understood

(a) This transmission was, incidentally, legally invalid, if only because "*Nemo plus juris alium transferre potest quam ipse habet.*" For a detailed study of this question see A. Gorovtzev, former professor of the Faculty of Law at St. Petersburg. "Revolutions, Methods of Breaking and Promoting Them." (in French) Alcan, publ. Paris, 1930. p. 108 et seq.

that his decision would stand until a Constituent Assembly would decide on a future form of government.

The conditions under which the Constituent Assembly met several months later and its subsequent fate are well known. (3) The span of its life was predetermined and conformed in every detail to the forecast made by Plekhanov in his London speech when outlining the program of the Russian Social Democratic Party, quoted in Chapter X.

By March 3/16 the real meaning of all that was happening in the rear seems, at last, to have been grasped by G.H.Q. At least we have the following avowal by General Alexeiev:

"I can never forgive myself for believing in the sincerity of certain persons and for following their advice by sending the Army-group Commanders the telegram concerning the Emperor's abdication." (a)

However, the irreparable had by then happened; the act of abdication was already a matter of history.

A few days later the Emperor sent his farewell message to the Army:

"My beloved soldiers, I am speaking to you for the last time. After my abdication, in my own name and in the name of my son, supreme authority was assumed by the Provisional Government formed on the initiative of the Duma. May it, with God's help, guide Russia to prosperity and glory. May God help you, courageous soldiers, to defend our country against the cruel foe. For over two years and a half you have withstood the enemy's pressure. Much blood has been shed and great feats accomplished. The hour is at hand when, in a common effort, Russia and her gallant Allies will break the stubborn resistance of the enemy.

(a) On the crisis and General Alexeiev see General Denikin "Outline of the Russian Crisis." (in Russian) Vol. I. p. 54.

"This war, without precedent in history, must be fought till final victory. Anyone at the present time considering peace or even desiring it is a traitor to his country. I feel confident that every honest fighter thinks like I do. Do your duty, obey your superiors and remember that any weakening of discipline serves no one but the enemy.

"I am firmly convinced that boundless love for our lovely country has not yet died in your hearts. May God's blessing be upon you and may the great martyr St. George lead you to victory.

"Nicholas."

This message was never allowed to reach the Army. It was intercepted and its publication prohibited by the Provisional Government for fear of the loyal reaction it might have on the troops.

Surely this was an act of petty meanness which shows up the men who succeeded to the historical supreme power of the Russians for what they really were.

We are faced by a tempting question: what would have happened if Czarism had not been overthrown in 1917? That Russia would have continued to advance by giant strides along the path of material and moral progress she was following, is the first answer that springs to mind. In 1913 the well-known French economist Ed. Théry wrote:

"If we consider the results observed from the beginning of this century, we are bound to conclude that, provided things in the Great European Nations retain the same pattern from 1912 to 1950 as between 1900 and 1912, Russia toward the middle of the century will dominate Europe politically, financially and economically." (4)

Had the revolution not occurred peace would have been signed in the summer of 1917 instead of 18 months later. Russia

would not only have retained her possessions but also reached her natural boundaries in the Carpathians and reintegrated into the Empire the millions of Russians living in Eastern Galicia. For the greater good of the world Constantinople would have been placed under Russian suzerainty. (International agreement confirmed at the St. Petersburg conference of January, 1917.) The whole of Armenia, freed from the Turkish yoke would have formed part of the Empire, thus providing it with outlets to Mesopotamia and Syria. Other compensations, designed to stabilize peace, would have been obtained by Russia, corresponding to those obtained by the Allies in Africa, the Pacific and elsewhere.

Russia would have enjoyed universal respect. She would have helped to bring to the Treaties of Peace an element of calm and moderation by exercising that particular spirit of clemency and justice which always moved her to complete reconciliation with her former enemies.

Added to this, universal economic chaos, the revolt of Asia against Europe, social unrest in every nation, the progressive bolshevization of entire continents and the terrible martyrdom of a conglomeration of peoples and races inhabiting more than a third of the land surface of the globe, all would have been avoided had that tremendous calamity both for Russia and humanity, the fall of Czarism, not occurred.

But here another question arises. Czarist Russia's extraordinary progress in the 20th century and her advance toward unequalled prosperity and power, were not these the main reasons for her downfall? Take, for instance, the case of a gifted individual who has outstripped his equals. When his position is firmly established or his talents universally recognized his rise to power or fame are seldom viewed with sympathy or even with indifference. On the contrary, they are far more likely to evoke feelings of jealousy and hatred. In this order of things nations and individuals tend to react in the same way. Therein, perhaps, lies the solution to the puzzle why two great powers and sundry other international groups

so determinedly supported the Russian revolutionaries, those perpetual opponents of the creative and constructive genius of our Czars.

It may, therefore, be pointed out that the ever-increasing might of Czarist Russia was, in the nature of things, bound to breed among her sister nations feelings of jealousy or even of blind hatred as well as of supposedly legitimate fear.

An examination of Russia's policy in the field of international affairs under the Czars contradicts any such ideas. On the contrary, the unfettered march of humanity toward progress largely depended upon the existence of historical Russia. This fact, if ignored, is done so by design. What the enemies of Russia either foresaw or hoped to achieve by "liberating" her from the "tyranny" of Czarism has come to pass and been realized beyond their most sanguine expectations. Today many of them regret their former attitude to Russia when they view the effects it has had on their recent history and their most vital interests.

NOTES

(1) From the beginning of the war the political parties of the left took up an attitude of hostility toward the Government in spite of the wave of genuine patriotism which swept over the country. The "Rietch," organ of the Cadet Party and the mouthpiece of its leader Miliukov, at once published an article directed at poor, unfortunate Serbia, and was so disloyal in contents that the paper was suspended by order of the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief. Even in those early days there already existed a certain understanding and collusion between the elements of the radical left in the Duma on the one hand and those of its liberal members who flaunted their patriotism, on the other. At the request of the President of the Duma, Rodzianko, the Grand Duke rescinded his order and "Rietch" resumed publication. A powerful weapon was thus at once placed in the hands of an avowed enemy of the régime. By flouting a timorous censorship and using his reputation for moderation as a cloak, Miliukov was given the chance of conducting with utter impunity and in the full spate of war a slanderous campaign against the Government. It seems unnecessary to stress the extent by which the renewed life of "Rietch," as well as other openly seditious literature printed at the enemy's expense, facilitated the task of discrediting the immense war effort demanded of the nation.

No politician ever dropped so many political bricks as Miliukov or yet made so many prophecies which somehow never materialized. In 1914, soon after the beginning of the war when national patriotism was at its height, his more astute colleagues, like Maklakov, made him see the advisability of changing his tactics. He followed this advice and, though pro-German to the core and a slave of German "kultur," he turned to a violent form of barrel-thumping jingoism. In the now far-off days of the war with Japan and the painful years following, his conduct was definitely suspect and, among other things, he then did his best to torpedo the French loan to Russia, as witnessed by the reports of our financial agent in Paris. Now he conjured up and trumpeted all over Russia the legend of "Treason from above."

His pro-German sympathies and his complete lack of political insight are shown in the report he submitted to General Alexeiev at the time of the Bolshevik coup d'état. "France," said the former Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government, "is on the eve of a second Sedan and will be beaten to her knees by Germany." In 1918 he was expelled from France, as a traitor to the Allies.

This hatred of France was a feeling shared by Russian revolutionaries, liberals of advanced views and intelligentsia of every hue. As early as 1914 M. Paléologue comments with surprise on the bitterness of this hatred. "It is confined," he says, "to the 'intelligentsia' classes, who seem unable to forgive us the financial support we rendered Czarism in the past. In their eyes this wrong is now aggravated by another: we are accused of bringing Russia into the war so that we might regain possession of Alsace and Lorraine at the price of Russian sacrifices." (Work quoted. Vol. I. pp. 234-235.) In two articles published by "La Revue de France" in January and February, 1930, M. J. Jacoby, the French historian, analyzes the various trends of Russian liberal opinion. He says it is an insult to tar the genuinely progressive section of Russian thought and politics with the same brush as the anarchical and disruptive elements of the Duma.

(2) Additional light is shed on the immature approach of Russian liberalism to politics by quoting MacKenize Wallace. This is what he writes concerning an interview with one of the leaders of the Cadet Party about 1906. "As a matter of principle the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats) liked to be called a moderate party, which, in fact, they were far from being. This is proved by an interview I had with one of the leaders of the party. With great diffidence I took the liberty of suggesting to him that his party might, perhaps, do better if, instead of persisting in an attitude of systematic hostility to the Government, it cooperated with it and thereby brought about a state of affairs somewhat approaching the British parliamentary system, for which the Cadets professed such genuine admiration. I added that this might take eight or ten years to achieve. Here I was interrupted by my friend who ex-

claimed: "Eight or ten years? We cannot possibly wait for so long!" I replied: 'I do not, for a moment, pretend to know your business better than you do, but I would point out that in England, considered as a model by admirers of parliamentary government, we have had to wait for several centuries.' ("Russia." p. 728. Translated from the French.)

Full power, concentrated in their hands, is what the leaders of the Cadet Party really desired. Their views on constitutional monarchy were revealed by Miliukov at the beginning of the revolution when he said with his customary coarseness that "the combination of the Heir Alexis and the Grand Duke Michael was very favorable as an introduction to real government by parliament, for one was a child and the other an imbecile." (Sukhanov. "Notes on the Revolution." 1922. Vol. I. p. 279. In Russian.) Incidentally the last part of his remark is quite unjustified if we are to believe M. Paléologue's appraisal of the Grand Duke given in the 3rd volume of his "La Russie des Tsars."

Mr. Maklakov, formerly a prominent member of the Cadet Party and ambassador in Paris of the Provisional Government writes: "These circles (the Cadet leaders) were influenced by their political past as members of the 'professional opposition' who, so far, had never had the opportunity of appreciating the difficulties of government. On the other hand, they had studied the art of malicious criticism and in perfecting it sought to justify their existence. Their aim was to educate the country politically but, when comparing the shortcomings of everyday life with the lofty ideals they proclaimed, they would never stoop to consider its realities. They talked of elaborate reforms in which they themselves hardly believed and then opposed any suggested improvement because it fell short of their demands."

I quote these lines from M. Maklakov's preface to "La Chute due Régime Tsariste" (The Fall of the Czarist Régime) "Interrogation of Ministers, Counsellors and Dignitaries of the Russian Imperial Court by the Extraordinary Commission of the Provisional Government." Paris. Payot, publ. 1927.

The course of the Government, burdened with an opposition of this kind, was not an easy one; matters did not improve during the war when, in "politically educating" the nation, the opposition saw fit to make very grave and serious charges against the administration. All were subsequently disproved as witnessed by a multitude of official documents published after the revolution. In this connection "The Fall of the Czarist Régime, etc.," merits special attention. The Russian version, entitled "Padenie Czarskovo Regima" (Moscow 1925-1926) comprizes seven volumes, while the French edition, quoted above, giving a translation of the main interrogations, runs into well over 500 pages.

It is a report of the findings of the Extraordinary Commission set up by special decree of the Provisional Government two days after the abdication

of the Emperor to enquire into the charges of abuse of power and treason brought against his ministers and high ranking civil servants. Notwithstanding the composition of the Commission which was, of course, revolutionarily biased, and its admitted aim of revealing the "misdeeds" of the accused, all the charges were proved to be unfounded. The Empress, so odiously calumniated, and sundry ministers, like Sukhomlinov, Sturmer and Protopopov—charged with high treason—were not only completely exonerated but found not guilty of having at any time aspired to separate peace or even entertained the wish to traffic with the enemy. (Concerning the Empress, M. Paléologue quite rightly says: "Alexandra Fedorovna never was, nor is, either in spirit or at heart a German." See Vol. I. pp. 249-251 of his Memoirs, where he refers to the Empress and discusses the rumors connected with her person.)

Attention is drawn to the Rasputin legend. Here are the facts as they emerge from the "Interrogations."

Rasputin was a peasant endowed with pronounced hypnotic powers and the ability of performing the kind of "miracles" we usually associate with Indian fakirs. He claimed "to be searching for God" and had been on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

The origin of his ascendancy over the Emperor and Empress was due to two causes; First, the Imperial couple saw in Rasputin a true representative of "the people," whom the Empress idealized and compared favourably with Petersburg high society, "the bridgeplayers," as she called its members. In this she suffered from the same psychosis to which a majority of Russian society were victims, commencing with Leo Tolstoy. It first appeared in the second half of the 19th century and sought to prove the "superiority of the mujik," the "unspoilt man." Second, Rasputin was for the Empress the "man of God," who alone had the power to cure her son and it was in this capacity that he was first introduced to the Court in 1908. As everyone knows the Czarevitch suffered from haemmophilia, the hereditary malady of the house of Hesse, against which the doctors were powerless.

After 1914 Rasputin's private life, the details of which he was at pains to conceal from his Imperial masters, was one of drunkenness and debauch. The ugly rumors connected with his name were regarded as malicious slander both by the Sovereigns and those members of society who were unacquainted with this sordid side of his life. The idea of a debauched Rasputin seemed quite inconceivable and the campaign against the mujik was ascribed by the Emperor and Empress to intrigues promoted by their enemies in order to deprive them of a trusted friend, a son of the people and the only person capable of easing the suffering of their child.

The "Interrogations" also reveal that toward the end of his life Rasputin was not averse to receiving bribes in kind, especially Madeira wine of which

he was particularly fond, and of using his influence to promote the unsavory dealings of various "spivs."

The stories circulated by enemies of the Imperial family and just plain enemies of the régime would have us believe in the sinister influence Rasputin exercised on politics or in his German sympathies. The "Interrogations" tell us that he never aspired to the former and that he was a staunch supporter of continuing the war till final victory. (See pp. 305/6 of the "Interrogations.")

According to the Rasputin legend he was also supposed to be a tool in the hands of mysterious "occult" circles, headed in St. Petersburg by a Jewish banker named Manus, himself rumoured to be an agent in German pay. This, too, is contradicted by the "Interrogations." Furthermore, the unfortunate Manus later shared the fate of many of his colleagues who failed to escape abroad and was shot by the Bolsheviks. Had he really been a German agent he might have met with a less unpleasant end.

Taken by itself the whole Rasputin story is neither better nor worse than the story of a hundred other unsavory episodes which can and do happen everywhere. But because of the notoriety it achieved through skillful presentation, by the way it was exaggerated and ably exploited, it did the Government untold harm. To the patriotically minded it showed Rasputin as an enemy agent, thereby undermining the personal prestige of the Empress and consequently of the régime. For the people the legend acquired a character no less monstrous in its implications: Rasputin's private life of sensuality and debauch was intimately linked with his role as healer of the Czarevitch and his proximity to and intimacy with the Sovereigns. It is under this horrible aspect that the story has been spread abroad. Within the last 30 or 40 years the West has thrown up an endless series of novels, films and plays, some of them frankly pornographic, perpetuating this scurrilous legend. No aspect of the filthy story, which does not further damage the reputation of our martyred Czar, defile his memory or sully the character of his unfortunate consort, has been allowed to go by default. Faced by this infamous calumny which is exploited to the full and used to perpetuate the rooted hostility to Czarism, it is high time for those of us who are anxious to maintain and establish the truth to rise in indignant protest.

(3) At the time (1917), the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly caused considerable comment in the West. It is questionable whether its further deliberations would have been viewed with much favor if we consider that within the brief span of its life it resolved: (a) to repudiate Russia's foreign debts, (b) socialize all the land and (c) pursue negotiations with the enemy powers for a separate peace. A single day of debate sufficed to expose the utter impotence of the Assembly, an impotence dooming it to oblivion, regardless of its actual dispersal by bolshevized sailors of the Baltic Fleet. In actual fact

it represented the perfect synthesis of all the bewildering ramifications of the revolutionary "intelligentsia."

(4) To confirm a forecast made in 1913 that Russia was bound shortly to become the dominating factor in Europe, M. Ed. Théry, after commenting on the size, riches, increased production and industrial potential of Russia, drew up the following table of the estimated population of the principal European countries by 1948 based on the respective increase in their populations between 1900 and 1912.

(Million of inhabitants)

Country	Actual figures		P.c. increase by 1912	Estimated figures		
	1900	1912		1924	1936	1948
Russia	135.6	171.1	26.2	215.9	272.5	343.9
Germany	56.4	65.8	16.7	76.8	89.6	104.6
Austro-Hungary	45.4	52.6	15.9	61.0	70.7	81.9
Gt. Britain	41.2	45.6	10.7	50.5	55.9	61.9
Italy	32.2	35.1	9.0	38.2	41.6	45.3
France	38.9	39.7	2.1	40.5	41.4	42.3
Total for the five powers excluding Russia	214.1	238.8	11.5	267.0	299.2	336.0

CHAPTER XII

REFLECTIONS

A revolution is the consequence of an "old order" only if the latter fails to appreciate the budding aspirations of the nation or yet if, by its policy, it paralyzes its normal development. I suggest that far from having outlived its usefulness Czarism which was responsible for the tremendous upsurge of Russia and the spectacular expansion of the nation's productive genius was not allowed the time sufficiently to develop. The terrifying tragedy of Russia was not a result of the "ancien régime" but a direct and inevitable consequence of its disappearance.

A revolution is "legitimate"(1) when it tends to free a nation of a wicked tyranny by which its development is being strangled. It is then useful and in the end it is constructive.

A revolution is a socially criminal act when it destroys the fountain spring of the nation's well being. In which case it is inevitably destructive and continues to be so to an ever increasing degree.

The effects of the Russian revolution are so stupendous and without precedent in history precisely because of its utter uselessness and the criminal aspect of its character. For years it did nothing but turn the country into a vast torture chamber, a gigantic cemetery, a heap of ruins. If today it is, perhaps, possible to discern at home a certain change of attitude in the authors of these horrible crimes it is only to witness their repeated perpetration in other countries under the Soviet yoke.

In the West the apparent stability of the régime in Russia and the fact that the nation has to all intent acquiesced in the Soviet form of government, except for sporadic outbursts of revolt, have been frequently used as an argument against any

intervention in the internal affairs of Russia. The truth is exactly the opposite. The vast majority of the Russian people is radically opposed to the régime and detests the principles it represents. Unfortunately for as long as the people are subjected to the existing system of repression, espionage, denunciation and persecution they will remain powerless to act. Is any success likely to be achieved by a people in revolt faced with modern weapons of war and a ruthless determination to use them to the full when occasion arises? The recent events in Hungary supply the answer. When at the beginning of the German invasion hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers went over to the Germans they did so in the genuine belief that the enemy was fighting Communism, not Russia. It was not an escape to freedom and it cannot be called treachery. It was the first chance offered of fighting to free the country of the yoke of oppression. The revolt of the people against Communism has every time been subdued by reprisals, deportations and every other bestial means available to those in power; even in the early days of the régime, when the population might logically have been expected to rejoice at the success of the revolution, wave after wave of insurrection swept the country only to be broken against the machine-guns of Bolshevik "banditocracy" and then surpressed by an unparalleled system of terror.

We have now reached a stage when the civilized world is in a position to ponder over the full effects of the Russian upheaval. No revolution can be said to have started on a given date, be due to one particular fact or have been brought about by one particular individual. It simply becomes abruptly apparent. Lenin's arrival on the Russian scene was not the starting point, but the affirmation of pre-existing revolutionary conditions. These conditions far from being caused by the defects of the old order were created by the activities and propaganda of the Russian revolutionaries.

These men were at the time, and still are, the most formid-

able enemies in the world of ordered society as we know it. It must further be understood that their disruptive activities, much as they were assisted by the war, were strengthened by the open and secret support they obtained from all the various forces bent upon the destruction of Russia. However, we can now follow the development of these activities carried a stage further as applied to the so-called bourgeois countries and accurately assess the measure of encouragement they receive from the fount of triumphant Communism, oppressed Russia, which has been turned into a base of world revolution.

Lenin's speeches which so masterly paved the way for his advent, his very words, so strangely adaptable to any and every situation, now resound all over the world, driving home the gospel of hate and civil strife. As Dr. G. Le Bon so justly remarks:

"We now live at a time when words, myths and formulae exercise a dominating influence over the credulous instincts of the masses." And further:

"Today the demands of the masses by becoming increasingly defined tend toward the complete disruption of society, as it now stands, and aim at reducing it to a condition of primitive Communism which was the common state of every human collective before the dawn of civilization."

Communist leadership is no longer content with making the masses "Communist minded" or bringing them by skillful propaganda to a state of mental indiscipline and disintegration when resistance to conquering Communism is no longer possible. From words it has turned to deeds. In every country of the world a streamlined communist organization backed by years of experience is assiduously and expertly hammering away at its task, which is to give its victims the illusion of outward political stability until the hour of irrevocable ruin.

When the Communist plague descended upon Russia there existed no historical precedent by which to gauge the immensity of the danger that then threatened the country and later the world or yet to dictate a salutary policy with which to fight it as soon as it had made itself manifest. We Russians are offered the somewhat cold consolation of realizing that we were the sacrificial offering necessary to the full comprehension of international Communism.

Up to quite recently the fate of the millions of human beings doomed to suffering and death in prison and concentration camp somewhere in the limitless spaces of Eastern Europe and Siberia left the Western world callously indifferent.(2) There was no visible sign of compunction about shaking the bloody hands of the Moscow butchers or about handing over to torture and death loyal sons of Russia on the strength of agreements signed and extorted during the war.

Opposition to Communism is now growing in the West. Why this sudden change? Is it based on a sudden upsurge of humanity, on a sudden awakening to the teachings of the Christian faith? Anyone looking squarely at the truth knows that it is prompted by the unpleasant fact that Communism is now threatening the Western world itself. Bitter experience has taught the West that "co-existence" is a mockery and that no lasting agreement with Communism is possible. Had the true nature of Communism been understood in time by the Western powers, had timely action been taken before the evil had taken root in Russia the spread of Communism in the world today would have been avoided.

A great mistake, and I cannot too strongly emphasize the point, of modern anti-communist policy is to identify national Russia with her present day rulers. The identification of the Soviet Union with Russia and the aims of Communist policy with those of National Russia is an error fraught with the greatest danger. This mistaken identification has brought us to the point when Russia and not the Soviet Union is regarded as

the potential source of international disquiet, while the fact that the Russian people are the first victims of international Communism is totally disregarded. The world seems to have forgotten that Communism was introduced into Russia from the West and that it is essentially foreign to Russia in its concepts.

To persevere in this mistaken appraisal merely plays into the hands of the Communists. It enables them to convince their subjugated people that the enmity of the West is directed against Russia, as such, and in the event of trouble, to make use of genuine national patriotism in the defense of Communism.

I quote here from "An Appeal to the Free World" made by H.I.H. the Grand Duke Wladimir of Russia in February 1952:

"This fallacy which interprets the acts of the rulers of the USSR as representative of the will of the Russian Nation, is responsible for the popular bogey of a 'new Russian Imperialism.' The program and aims of Soviet international policy are wholly distinct from those of National Russia.

"Nevertheless, as tension increases between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, the press and politicians of the Western nations, with a view to preparing public opinion for an eventual war against the USSR, make ever more frequent use of such slogans as 'the Russian Menace' and 'the danger of Russian Imperialism.'

"History shows that every nation and state in the course of its development endeavors to increase its territorial possessions in the interests of its people. This is a natural tendency and Russia was no exception to the rule. At the same time the territorial expansion of the Russian Empire was a gradual process, the result of the wise and peaceful policy of its monarchs rather than of wars of conquest and aggression.

"Once Russia had obtained the indispensable outlets to the sea and frontiers that guaranteed her security, she sought no further territorial acquisitions. On the contrary, the Russian Empire during the last decades of its existence voluntarily ceded certain territories that were not considered of vital strategic importance.

"It is also relevant to note that Russian expansion had already come to an end when other nations, France, Germany and Great Britain, for example, were still, in the 20th century, seeking their aggrandisement in colonial and other wars.

"Russia has nothing to gain by the conquest or control of territories outside her national frontiers or the oppression of other peoples, some of whom were liberated from foreign domination at the cost of many Russian lives. She certainly did not assist the Bulgarians, Serbs and Rumanians to win their independence in order that a few decades later they would be infamously subjugated by International Communism. The Russian people have no need whatever of Stalin's territorial or political conquests, still less do they desire to oppress other nations. No true Russian can take any pride in the sight of red flags flying over Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Belgrade, Bucharest, Riga, Reval, Kovno, Vienna, or even over the Brandenburg Gate.

"It is not in any country's interest for it to annex foreign territory and subjugate other peoples that have their own age-old history, culture, traditions and language. It is, indeed, dangerous because such violations of legitimate rights invariably create lasting enmities.

"These errors have certainly been frequent in the past; few nations can claim never to have committed any injustice of this kind in the course of their history. For example, Imperial Russia made precisely such a mistake in the case of Poland. It should, however, be remembered that during the First World War Russia promised that

Poland would be granted her independence when hostilities ended. I should sincerely like to be able henceforth to regard this country and all Russia's neighbors as loyal allies in the struggle against the common foe, and I trust that in the future they will no longer live in fear of Russia but will rather consider her as a friend.

"I repeat again that Russia has never had the least intention of dominating Europe or the world. She has no need to acquire or control territories beyond the frontiers that ensure her security. Russia has never desired, and never could desire, to assume the odious role of bogey to the rest of the world which Communism has forced upon her. It is imperative to understand that neither Stalin, Vyshinsky, the Politbureau nor the Communist Party are in any way representative of the true Russia and her people."

The First World War, which occurred at a time when fundamental changes were taking place in the whole structure of Russian life was, unquestionably, one of the main reasons responsible for the downfall of the Empire. Another contributory factor, though equally fateful in its consequences, was the increased activity of the Russian revolutionary bodies powerfully sustained from abroad at a period when the forces of the nation were taxed to the straining point and were centered on a single target, that of winning the war. In the gigantic task of fighting the enemy these forces were all but broken, while the resultant widespread feeling of general lassitude and moral fatigue was largely responsible for the success of skilfully directed revolutionary propaganda. In spite of this it is doubtful if these two factors would by themselves have been powerful enough to foment and consummate the revolution had the political body of the country not been previously undermined by the revolutionary virus and the whole political atmosphere not permeated by a feeling of frustration and disillusionment caused by the heavy sacrifices demanded by

the war. The closer we examine this period of Russian history the more does the all-important link between the revolution and the war become apparent.

Sir Winston Churchill and Professor Charles Sarolea have given us their views on the real causes of the Russian tragedy and, in conclusion, I take the liberty of quoting them somewhat extensively. I must, however, add that their views differ widely from those generally expressed by the many authors who have sought to unravel this baffling problem. By concentrating their attention on the fundamental factors of our national evolution and refusing to be distracted by the apparent and trivial, by setting aside their own political preferences and avoiding so to distort the true perspective of events as to suit the public taste for the vulgar and commonplace, these two men, one the ablest statesman of our age and great historian, the other a man of learning and a high authority on Russia, have been able to discern "the wood from the trees."

Sir Winston Churchill and Professor Sarolea belong to that small group of foreigners, represented in the 19th century in France by F. Le Play, A. Leroy-Beaulieu, in Germany by Haxthausen and in England by MacKenzie Wallace, who, though watching contemporary events in Russia from the outside, or perhaps precisely because of this reason, were able better to assess the interplay of cause and effect than many Russians themselves. From afar they were in a position to grasp impartially the many "*differentiae speciffae*" of Russia and of her crisis.

"Surely to no nation," writes Winston Churchill, "has fate been more malignant than to Russia. Her ship went down in sight of port. She had actually weathered the storm when all was cast away. Every sacrifice had been made; the toil was achieved. Despair and Tyranny usurped command at the very moment when the task was done.

"The long retreats were ended; the munition famine was broken; arms were pouring in; stronger, larger, better equipped armies guarded the immense front; the depots overflowed with strong men. Alexeiev directed the Army and Koltchak the Fleet. Moreover, no difficult action was now required: to remain in presence: to lean with heavy weight upon the far-stretched Teutonic line: to hold without exceptional activity the weakened hostile forces on her front: in a word, to endure—that was all that stood between Russia and the fruits of general victory. Says Ludendorff, surveying the scene at the close of 1916: 'Russia, in particular, produced very strong formations, divisions were reduced to twelve battalions, the batteries to six guns; new divisions were formed out of surplus fourth battalions and the seventh and eighth guns of each battery. This reorganization made a great increase of strength.' (Ludendorff, Vol. I, p. 305)

"It meant in fact that the Russian Empire marshalled for the campaign of 1917 a far larger and better equipped army than that with which she had started the war. In March the Czar was on his throne; the Russian Empire and people stood, the front was safe, and victory certain.

"It is the shallow fashion of these times to dismiss the Czarist régime as a purblind, corrupt, incompetent tyranny. But a survey of its thirty month's war with Germany and Austria should correct these loose impressions and expose the dominant facts. We may measure the strength of the Russian Empire by the battering it endured, by the disasters it had survived, by the inexhaustible forces it had developed, and by the recovery it had made. In the governments of states, when great events are afoot, the leader of the nation, whoever he be, is held accountable for failures and vindicated by success. No matter who wrought the toil, who planned the struggle, to the supreme responsible authority belongs the blame or credit for the result.

"Why should this stern test be denied to Nicholas II? He had made many mistakes, what ruler had not? He was neither a great captain nor a great prince. He was only a true, simple man of average ability, of merciful disposition, upheld in all his daily life by his faith in God. But the brunt of supreme decisions centered upon him. At the summit where all problems are reduced to yea or nay, where events transcend the faculties of men and where all is inscrutable, he had to give the answers. His was the function of the compass-needle. War or no war? Advance or retreat? Right or left? Democratize or hold firm? Quit or persevere? These were the battlefields of Nicholas II. Why should he reap no honour for them? The devoted onset of the Russian armies which saved Paris in 1914; the mastered agony of the munitionless retreat; the slowly regathered forces; the victories of Brussilov; the Russian entry upon the campaign of 1917, unconquered, stronger than ever; has he no share in these? In spite of errors vast and terrible, the régime he personified, over which he presided, to which his personal character gave the vital spark, had at this moment won the war for Russia.

"He is about to be struck down. A dark hand, gloved at first in folly, now intervenes. Exit Czar. Deliver his and all he loved to wounds and death. Belittle his efforts, asperse his conduct, insult his memory: but pause then and tell us who else was found capable. Who or what could guide the Russian State? Men gifted and daring; men ambitious and fierce; spirits audacious and commanding—of these there was no lack. But none could answer the few plain questions on which the life and fame of Russia turned. With victory in her grasp she fell upon the earth, devoured alive, like Herod of old, by worms. But not in vain her valiant deeds. The giant mortally stricken had just time, with dying strength, to pass the torch westwards across the ocean to a new Titan long sunk in doubt who now arose and began ponderously to arm. The Russian

Empire fell on March 16th; on April 6th the United States entered the war." (a)

"If we were to accept the current explanation of the Russian catastrophe" writes Charles Sarolea, "the revolution surprised the Russian Government in a hopeless state of decay, corruption and exhaustion. The reality is entirely different. When the upheaval came, it found the people in a crisis of growth, on a high tide of political reform and economic prosperity. I can well remember my amazement and perplexity when I studied Russian conditions before the war. I had witnessed on a previous visit the terrible disorganization following the Japanese and Civil War. Revisiting the country in 1909, I fully expected to find everywhere traces of the suffering endured in the two terrible years 1904 and 1905. Instead, I observed the most wonderful recovery, a gigantic agrarian reform successfully carried through by the statesman Stolypine; millions of peasants settled in Siberia, industries growing by leaps and bounds, capital flowing into the country, the budget showing an abundant surplus, the population increasing at the rate of three million a year.

"Why then did the collapse come? Why did a prodigious prosperity end in unexampled disaster? Why did the Russian Monarchy fall almost without a struggle? It did not fall because of its inner weakness and corruption. It did not fall because it had outlived its usefulness. It fell because of purely accidental causes which would have brought about the downfall even of the most ideal Western government, if it had been faced with the same ordeal.

"Czarism fell in the first place because of the tragic coincidence that in the greatest political crisis of European history a weak ruler happened to occupy the throne, at the very moment when a strong monarch was most urgently needed. As in the case of the English revolution in the

(a) Winston Churchill. "The World Crisis, 1916-1918" pp. 223-225.

seventeenth century, of the French revolution of 1789, of the second Napoleonic Empire, of the Austrian revolution of 1918, even so in Russia the ruler who was riding the storm happened to be a hen-pecked husband.

"Czarism fell in the second place because an agricultural state was unexpectedly called upon to fight a gigantic industrial war when it had not the material or technical means of carrying on such a war. Even a highly organized community like Great Britain was taken by surprise and found itself short of munitions. Even France had largely to depend on the assistance both of Great Britain and of the United States.

"But whereas Great Britain could depend on the co-operation of the United States, whereas France could depend on the assistance of her British ally, Russia was compelled to struggle in tragic isolation. She was left to her own resources. She had to fight without weapons and munitions. Russia had the right to expect that British sea power would keep open the Dardanelles, and that British industrial power would supply the Russian armies with the means of continuing the war. Great Britain was not able to discharge either of these functions. Through the closing of the Dardanelles, Russia from the beginning, was cut off. Through the British shortage of munitions Russia was faced with military disaster, and military disaster inevitably culminated in a political revolution, even as the military disaster of Sedan culminated in the Paris Commune of 1871. It may therefore justly be said that the Russian monarchy was the vicarious sacrificial victim of the delinquencies of her allies. We often hear it said that Russia failed her allies in their hour of need. The truth is exactly the opposite. It is not Russia who failed her allies. Her allies failed Russia. In fairness to the Russian people it would be well if British and French publicists, who are still denouncing the great Russia Treason of 1917, would remember that it was Europe who left the Russian people

in the lurch in the supreme hour of their national history." (a)

In the preceding pages I have tried to place before the foreign reader a true presentation of the political, social and economic state of Russia before the triumph of the revolution in 1917.

I have endeavored to vindicate Czarism and to dispel some of the preconceived and generally accepted errors on Czarism with which one is so frequently confronted.

If I have succeeded in explaining the true meaning of Russia's historical and traditional form of government and shown some of its achievements, if I have awakened a spirit of unbiased criticism about Russia I shall not have labored in vain.

Is it a mistake to conclude that the entire future of the world increasingly depends upon the solution of the Russian problem?

NOTES

(1) The division of revolutions into two categories, one prompted by criminal ambitions, the other by unfulfilled social aspirations, might at first glance appear fictitious. However, if analyzed, this distinction is shown to be pertinent. Far from being devoid of substance it is based on the evolution of ideas and events in the 19th century.

In the years following the Congress of Vienna the horror inspired by the excesses of the French revolution was such that conservative circles in Europe, governments and liberal public opinion alike, were hostile to any form of popular movement. Any revolution, irrespective of its nature, was regarded as criminal. At the same time an inverse conception, gradually taking shape, resulted toward the middle of the century in the formulation of a precept even more open to criticism. Every revolution was to be henceforth justified, provided it was crowned with success. "The People" could never be wrong. In those days the laws governing mass psychology, later so ably analyzed by Dr. Le Bon, who has been frequently quoted in this work, were as yet unknown, the strange phenomenon of collective suicide, capable of depraving or contaminating entire nations, unheard of. Comparable to a lighted match which,

(a) Professor Charles Sarolea. "The Truth About Imperial Russia." English Review, June, 1925.

if carelessly dropped in an arsenal, can cause the destruction of a city, so a "subversive idea," ably exploited by skillful propaganda and hammered into the minds of the people can undermine the foundations of a state and bring its people to disaster. The ease with which this explosion is brought about largely depends on the degree of susceptibility of the people to demagogic propaganda.

The "subversive idea," which was later to provoke the explosion, was the concrete application of the theory widely preached by successive generations that a revolution, essential in any case, was an indispensable corollary to progress. If a nation had by ill luck avoided a revolution in the past its belated appearance was attributable to the underdeveloped social mentality of the people.

There was thus brought into being the concept of the obligatory socially criminal act directly connected with the state of this development. The generations of Buffon and Goethe placed the existence of God and good in nature as a condition of human evolution, "cultured and consequently better," they said; "more fully developed and therefore ripe for the socially criminal act," argued the leading spirits of a more modern generation. Proceeding on these lines we finally come to Karl Marx, who went a stage further and formulated in precise terms his doctrine based on sophisms.

The experience of the last forty years and the accrued wisdom we have gained gives us Russians, the right, nay the duty, to impress on those nations which, in proud ignorance, have lightly trod this sorry path, the extent of the miseries they have been spared and by which they are at present threatened. For Communism, while always finding willing accomplices in the bosom of every nation and profiting by the assistance it is so generously given, is advancing along a road cleared of obstacles for over three quarters of a century by a doctrine of social disintegration.

As I have said, we have been taught to distinguish between the two types of revolutionary tendencies: those that are permissible and those that are criminal and purely destructive. We wish the rest of the world to profit by this costly lesson.

(2) This remark is in no way contradicted by the generous help given to the starving population of Russia during the years of famine in 1921 and 1922 by the American people through Mr. Herbert Hoover's organization and all the many different forms of succour unattached to politics given at other times by various sources.